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Hybrid security provision and 
democratic practice in Mali
This Malian case study joins an expanding body of literature that challenges 
prevailing state-centred and institutional approaches to both political 
authority and legitimacy. In contrast with classical representations of the 
state as the hierarchically supreme institutional locus of political authority in 
society, a heterarchical political order gradually emerged in Mali. The state 
increasingly operated as one of the institutions amongst many non-state 
equals involved in the exercise of public authority and performance of key 
statehood functions. The first part of this thesis reveals that the Malian state 
increasingly relied on non-state actors to counter recurrent security threats. 
The core part of this case study demonstrates that prominent democratic 
institutions have not enhanced Malian state legitimacy as expected from 
their official mandates and in ways predicted by theory. Quite to the contrary, 
the democratic structure seems to have actually weakened the position of 
the state vis-à-vis non-state power poles in Mali’s heterarchical context. 
Martin van Vliet (1979) studied Cultural Anthropology and Sociology 
of Non-Western Societies at the University of Leiden. He subsequently 
engaged with the Sahel region as programme officer for the Netherlands 
Institute for Multiparty Democracy; as advisor to the Special Representative 
of the Secretary General of the United Nations for Mali and Head of 
MINUSMA; and Sahel Coordinator at the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. During the course of his professional career, he has published 
extensively on democratic, security and governance developments in the 
Sahel and wider African continent. This thesis started as a project in the “IS-
Academy” of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which launched 
this initiative together with several research institutes and universities to 
increase knowledge about the functioning of, amongst others, fragile states.
Front-page image: ® Militants from the Movement for the Salvation of 
Azawad (MSA), a Tuareg political and armed movement gather in the 
desert outside Menaka on March 14, 2020 during the MSA congress. 
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still preferred democracy to authoritarian regime-types, this share dropped by ten percentage 
points between 2008 and 2012. Just over half of the population rejected military rule.4  
 The dramatic collapse of both state authority and democracy sharply contrasted with Mali’s 
international reputation as a relatively stable anchor in a troubled region and a beacon of 
democracy on the African continent. That same year, US Secretary of State Clinton contended: 
 
By most indicators, Mali was on the right path until a cadre of soldiers seized power  a 
little more than a month before national elections were scheduled to be held.5  
 
During an official state visit to the Netherlands months before the crisis erupted, President 
Touré emphasised that Malian democracy provided a vanguard for stability and strong checks 
and balances. In 2007, Mali hosted the prestigious Community of Democracies, a worldwide 
network of more than 100 democratic countries. Mali’s reputation as a posterchild for 
democracy was rooted in the exemplary transition that the country witnessed in the early 
1990s. Then Lieutenant Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré earned his nickname as a “soldier of 
democracy” by guiding the country to multi-party democracy after leading a military coup that 
ended almost 25 years of authoritarian rule. The political space opened up and associational life 
truly blossomed. The number of civil society organisations, media outlets, political parties and 
religious associations rapidly increased while Mali’s democratic leaders respected both civic 
and political rights. During previous decades of authoritarian and predatory rule, the state 
merely served narrow elitist interests. The transition generated a sense of optimism that 
democracy would enhance state performance in the public interest.  
 This positive outlook reflected a much broader trend at the time. Strong popular demand for 
democratisation pushed and shaped many democratic transitions around the world.6 This third 
wave of democratisation, as Huntington famously characterised it, spread-out over Eastern 
Europe, sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere.7 A wind of change blew away one authoritarian 
regime after the other. Some scholars even celebrated the victory of liberal democracy as the 
final form of government of all nations, marking “the end of history.”8 Thus, when Malian state 
	
4 Dulani, B. (2014) ‘Malian Democracy Recovering: Military Rule Still Admired’, Afrobarometer (Policy Paper, 
No.12).	
5 Clinton, H.R. (2012), ‘Remarks on Building Sustainable Partnerships in Africa’, 1 August 2012, University of 
Cheikh Anta Diop, Dakar, Senegal.  
6 Bratton, M. and Van de Walle, N. (1997) Democratic Experiments in Africa. Regime Transitions in Comparative 
Perspective, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
7 Young, C. (1999) ‘The Third Wave of Democratisation in Africa: Ambiguities and Contradictions’, in: Joseph, 
R. State, Conflict, and Democracy in Africa, Boulder, Co and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 






Theoretical and operational framework. Research design and methods. 
 
 From an historical perspective there is nothing particular about ‘state weakness’ in Africa.  
The state is not the only, not the historical and not the most likely form for the exercise of power. 
Ulf Engel and Andreas Mehler (2005)  
Governance in Africa’s New Violent Social Spaces  
 
In all too many cases, democratisation has been a matter of  
replacing a self-appointed dictator with an elected one. 
Claude Aké (2000) 
 The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa
  
 
During 2012, Malian citizens encountered the logic of Murphy’s Law in a most dramatic way 
as an unprecedented series of tragic events unfolded. A secessionist rebellion revived in 
northern Mali, disgruntled soldiers ousted President Amadou Toumani Touré (ATT) while an 
opaque alliance of drug smugglers, radical Islamists and armed groups took control over almost 
two thirds of the national territory. The Malian state has struggled to regain a foothold ever 
since. By 2018, Malian state expenditure reached a mere 20 per cent of the national territory.1 
In the northern and central regions, state authority remained largely confined to isolated urban 
pockets. A wide variety of other power poles, including traditional and religious leaders, local 
militias, armed groups, international military actors, terrorist groups and wealthy smugglers 
exerted their authority across parts of the vast rural areas.  
 The 2012 military coup equally exposed widespread popular frustration with the political 
elites and displayed major challenges related to the democratic regime. In the early 1990s, 
citizens took to the streets to protest against one-party rule despite violent responses and fierce 
repression by state forces. This time around, there was no such popular outcry. In 2012, Malian 
citizens refrained from defending their democratically elected President. On the contrary, a 
survey conducted in the capital city, Bamako, showed that a majority of residents actually 
supported the military coup that ousted President Touré.2 Moreover, less than a third of the 
electorate was satisfied with the way democracy functioned in 2012.3 Although most citizens 
	
1 Craven-Matthews, C. and Englebert, P. (2018) ‘A Potemkin State in the Sahel? The Empirical and the Fictional 
in Malian State Reconstruction’ African Security (11)1: 1-31, p.14. 
2 Whitehouse, B. (2012) ‘Bamako’s Lone Pollster Strikes Again’, 1 June 2012.  
3 Afrobarometer ‘Mali Country Data’, available at: www.afrobarometer.org.  
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democracy’s decay in 2012, received less attention in the literature. This thesis contributes to 
filling that void by analysing how prominent democratic institutions affected state legitimacy 
in the context of Mali’s emerging heterarchical political order. It thereby focuses on three key 
pillars that underpin democracy’s central proposition of legitimising state institutions: political 
participation, representation and accountability. The analysis provided in this thesis is limited 
to the performance of political parties (and the party system), the Malian legislature and local 
democratic institutions in shaping these patterns of political participation, representation and 
accountability. This choice stems from the fact that this thesis is developed based on a set of – 
considerably extended and reworked – individual academic publications focused on these 
specific democratic institutions. Hence, this thesis most certainly does not offer a 
comprehensive analysis of Malian democracy in the run-up to the 2012 crisis and its impact on 
state legitimacy. It rather provides an in-depth analysis of a limited number of influential 
components thereof.  
 The thesis consists of three main sections: (1) the first part provides an historical analysis of 
the gradual emergence of Mali’s heterarchical political order well before the 2012 crisis; (2) 
the second and core section examines the performance of several key democratic institutions 
and their impact upon state legitimacy in the years preceding the 2012 coup; while (3) the third 
and final part examines the anchoring of Mali’s heterarchical order in the aftermath of the crisis.  
 Section 1.2. below presents the overarching research question and ensuing sub-questions 
that guided this thesis in more detail. It also clarifies the conceptual and operational framework. 
First, however, the next section introduces the theoretical outline of this thesis. It clarifies the 
analytical shift away from a state-centred hierarchical political order towards the more diffused 
conceptualisation of a heterarchical order. Moreover, it introduces the theoretical foundations 






authority and democracy collapsed barely twenty years down the line, scholars and 
policymakers alike tried to understand what had gone wrong. A rapidly expanding body of 
literature offered detailed accounts of actual events on the ground9 and focused, amongst others: 
on the revived rebellion and the anchoring of terrorist organisations in northern Mali;10 the high-
value smuggling economy;11 the downfall of Colonel Gadhafi in Libya12 and wider regional 
dynamics;13 the limited potential of centralised statehood in a vast geographical but poor 
economic context;14 major governance challenges;15 or the support provided by international 
donors to domestically contested state institutions and elites.16  
 Several scholars compellingly demonstrated that the developments in Mali reflected nothing 
less than a fundamental departure from the postcolonial order in which the state constituted the 
hierarchically dominant power pole in society.17 In the Malian context, non-state institutions 
increasingly operated as “horizontal contemporaries of the organs of the state.”18 In the absence 
of a clear hegemonic force, a much more heterogeneous “heterarchical political order” emerged 
and prevailed.19 Indeed, the classical notion of a state that obtained a monopoly on the 
legitimate use of force seemed ever further away as armed groups, communal militias, 
international military actors, wealthy traffickers, vigilant youth groups, bandits, terrorist groups 
firmly instituted their authority across Malian territory.  
 However, the functioning of Malian democracy and its impact on state formation (and 
deformation) in that period between the heydays of democracy in the early 1990s and 
	
9 Lecocq, B. and Mann, G. (eds.) (2013) ‘The Blind and the Hippopotamus: A Multivocal Analysis of the Current 
Political Crisis in the Divided Republic of Mali’, Review of African Political Economy (40)137: 343-357; 
Whitehouse, B. (2012) ‘What Went Wrong in Mali?’, London Review of Books, (34)16: 17-18;  
10 Siegel, P.C. (2013) ‘AQIM’s Playbook in Mali’, CTC Sentinel, (6)3: 9-11; Daniel, S. (2012) ‘AQMI al-Qaïda 
au Maghreb islamique, l’industrie de l’enlèvement’, Fayard: France; Boeke, S. (2016) ‘Al Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb: Terrorism, Insurgency, or Organized Crime?’, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 27(5) 914-936. 
11 Lacher, W. (2012) Organised Crime and Conflict in the Sahel-Sahara Region. Washington, DC: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace (Carnegie Paper); Sidibe, K. (2012) ‘Criminal Networks and Conflict-
resolution Mechanisms in Northern Mali’, IDS Bulletin (43)4: 74-88. 
12 March, B. (2017) ‘Brothers Came Back with Weapons: The Effects of Arms Proliferation from Libya’, PRISM, 
6(4): 79-96.  
13 Whitehouse, B. and Strazarri, F. (2015) ‘Introduction: Rethinking Challenges to State Sovereignty in Mali and 
Northwest Africa’, African Security (8)4: 213-226.	
14 Craven-Matthews, C. and Englebert, P. (2018). 
15 ICG (2014) ‘Mali: Reform or Relapse’, 10 January 2014 (Africa report No. 210).  	
16 Bergamaschi, I. (2014) ‘The Fall of a Donor Darling: The Role of Aid in Mali’s Crisis’, The Journal of Modern African 
Studies, 52(3), 347-378; Van de Walle, N. (2012) ‘Foreign Aid in Dangerous Places: The Donors and Mali’s 
Democracy’, United Nations University (Working Paper No. 2012/61). 	
17 Hüsken, T. and Klute, G. (2015) ‘Political Orders in the Making: Emerging Forms of Political Organization 
from Libya to Northern Mali’, African Security, (8)4: 320-337; Whitehouse, B. and Strazarri, F. (2015) .  
18 Ferguson, J. (2004) ‘Power Topographies’, in: D. Nugent and J. Vincent (eds.) A Companion to the Anthropology 
of Politics, pp. 283-399, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing; Ferguson, J. and Gupta, A. (2002) ‘Spatializing States: 
Toward an Ethnography of Neoliberal Governmentality’, American Ethnologist, 29(4): 981-1002.  
19 Hüsken, T. and Klute, G. (2015), p.324. 
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9 Lecocq, B. and Mann, G. (eds.) (2013) ‘The Blind and the Hippopotamus: A Multivocal Analysis of the Current 
Political Crisis in the Divided Republic of Mali’, Review of African Political Economy (40)137: 343-357; 
Whitehouse, B. (2012) ‘What Went Wrong in Mali?’, London Review of Books, (34)16: 17-18;  
10 Siegel, P.C. (2013) ‘AQIM’s Playbook in Mali’, CTC Sentinel, (6)3: 9-11; Daniel, S. (2012) ‘AQMI al-Qaïda 
au Maghreb islamique, l’industrie de l’enlèvement’, Fayard: France; Boeke, S. (2016) ‘Al Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb: Terrorism, Insurgency, or Organized Crime?’, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 27(5) 914-936. 
11 Lacher, W. (2012) Organised Crime and Conflict in the Sahel-Sahara Region. Washington, DC: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace (Carnegie Paper); Sidibe, K. (2012) ‘Criminal Networks and Conflict-
resolution Mechanisms in Northern Mali’, IDS Bulletin (43)4: 74-88. 
12 March, B. (2017) ‘Brothers Came Back with Weapons: The Effects of Arms Proliferation from Libya’, PRISM, 
6(4): 79-96.  
13 Whitehouse, B. and Strazarri, F. (2015) ‘Introduction: Rethinking Challenges to State Sovereignty in Mali and 
Northwest Africa’, African Security (8)4: 213-226.	
14 Craven-Matthews, C. and Englebert, P. (2018). 
15 ICG (2014) ‘Mali: Reform or Relapse’, 10 January 2014 (Africa report No. 210).  	
16 Bergamaschi, I. (2014) ‘The Fall of a Donor Darling: The Role of Aid in Mali’s Crisis’, The Journal of Modern African 
Studies, 52(3), 347-378; Van de Walle, N. (2012) ‘Foreign Aid in Dangerous Places: The Donors and Mali’s 
Democracy’, United Nations University (Working Paper No. 2012/61). 	
17 Hüsken, T. and Klute, G. (2015) ‘Political Orders in the Making: Emerging Forms of Political Organization 
from Libya to Northern Mali’, African Security, (8)4: 320-337; Whitehouse, B. and Strazarri, F. (2015) .  
18 Ferguson, J. (2004) ‘Power Topographies’, in: D. Nugent and J. Vincent (eds.) A Companion to the Anthropology 
of Politics, pp. 283-399, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing; Ferguson, J. and Gupta, A. (2002) ‘Spatializing States: 
Toward an Ethnography of Neoliberal Governmentality’, American Ethnologist, 29(4): 981-1002.  
19 Hüsken, T. and Klute, G. (2015), p.324. 
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Giddens defined the modern state in terms of a:  
  
[p]olitical apparatus – governmental institutions, such as a court, parliament, or congress, 
plus civil service officials – ruling over a given territory, whose authority is backed by a 
legal system and the capacity to use force to implement its policies.26  
 
These formal rules and regulations of the state applied to all citizens, including state 
representatives.27 The hierarchically superior state thus obtained a considerable level of 
autonomy from society and functioned based on impersonal and technocratic lines. State-
society and public-private spheres were functionally distinct.  
 The “Westphalian” state thus obtained a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence in a well-
defined territorial area and emerged as one of the central conceptual building blocks of classical 
political science, international relations and law. The state was separated from society in an 
analytical sense and placed in a hierarchical position “above” society.  
 These ideal-type notions equally emerged as a normative framework to assess the 
performance of states around the world. They set the norm against which many states were 
labelled as “weak” or “fragile” and some received support through internationally sponsored 
state-building initiatives in order to modernise into well-functioning states.  
 Mamdani (1997) fiercely criticised these labels as they sought to “understand the state in 
Africa through an analogy rather than through its own history.”28 Indeed, influential historians 
such as Cooper (2002) and Ellis (2011) contended that this practice reflected a widespread 
pattern of portraying developments on the African continent in terms of “a lack of”, “a failure 
to” or “a distortion of.” 29 In other words, defining developments in terms of deficiencies 
prompted an analysis of what was not happening rather than focusing on what was actually 
occurring across the African continent. The normative stance also implicitly assumed that all 
states eventually emerged into the prototype Westphalian state. Gupta (1995) challenged this 
modernisation discourse and the applicability of the Westphalian conceptual toolkit and state-
centred analytical perspectives for grasping statehood practices beyond the OECD world.30 
	
26 Quotation from Barnett, M. (2006) ‘Building a Republican Peace: Stabilizing States after War’, International 
Security, 30(4): 87-112, p.91. 
27 Schlichte, K. (ed.) (2005) The Dynamics of States: The Formation and Crises of State Dominance, London and 
New York: Routledge. 
28 Mampilly, Z. (2003), p.22. 
29 Ellis, S. (2011) Season of Rains: Africa in the World, London: C. Hurst & Co.; Cooper, F. 2002. Africa since 
1940: The Past of the Present, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
30 Gupta, A. (1995) ‘Blurred Boundaries: The Discourse of Corruption, the Culture of Politics, and the Imagined 
State’, American Ethnologist, (22)2: 375-402, pp. 376-378.  
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1.1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
1.1.1. From a hierarchical to a heterarchical political order  
 
State-centred institutional perspectives 
Many European states managed to expand their influence over other power poles in society and 
gradually emerged as the principal and superior institutional locus of authority. This centrality 
and supremacy of the state was closely linked to the idea of political sovereignty.20 In 1648, the 
treaty of Westphalia formally established the principle of territorial delimitation of state 
authority. While the scope of religious authorities diminished, the internal sovereignty of states 
increased as they obtained the right to rule in an exclusive manner over specific territories.21 In 
this prevailing understanding of the concept, sovereignty referred, 
 
[n]ot to just any political authority but to the authority of states and not just any form of 
state authority, but superior or exclusive, though not necessarily unrestricted, authority.22  
 
Sovereignty thereby avoided an infinite regress or a deadlock between competing authorities. 
It constituted the distinguishing characteristic of the state in this classical – and still prevailing 
– analytical stance.23 Throughout the eighteenth century, numerous European states further 
extended their influence in society and affected the lives of ordinary citizens in a very direct 
manner. The sharp rise of per capita tax revenues during the seventeenth and especially 
eighteenth centuries attested hereto.24 The state managed to expand its dominance over society 
through a body of administrative, legal, extractive and coercive organisations.25 It underpinned 
its supreme authority, as Weber and his academic followers noted, with a monopoly on the 
legitimate use of violence and the ability to extract revenues and govern expenditures through 
a professional “rational-legal” bureaucracy.  
	
20 The term sovereignty is derived from the Latin word superanus, meaning supreme. 
21 See the Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law for an elaborate historical overview, available at:  
https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1472.  
22 Krehof, B. (2008) ‘Legitimate Political Authority and Sovereignty: Why States Cannot be the Whole Story’, 
Res Publica, 14: 283-297. 
23 Mampilly, Z. (2003) ‘Parcellized Sovereignty: The State, Non-State Actors, and the Politics of Conflict in 
Africa’, Ufahamu, (30)1: 15-53. 
24 Karaman, K., and Pamuk, S. (2013) ‘Different Paths to the Modern State in Europe: The Interaction Between 
Warfare, Economic Structure, and Political Regime’, American Political Science Review, 107(3): 603-626. 
25 Evans, P.B., Rueschemeyer, D. and Skocpol, T. (eds.) (1985) Bringing the State Back In, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. Migdal, J.S. (2001) State in Society: Studying how States and Societies Transform and Constitute 
One Another, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
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regime developed bureaucratic structures similar to those encountered on the European 
continent. Yet, Hopkins (2000) nuanced this view based on an extensive review of the 
(historical) literature.35 He emphasised the autonomy of the federal Asante states and the 
personalised, rather than bureaucratised, form of rule. The degree of local autonomy under the 
Maacina Empire was somewhat limited but the Mali Empire, encompassing over 400 cities, 
was bound together in a very loose manner.36 Similarly, in reference to the Tuareg hegemony 
over northern Mali in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, Olivier de Sardan (2012) observed  
 
[…] a very particular kind of hegemony. It was neither centralised nor uniform, and was 
devoid of a common political ambition, of the state or imperial type. No administration, 
even indirect, of the regions and population subject to this hegemony was implemented.37  
 
The role of the colonial period in African history is a topic widely studied and vigorously 
debated. It is certainly beyond the scope of this thesis to provide a comprehensive overview of 
this vast academic field of interest and the perspectives advanced. Nevertheless, a number of 
observations regarding colonialism and state formation are critical by way of introduction.  
 The demarcation of state boundaries by colonial powers, regardless of existing socio-
political and cultural ties, continued to affect state formation processes after independence. This 
certainly proved to be the case in Mali, where several communities in the northern regions 
opposed their inclusion into the colonial state boundaries in the run-up to independence, as 
illustrated in the next chapter. State building efforts instigated by European powers in the 
colonial territories fundamentally differed from the state formation trajectories in their home 
countries. Not only because of the very different objectives that guided the efforts undertaken 
by colonial forces across the African continent, but also as a result of the limited means they 
made available to this end. The colonial project was not about state building per se. Colonialism 
was a process of political competition between European powers who strived for power in 
Europe and elsewhere. Moreover, colonial institutions aimed to extract resources and maximise 
profits at minimum costs.  
	
35 Warner, J. (1999) ‘The Political Economy of  “Quasi-Statehood” and the Demise of 19th-Century African 
Politics’, Review of International Studies, 25(2): 233-255; Hopkins, A.G. (2000), ‘Quasi-States, Weak States and 
the Partition of Africa.’, Review of International Studies, 26(2): 311-320. 
36 Jansen, J. (1995) De Draaiende Put. Een Studie naar de Relatie tussen het Sunjata-epos en de Samenleving in 
de Haut-Niger (Mali), Leiden: Onderzoeksschool CNWS. 
37 Olivier de Sardan, J.-P. (2013) ‘The Tuareg Question in Mali Today’, Cahiers du Mapinduzi, 3(1) 25-39, p. 30. 
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These authors argued that processes of state formation (and deformation) were open-ended 
processes that varied across space and time. Polities did not progress along some single road 
towards modernity. Studying the historical trajectories of statehood was therefore critical. 
 
Historical trajectories of statehood 
This Malian case study contributes to a growing body of literature that challenges the universal 
validity of a state-centred perspective that constituted “the bedrock of the study of comparative 
politics since at least the beginning of the twentieth century.”31 Chapter 2 provides an historical 
overview of the gradual emergence of a heterarchical political order in Mali. This model sharply 
contrasts with ideal notions of the hierarchically supreme Westphalian state presented here 
above. This section provides a number of general observations about historical state formation 
processes across the African continent – in all its diversity – that emerge from the literature. 
The next chapter assesses the specificities of the Malian case in more detail.   
 First, geographical, economic, environmental and sociocultural factors all significantly 
affected the historical trajectory of state formation and deformation across the African 
continent. The challenging physical environment often made it very costly to extend authority 
into the rural hinterland. Herbst (2000) noted that the abundance of land combined with low 
population density prompted a form of statehood that prioritised control over people instead of 
land.32 State authority was concentrated in populated centres but decreased towards the 
peripheries. High levels of mobility of both goods and people further constrained the rise of 
centralised polities.33 The Sahel-Sahara region constituted a geographical zone where it proved 
to be particularly challenging to sustain clear-cut boundaries or centralised sovereign entities.34 
 Decentralised forms of authority thus prevailed across the African continent. Although vast 
empires emerged across Northwest Africa, such as the Ghana (originating in the fourth or fifth 
century), Mali (thirteenth century), Songhai (fifteenth century), Asante (seventeenth-–late 
nineteenth century) and Maacina empires (nineteenth century), local power holders maintained 
a large degree of autonomy under these structures. Warner (1999) contended that the Asante 
	
31 Migdal, J.S. (2001) State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
32 Herbst, J. (2000) ‘States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control’, Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
33 Mbembe, A. (2000) ‘At the Edge of the World: Boundaries, Territoriality, and Sovereignty in Africa’, Public 
Culture, 12 (1): 259-284; Garcia, R. V. and Spitz, P. (1986) The Roots of Catastrophe: The 1972 Case History, 
vol. 3, London: Pergamon Press; Boesen, E. Marfaing, L. and De Bruijn, M. (2014) ‘Nomadism and Mobility in 
the Sahara-Sahel: Introduction’, Canadian Journal of African Studies, 48(1): 1-12. 
34 Raineri, L. and Strazzari, F. (2015) ‘State, Secession, and Jihad: The Micropolitical Economy of Conflict in 
Northern Mali’, African Security, (8)4: 249-271.  
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practices whereby sovereignty had to be earned. […] The notion that Africa was ever 
composed of sovereign states classically defined as having a monopoly on force in the 
territory across their boundaries is false.40  
 
The position that sovereignty was not necessarily “earned” in the case of many African 
countries did not do justice to the courageous independence struggle and the sacrifices many 
people made. Moreover, Brown (2013) aptly nuanced strong propositions about African state 
sovereignty by distinguishing sovereignty “rights” and “authority”.41 The first related to the 
claims of a state to rule over a given country and the latter to its ability to act and to control 
particular outcomes across its territory. He underlined that sovereignty rights of African states 
mattered. International donors, for example, could not simply bypass the African state and their 
governments. Nevertheless, state authority and the ability to implement policies was indeed 
highly restricted. At independence, many African states obtained “legal sovereignty”, referring 
to their right to external non-interference and their official position as principal internal 
authority. Yet, their “political sovereignty”, in terms of their ability to actually satisfy such 
claims was limited. Indeed, the external recognition of statehood at independence had “little or 
nothing to do with how effective, strong or legitimate a particular type of local statehood” was.42 
Many non-state actors continued to play a major – and sometimes leading role – in shaping 
statehood practices in interaction with or besides the state. In the context of such hybrid political 
orders, conceptual boundaries between state and society, formal and informal institutions and 
the public and private sphere remained highly blurred, as the next section further illustrates.  
 
Hybrid political orders 
Independence gave birth to African states who, in many cases, depended on non-state actors to 
enforce authority and implement policies. The state “had to share authority, legitimacy and 
capacity with other structures.”43 Gupta (1995) contended that the “conventional distinction 
between state and society, on which such a large portion of the scholarship on the state is based,” 
needed to be re-examined as boundaries between the categories were fundamentally blurred.44 
	
40 Herbst, J. (1996) ‘Responding to State Failure in Africa’, International Security, 21(3), 120-144, p. 121.   
41 Brown, W. (2012) ‘Sovereignty Matters: Africa, Donors, and the Aid Relationship’, African Affairs, 112(447): 
262-282, p. 268. 
42	Doornbos, M. (2010) ‘Researching African Statehood Dynamics: Negotiability and Its Limits’, Development 
and Change 41(4): 747-769, p. 758.	
43 Boege, V., Brown, A., Clements, K. and Nolan, A. (2008) On Hybrid Political Orders and Emerging States: 
State Formation in the Context of ‘Fragility’, Berlin: Berghoff Foundation, p. 10. 
44 Gupta, A. (1995), p. 376. 
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The colonial administration therefore concentrated its presence in areas of economic interest. 
The state bureaucracy did not reach far out or deep into the hinterlands of the African 
continent.38 An important legacy of the colonial period, Mandani (1996) noted, was the 
“bifurcated nature” of the state that ensued from the very different types of rule between urban 
and rural areas: 
 
Debated as alternative models of controlling natives in the early colonial period, direct 
and indirect rule actually evolved into complementary ways of native control. Direct rule 
was the form of urban civil power. It was about the exclusion of natives from civil 
freedoms guaranteed to citizens in civil society. Indirect rule, however, signified a rural 
tribal authority. It was about incorporating natives into a state enforced customary order.39  
 
Indeed, colonial states relied heavily on informal non-state authorities to administer the rural 
areas and to control vast territories at minimal costs. The degree of autonomy of these local 
leaders vis-à-vis the colonial forces differed from one place to the other. Yet, the impact of this 
system of indirect rule was felt almost everywhere. The position of local customary chiefs 
altered into that of an intermediary role between people at the local level and a superior colonial 
authority. Local chiefs expanded their regional authority as a result of their connections to the 
state administration. Colonial authorities collaborated with specific local chiefs and factional 
leaders to the detriment of others, thereby evoking tensions and altering local power balances. 
 The colonial state administration and francophone education sector further enhanced the 
‘bifurcated’ character of statehood. Those small and predominantly urban sections in society 
educated in French and obtaining positions in the colonial administration would come to play 
a leading role in the postcolonial state after independence. The urban-rural divide developed 
into one of the principal cleavages in political, economic and socio-cultural terms. 
 As the decolonisation process unfolded, new African states emerged that rapidly obtained 
international recognition. In this context, Herbst (1996) contended: 
 
 [The] United Nations grant of sovereignty by administrative fiat, simply because a 
country had achieved independence, was a revolutionary departure from traditional 
	
38 Frankema, E. and Van Waijenburg, M. (2013) ‘Endogenous Colonial Institutions: Lessons from Fiscal Capacity 
Building in British and French Africa, 1880-1940’, Lund: Lund University, Department of Economic History 
(African Economic History Working Papers, No.11).  
39 Mamdani, M. (1996) Citizen and Subject, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p.18. 
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practices whereby sovereignty had to be earned. […] The notion that Africa was ever 
composed of sovereign states classically defined as having a monopoly on force in the 
territory across their boundaries is false.40  
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The colonial administration therefore concentrated its presence in areas of economic interest. 
The state bureaucracy did not reach far out or deep into the hinterlands of the African 
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It was in this latter “realm of symbolic production,” as Bourdieu contended, “that the grip of 
the state is felt most powerfully.”53 However, Doornbos (2010) underlined that “ingredients for 
common national myths at the level of the post-colonial African state [were] limited.”54 
Linkages in terms of shared commonalities and relevant symbols were indeed often poorly 
developed at the time of independence. Boege et al. (2008) noted: 
  
In many of the newly independent states there was no history of pre-colonial unitary rule 
and people did not have a tradition of national identification; only few of these states 
shared one common language and one common culture.55  
 
In the case of Mali, Lecocq (2010) revealed a strong tendency of state authorities to tap into 
historical narratives and symbols of specific southern communities in representations of the 
postcolonial state and the construction of a national identity.56 Moreover, he illustrated that 
Tuareg leaders constructed an alternative nation in contrast to the one promulgated by state 
representatives. Two, if not more, nations were thus being constructed in opposition to one 
another. This is not to suggest a static interpretation of nationhood or identity, which are always 
multi-layered and subject to processes of constant deconstruction and reconstruction. People 
are related to a wide variety of (imagined) communities, in the religious realm, as members of 
nations, local communities, factions and status groups within these communities and tied 
together through many other perceived bonds of affiliation. These different layers overlap or 
conflict with one another and their interaction changes over time.  
 Nonetheless, in the context of a hybrid political order, the analytical perspective moves away 
from state legitimacy towards public legitimacy by focusing on the interplay, in either a 
mutually reinforcing or undermining manner, “between actors having more or less access to 
more or less powerful public resources of legitimation.”57 Multiple actors co-exist that may be 
competing over legitimacy from differentiated sources of power. Sears (2007) referred to Mali’s 
“triple heritage” of indigenous, religious and Western-democratic aspects of struggles for 
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Institutions of public authority operated in the “twilight between the state and society.”45 In 
their edited volume, Bellagamba and Klute (2008) demonstrated that no single institution 
exercised domination across the African continent and illustrated that “hybrid governance 
practices” prevailed. “The state within society only materialises through constant 
confrontations with other power poles.” 46 Likewise, Hagmann and Péclard (2010) emphasised 
the impact of multiple power poles “that exist within, at the interface, and outside of the 
bureaucratic apparatus” upon actual governance practices.47 Statehood was thus “negotiated” 
in constant interactions between state and non-state institutions, constructively reinforcing one 
another, in some cases, or being in outright competition in others.48 Public authority was thereby 
(re)conceptualised as a relational force that was not restricted to the confines of the state.49  
 In other words, the focus on state authority – long taken as a normative reference for 
processes of statehood formation in very different contexts – evolved into public authority that 
involved both state and non-state actors. The supremacy of the state should therefore not be a 
priori assumed as “the exercise of authority is both multidimensional and multi-attributive.”50 
Moving away from a state monopoly on the use of violence, Whitehouse and Strazzari (2015) 
stipulated that public security provision across vast parts of the Sahel and the wider northwest 
African region involved several state and non-state actors.51  
 Beyond these physical and material aspects of statehood, which focused on the state as a set 
of institutions and practices, the idea of the state – how it was represented in society and how 
the nation was constructed – constituted important dimensions of statehood. Ruigrok (2011) 
underlined that the inscription of a shared history and the use of public rituals provided states 
with historical aura and local meaning.52 States constantly defined and redefined customs, 
symbols and rituals as national characteristics in order to underpin their national sovereignty.  
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Likewise, Ferguson (2004) emphasised that non-state institutions increasingly operated as 
“horizontal contemporaries of the organs of the state.”62 The notion of heterarchy thereby 
provides a suitable analytical lens to depict the equitable power balance between state and non-
state actors that prevailed in Mali by the end of 2018. Section 1.2. below operationalises the 
term in more detail by way of introduction to Chapter 2, which traces the historical roots of 
Mali’s heterarchical political order. 
 In conclusion, the post-colonial African state often remained a far cry from the ideal notions 
that underpinned the Westphalian state. In practice, hybrid political orders emerged and the 
state shared key statehood functions with non-state actors across society, including religious 
leaders, local militias or traditional chiefs. In some cases, state and non-state power poles even 
developed into “horizontal contemporaries” as an inherently unstable hetarchical political order 
emerged over time. However, several scholars also criticised the classification of political 
orders as “hybrid”. Two points of critique stand out in particular. The conceptualisation of 
political orders as “hybrid” emerged in response to the labelling of statehood dynamics as 
“fragile” or “weak” based on normative (Western) statehood practices. Certainly in its initial 
phases, the hybrid analytical perspective favoured a “more positive outlook” by emphasising 
the “strength” and “resilience” of non-state governance rather than the “weakness” of the 
state.63 While Meagher (2012) acknowledged the increased role of non-state actors in hybrid 
security arrangements across Africa, she also questioned the (at times implicit) assumption that 
non-state actors were necessarily more legitimate or effective compared to state institutions.64 
She rightfully argued that popular perceptions about any attempt, either by state or non-state 
actors, to institute authority should be empirically assessed rather than a priori assumed.  
 A second point of critique concerned the risk of portraying dynamic statehood processes as 
too static simply by depicting them as “hybrid”. Defining the interplay between formal and 
informal institutions should be the starting point for further empirical analysis rather than a final 
analytical verdict. Otherwise, the term hybrid evolves into a catch-all concept with little 
analytical value. Examining how interactions between state and non-state actors or institutions 
evolve over time is therefore crucial. This thesis has adopted such a longer-term perspective 
focused on historical patterns of both change and continuity, as section 1.2. reveals.  
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legitimacy.58 Likewise, Raineri and Strazzari (2015) demonstrated that non-state actors 
projected increasingly powerful alternative “geopolitical imaginaries” beyond the socio-
political construct of the nation.59 These actors advanced secessionist, jihadist or highly 
localised ethnic idioms and symbols in an attempt to legitimise their authority in specific 
territories across the northern and central regions.  
 Clearly, overlapping or competing webs of narratives and the construction of sociopolitical 
communities either in line or at odds with the nation thus characterised Mali’s hybrid political 
order. Scholars proposed many different ways to conceptualise the plurality of power poles 
engaged in instituting and legitimising their authority in the context of a hybrid political order. 
Mampilly (2003) referred to “parcellised sovereignty” to depict a situation in which non-state 
actors in areas de-linked from the power of the state (often as a result of conflict) claimed a 
form of sovereignty.60 Such representation is problematic because, as noted in the above, the 
legal dimension of sovereignty is not parcellised or shared between state and non-state actors.  
 This thesis follows Hüsken and Klute (2015) and their conceptualisation of a “heterarchical” 
hybrid order because it aptly grasps the absence of a hierarchical power relation between state 
and non-state actors encountered in the Malian context.  A key feature of the Westphalian state 
constituted its hierarchically superior position vis-à-vis other power poles in society. The state 
was on top, and so it should be. The hegemony of the state provided a certain stability to the 
political order. The alternative to such hierarchical political order was anarchy. Hüsken and 
Klute (2015) situated heterarchy somewhere in the middle of that scale between hierarchy and 
anarchy. It reflected a political order in which none of the actors, state or non-state, obtained 
the position of an overarching hegemonic force.  
 
A heterarchical order, they noted, was characterised by:  
 
The mutable as well as unstable intertwining of state and non-state orders and the plurality 
of competing power groups.61  
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Local kingpins in the high-value smuggling economy emerged as influential powerbrokers as 
they boosted their resource basis and established well-armed militias to protect their interests. 
The relationship between power, conflict, accumulation and criminality thereby strongly 
influenced the trajectory of political order in this part of the world. A phenomenon already 
noted by the authors of the seminal publication “The Criminalization of the State in Africa” 
decades ago.69 These transnational networks clearly challenged prevailing state-centred 
conceptions of sovereignty, territoriality and citizenship while reinforcing the diffused and 
heterarchical patterns of statehood. Bøås (2015) aptly depicted Mali’s northern regions as a 
geographical area characterised by overlapping and competing networks that were “neither 
entirely state nor non-state, local or global, but somewhere in between.”70  
 In sum, this concise theoretical outline revealed an analytical move away from state 
authority and legitimacy in a hierarchical political order towards more hybrid forms of public 
authority and legitimacy in a heterarchical order. It is in such a context that democracy was 
expected to reinforce state legitimacy. The next section first clarifies the conceptual foundations 
of democracy’s contribution to state legitimacy and subsequently introduces key aspects of the 
institutional, political, societal and international context in which democratisation transpired 
across the African continent.  
 
1.1.2. Democratisation in the context of a heterarchical order   
 
Democratisation influences processes of state formation in multiple and complex ways. This 
thesis focuses on key elements of one of the most central propositions of democracy, i.e. that it 
constitutes a political system based on popular consent rather than coercion.  
 State legitimacy, following Weber, entailed the acceptance of power and voluntary 
compliance of citizens with state domination. A normative, procedural and state-centred 
analytical perspective long underpinned prevailing notions of legitimacy. The only state that is 
legitimate, Fukuyama contended, is a democratic one.71 This analytical stance chimes with the 
prevailing conceptualisations of state authority as presented in the previous section. According 
to these state-centred views, Andersen (2012) noted: 
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This thesis follows Doornbos (2010), who noted that the hybrid model of negotiated statehood:  
 
[o]ffers a much-needed corrective to prevailing Weberian state notions and black and 
white dichotomies like state and non-state, or many discussions in terms of state failure.65  
 
Yet, empirical research must take into account popular perceptions about hybrid practices and 
allow for a dynamic approach that assesses changes in the interaction between state and non-
state actors over time. The following and final part of this section briefly highlights the profound 
impact of transnational networks upon hybrid governance practices.  
 
Transnationalism fuelling heterarchy  
Long-distance networks historically secured the economic, social and political survival of 
Saharan towns. In this part of the world, Scheele (2012) noted, places exist as the result of 
permanent movement.66 Human mobility and commodity circulation have always been critical 
elements of local survival strategies.67 The “local” cannot be conceived without considering 
long-distance interconnections and interdependencies.  
 Several transnational networks have increasingly influenced Mali’s political order in recent 
decades. These networks ranged from international aid, high-value smuggling networks, a 
lucrative kidnapping industry, terrorist networks or international military operations. Both state 
and non-state actors tapped into and relied significantly on these and other transnational 
networks to extract resources that enabled them to underpin and expand their authority. Bøås 
and Strazzari (2020) noted that a “plurality of rent-seeking opportunities” became available for 
local politicians and entrepreneurs beyond the state.68 Non-state actors thereby managed to 
reinforce their authority in the context of Mali’s heterarchical political order because their 
dependence on state-provided resources decreased. Transnational ties thus considerably 
affected the power balance between state and non-state actors.  
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66 Scheele, J. (2012) ‘Garage or Caravanserail: Saharan Connectivity in Al-Khalil, Northern Mali’, in: McDougall, 
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in the Making’, The International Spectator, 55(4):1-17, p. 5. 
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Local kingpins in the high-value smuggling economy emerged as influential powerbrokers as 
they boosted their resource basis and established well-armed militias to protect their interests. 
The relationship between power, conflict, accumulation and criminality thereby strongly 
influenced the trajectory of political order in this part of the world. A phenomenon already 
noted by the authors of the seminal publication “The Criminalization of the State in Africa” 
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Likewise, Scharpf (2007) noted that analytical perspectives on state legitimacy in modern, 
Western polities tend to: 
 
[f]ocus on institutional arrangements ensuring democratic participation, the    
accountability of governors, and safeguards against the abuses of governing powers.76  
 
This thesis primarily assesses patterns of citizens’ mobilisation, interest representation and 
accountability ties provided through: (1) the party system; (2) the legislature; and (3) 
democratic institutions at the local level. Both political party representatives and 
parliamentarians mobilise people into the democratic process. They equally play a unique, dual  
role in shaping accountability. They are individually held accountable by citizens along vertical 
lines but, in turn, collectively hold the executive to account at the horizontal level. The analysis 
provided in the core part of this thesis thus explores the contribution of these democratic 
institutions to enhancing Malian state legitimacy. This analytical scope is, however, restricted 
in two important ways.  
 Firstly, the assessment of these democratic institutions paints only part of the overall state 
legitimacy picture. State legitimacy certainly does not solely depend on the democratic 
processes that connect citizens to the state, based on which decisions are made or leaders are 
elected (“input legitimacy”).77 It hinges in no small part on the actual performance of state 
institutions and representatives (“output legitimacy”). The assessment of the different 
democratic institutions provided in this thesis therefore does not allow us to draw conclusions 
about the overall level of Malian state legitimacy but merely on democracy’s contribution to 
state legitimacy.  
 Secondly, the thesis is centred on prominent but relatively few political mechanisms that 
shape political participation, representation and accountability ties. Other broader – societal, 
judicial, bureaucratic, financial – forms are touched upon in the individual chapters but certainly 
not assessed in a structured manner. Therefore, the analysis presented in this thesis merely 
provides an in-depth study of the performance of a limited number of democratic institutions 
and their impact on state legitimacy rather than a comprehensive assessment. 
 
	
76 Scharpf, F.W. (2007) ‘Reflections on Multilevel Legitimacy’, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, 
Cologne, July 2007 (MPIfG Working Paper 07/3). 
77 Scharpf, F. W. (1999) Governing in Europe: Effective and democratic?, Oxford: Oxford University Press; idem 
(1997) ‘Economic Integration, Democracy and the Welfare State’, Journal of European Public Policy, 4:18-36.	
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Legitimacy can be objectively assessed by looking at the presence of certain defining 
features or properties at the institutional state level.72  
 
The literature links this “legitimising impact” of democracy upon state institutions to three key 
concepts: (1) participation; (2) representation; and (3) accountability (see Figure 2  below). 
 As a political system that requires a government by the people and of the people, both 
participation and representation constitute two central components of democracy’s 
contribution to state legitimacy.73 Mobilising citizens and representing their interests, in a direct 
or indirect manner, are indeed critical building blocks of a political system that aims to connect 
people’s preferences with actual policy choices. Ensuring inclusiveness is crucial if that system 
is to adequately reflect the popular will. Persistently low levels of popular participation, in 
general or amongst specific groups in society, thus hollows out state legitimacy.  
 Accountability constitutes a third key pillar of democracy’s contribution to state legitimacy. 
In any representative democracy, people are only periodically mobilised and decision-making 
powers are transferred from ordinary citizens to a governing body. Precisely for that reason, 
mechanisms must be in place that compel rulers to inform, explain and justify their actions 
(answerability), while empowering citizens to impose sanctions (enforceability), ultimately by 
removing those in power. 74 These two core dimensions of accountability ties are shaped: (1) 
along vertical lines between those who govern and ordinary citizens; and (2) along horizontal 
lines amongst the different branches of government. Olsen (2013) underlined this relation 
between representation and accountability: 
 
Those acting on behalf of the community and on authority and resources embedded in 
public office are accountable to citizens. […] Office-holders are assumed to be more 
likely to act in the public interest when they are accountable to the governed – that is, 
when they have to explain and justify their behaviour and performance in public and face 




73 Schmidt, V. (2010) ‘Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union Revisited: Output, Input and 
Throughput’, November 2010, Kolleg-Forschergruppe Freie Universität Berlin (Working Paper Series, No. 21).  
74 Lindberg, S. (2013) ‘Mapping Accountability: Core Concept and Subtypes’, International Review of 
Administrative Sciences’, 79(2): 202-226.  
 
75 Olsen, J.P. (2013) ‘The Institutional Basis of Democratic Accountability’, West European Politics, 36(3): 447-
473, p. 454. 
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Yet, political trends across the African continent continued to reveal the limitations of too great 
an emphasis on elections (e.g. the “electoral fallacy”) as the principal driver of democratisation. 
Scholars noted an: 
 
Unprecedented growth in the number of political regimes that were neither clearly 
democratic nor conventionally authoritarian.80  
 
A whole set of sub-categories of regime types emerged in the literature that ranged from liberal 
democracies, electoral democracies, ambiguous semi-democracies and competitive or 
hegemonic autocracies. Both “electoral democracies” and “competitive authoritarian regimes” 
prevailed in Africa.81 These regime sub-types both tolerated minimal democratic standards (to 
varying degrees) but concentrated political power strongly in the hands of executive presidents. 
Significant areas of decision-making remained beyond the control of other elected officials.  
 It was in this context that Carothers (2002) proclaimed the end of the “democratic transition 
paradigm” by the turn of the millennium. He contested the – often implicit – assumption that 
countries moved through similar stages after a democratic transition towards a predestined end 
goal of democratic consolidation.82 In reality, many democracies seemed lost in transition and 
authoritarian patterns displayed a high level of continuity throughout the democratic era.  
Several studies exposed severe institutional obstacles to effective accountability mechanisms 
vis-à-vis the executive branch of government in many of the “third wave democracies.” A 
comparative study conducted by Van Cranenburgh (2008) revealed particularly high levels of 
institutionally anchored presidential powers in 30 African countries, compared to electoral 
democracies in other parts of the world.83 Kapstein and Converse (2009) showed that 
constraining executive power increased the probability of democratic survival. Their 
comparative research suggested that democracy did not easily take root in those places where 





80 Diamond, L.J. (2012) ‘Thinking about Hybrid Regimes’, Journal of Democracy, 30(2): 21-35. 
81 Haggard, S. and Kaufman, R.R. (2016) ‘Democratisation During the Third Wave’, Annual Review of Political 
Science, 19: 125-144; Bratton, M. (2004).  
82 Carothers, T. (2002) ‘The End of the Transition Paradigm’, Journal of Democracy, 13(1); 5-21. 
83 Van Cranenburgh, O. (2008) ‘Big Men’s Rule: Presidential Power, Regime Type and Democracy in 30 African 
Countries’, Democratisation, 15(5): 952-973.  











Figure 2: Key components of democracy’s impact upon state legitimacy 
 
Without pretending to offer a comprehensive overview, the following section introduces key 
factors that shaped the context in which patterns of political participation, representation and 
accountability transpired on the African continent subsequent to the third wave of 
democratisation. This thesis thereby complements well-known institutional factors with socio-
cultural dimensions of democratisation that prevail in the literature.   
 
Institutional and political context  
Initially, studies on democratisation strongly or solely focused on elections. This approach was 
rooted in Schumpeter’s procedural definition of democracy as a decision-making process 
through elections. Huntington (1991) even considered two peaceful transfers of power in 
successive elections, the so-called two-turnover test, as an indicator of satisfactory democratic 
consolidation.78 The Mali case clearly revealed the limitations of such minimal procedural 
definition. The country was only months away from a second democratic turnover in the run-
up to the 2012 elections when democracy completely collapsed instead of consolidating.  
More generally, an Afrobarometer survey revealed that citizens across the African continent 
continued to display high levels of dissatisfaction with the quality of elections as mechanisms 
of representation and accountability.79 As ruling elites appeared to orchestrate elections to their 
advantage, scholars broadened the scope of research by focusing on the “enabling environment” 
of electoral competition. They assessed, amongst others, whether the electoral process provided 
equal access to citizens, a level playing field for the competitors and the extent to which 
authorities respected political and civic rights.  
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appointed personnel or state agencies to the local level, with continued reporting lines to central 
state institutions. The latter – embraced in Mali in the 1990s – constituted a real transfer of 
authority, responsibilities and resources to more autonomous subnational layers of government. 
Municipal authorities obtained substantial discretionary authority in several policy areas. On 
paper, devolution changed the intra-state power balance between central and local tiers of 
government considerably. In practice, “decentralisation in Africa has been widespread but not 
deep” and research revealed the continued dominance of central government:89   
 
The main conclusion that emerges from African decentralisation experience is that 
governments have, on the whole, been reluctant to decentralise sufficient power to local level 
governments to enable them to have significant impact on local service delivery.90 
 
In sum, highly centralised institutional and political characteristics continued to characterise 
many African democracies despite the democratic transition and decentralisation reforms.  
 
Socio-cultural context 
This thesis assesses citizens’ mobilisation and interest representation by Malian political 
institutions around prevailing social cleavages such as class, religion, ethnicity and the urban-
rural divide. Even so, the emerging literature revealed a notorious lack of programmatic 
differences amongst political parties and policy debates during electoral campaigns.91 Gyimah-
Boadi’s (2007) view captured the wider stance that: 
 
Contrary to what conventional political theory prescribes, [political parties] are hardly 
conceived and developed as mechanisms for representation, conflict resolution, opposition 
and accountability, or institutionalisation of democratic behaviour and attitudes. The 
continent’s parties are largely conceived and organised as vehicles for capturing the state.92  
 
	
89 Cabral, L. (2011) ‘Decentralisation in Africa: Scope, Motivations and Impact on Service Delivery and Poverty’, 
Overseas Development Institute, March 2011 (Working Paper No. 020).  
90 Conyers, D. (2007) ‘Decentralisation and Service Delivery: Lessons from Sub-Saharan Africa’, IDS Bulletin 
38(1): 18-32, p.24. 
91 See: Walle, N. van de. and Butler, K.S. (1999) ‘Political Parties and Party Systems in Africa’s Illiberal 
Democracies’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 13(1): 14-28. 
92 Gyimah-Boadi, E. (2007) ‘Political Parties, Elections and Patronage: Random Thoughts on Neo-Patrimonialism 
and African Democratisation’, in: Votes, Money and Violence Political Parties and Elections in Sub-Saharan 
Africa’, Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet / Kwalzula-Natal: University Press, p.25. Also see: Randall, V. and 
Svåsand, L. (2002) ‘Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Africa’, Democratisation, 9(3): 30-52. 
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These views all echoed Aké’s (1996, 2000) earlier well-known posture: 
 
Even in the era of democratisation, African constitutions give far too much power to the 
presidency, sometimes to the point of constituting it virtually as a dictatorship. In all too 
many cases, democratisation has been a matter of replacing a self-appointed dictator with 
an elected one.85 
 
The concentration of power in the executive branch obviously affected accountability ties vis-
à-vis other branches of government at the horizontal level. Based on an extensive review of the 
literature, Nijzink et al. (2006) concluded: 
 
Powerful presidents seem to be one of the most important reasons why modern parliaments 
in Africa are generally regarded as weak institutions.86  
 
Equally, the electoral system in place constituted another important institutional factor shaping 
patterns of political mobilisation, representation and accountability ties.87 Systems based on 
proportional representation generally produced higher voter turnout figures. Accountability ties 
between citizens and political representatives tended to be more direct and personal in 
constituency-based electoral systems. The possibility of holding individual parties accountable 
in systems of proportional representation (and coalition governments) were more restricted. 
Many party systems that emerged after the democratic transition also constrained patterns of 
accountability across the African continent. In great contrast to most democracies elsewhere, 
one-party dominance emerged and prevailed in a considerable number of African 
democracies.88 This political trend indeed eroded the potential for horizontal accountability.  
 Institutional reforms undertaken in the area of decentralization were of particular interest in 
such highly centralised political contexts. Amidst the many definitions and dimensions, two 
forms stood out: deconcentration and devolution. The former entailed a transfer of centrally 
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(12)3-4: 311-335, p.317. 
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These views all echoed Aké’s (1996, 2000) earlier well-known posture: 
 
Even in the era of democratisation, African constitutions give far too much power to the 
presidency, sometimes to the point of constituting it virtually as a dictatorship. In all too 
many cases, democratisation has been a matter of replacing a self-appointed dictator with 
an elected one.85 
 
The concentration of power in the executive branch obviously affected accountability ties vis-
à-vis other branches of government at the horizontal level. Based on an extensive review of the 
literature, Nijzink et al. (2006) concluded: 
 
Powerful presidents seem to be one of the most important reasons why modern parliaments 
in Africa are generally regarded as weak institutions.86  
 
Equally, the electoral system in place constituted another important institutional factor shaping 
patterns of political mobilisation, representation and accountability ties.87 Systems based on 
proportional representation generally produced higher voter turnout figures. Accountability ties 
between citizens and political representatives tended to be more direct and personal in 
constituency-based electoral systems. The possibility of holding individual parties accountable 
in systems of proportional representation (and coalition governments) were more restricted. 
Many party systems that emerged after the democratic transition also constrained patterns of 
accountability across the African continent. In great contrast to most democracies elsewhere, 
one-party dominance emerged and prevailed in a considerable number of African 
democracies.88 This political trend indeed eroded the potential for horizontal accountability.  
 Institutional reforms undertaken in the area of decentralization were of particular interest in 
such highly centralised political contexts. Amidst the many definitions and dimensions, two 
forms stood out: deconcentration and devolution. The former entailed a transfer of centrally 
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Scholars differed about the relative weight of patrimonial forms of domination in relation to 
official state structures. Chabal and Daloz (1999) contended that patrimonial forms determined 
political dynamics. Political elites and state officials merely instrumentalised their positions in 
the state apparatus to distribute public resources amongst their personal networks. The 
representation of particularistic interests persistently surpassed and trumped public service 
delivery in the national interest. Based on his extensive study of Nigerian politics, Daloz (2003, 
2005) also portrayed patterns of “patrimonial rule” as the “principal mode of legitimation.”  
Yet, others contended that the state administration was more than a mere façade. The “neo-
patrimonialist” concept connected the Westphalian “rational-legal” type of domination with the 
“patrimonial” form in an analytical sense. Engel and Erdman (2007) defined neo-
patrimonialism as: 
 
The mixture of two co-existing, partly interwoven, types of domination: namely, 
patrimonial and legal-rational bureaucratic domination.99  
 
Exactly how the balance between “rational-legal” and “patrimonial” forms of domination 
played out in different contexts was simply a matter of empirical enquiry. The combination of 
strong powers vested in the presidency and patrimonial forms of domination enabled political 
elites to remain in power for a prolonged period in many countries across the continent. Indeed, 
both factors appeared to significant in terms of the relative “political stasis” (e.g. the lack of 
renewal of political elites), which Bleck and Van de Walle (2018) observed in their analysis of 
electoral politics on the continent since the 1990s.100  
 While patrimonialism was widely recognised as a key factor shaping patterns of political 
representation and accountability in many African polities, it was also criticised and nuanced. 
Several empirical studies convincingly challenged its one-dimensional focus on the exchange 
of public resources in private networks as the sole – or at least primary – anchor of interest 
representation and accountability ties. The patrimonial framework tended to ignore or at least 
underestimate broader factors underpinning authority. Nugent (2001), for example, 
demonstrated the need for Ghanaian politicians to transform money into some kind of moral 
authority for it to become an effective campaign tool.101  
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Instead, voter mobilisation and representation appeared to be shaped along alternative lines, 
with a prominent role for clientelistic and patrimonial networks. In a context of largely agrarian 
and informal economies with poorly organised and institutionalised socio-economic interest, 
Van Walraven (2000) contended: 
 
Ethno-regional and clientelist interests may indeed represent the most rational strategy 
for political actors to aggregate social interests.93   
 
In their seminal work “Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument”, Chabal and Daloz 
(1999) underlined the prevalence of patrons above policies. Citizens supported patrons – not 
necessarily parties – whom they considered capable of providing them with tangible benefits. 
Politics was shaped through hierarchical personalised ties rather than intermediary political 
institutions. At the heart of this patrimonial form of domination was an exchange of loyalty, 
political support and particularistic favours between patrons at the top and their individual 
clients (clientelism) or larger groups of supporters (patronage) in society.94 Political elites were 
primarily held accountable for their ability to nourish an informal clientelistic support network 
on which their power rests.95 All across the African continent, large segments in society 
expected their representatives to take care of them in a parental way.96  
The geographical dimension underpinning such networks proved particularly relevant. 
Several studies revealed that individual patrons often maintained a strong clientelistic support 
basis amongst kinsmen and, more specifically, their region of origin.97 Citizens, from their point 
view as clients, preferred to rally around a political fils du terroir as they believed: that “only a 
member of the community can be expected to be accountable to its members.”98  
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So far, this section has introduced key aspects of the institutional, political and socio-cultural 
national context in which patterns of citizens’ mobilisation, interest representation and 
accountability were shaped through democratic institutions. This section ends with a short 
reflection on the influence of the international context on accountability ties. This analysis is 
further extended throughout the different chapters of the thesis. 
 
International context 
International aid instituted strong external accountability relations of receiving governments 
towards international donors, often to the detriment of domestic accountability ties. Mali proved 
to be a case in point. The country received an average of 15 per cent of its GDP from aid 
between 1967 and 2013. This amount increased to approximately 25 per cent (in terms of 
commitments) in subsequent years.106 Per capita Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
tripled from $26 in 2000 to a peak of $84 in 2013. By 2015, international aid had risen to a 
staggering 75 per cent of central government expenditure.107 In contrast, Mali’s tax-to-GDP 
ratio decreased from 16.7 per cent (2017) to 14.1 per cent (2018). This percentage was well 
below the average score of 30 other African countries.108 Only an estimated one per cent of 
international donor support provided to Mali benefitted democratic institutions (e.g. elections, 
judicial sector, promoting political and civil rights).109 Moreover, aid dispersed in other policy 
areas hardly included interventions geared towards improving democratic governance in these 
sectors. International donor support thereby further boosted an already omnipotent executive 
vis-à-vis other branches of government and society at large. It weakened democratic oversight 
and widened the gap between rulers and ruled.  
 With regards to horizontal relationships of accountability, Burnell (2012) underlined the 
detrimental impact of development aid on national checks and balances by institutions such as 
the legislature.110 In the case of Mali, Van de Walle (2012) illustrated that budget support 
negatively impacted the balance of power between the branches of government.111   
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Hansen (2003) offered a detailed account of an official visit by a minister to his hometown in 
Cameroon.102 During a public address, the minister emphasised his position as a patron for his 
region of origin. He assured his support base that he would mobilise state resources to the 
benefit of “his” area while sharing a big envelope with brand-new banknotes (public resources) 
amongst the local notables (personal network). Yet, he also legitimised his own position and 
state authority more generally with subtle reference to notions of honour, religion, violence and 
hierarchy. Hence, there is a need to shift from a one-dimensional patrimonial model towards a 
multi-dimensional approach of political representation and accountability.   
 Political agency was played out on a “cultural field” that was more complex than patrimonial 
or rational-legal forms of authority could account for.103 Political culture has often been 
characterised as a deeply engrained and historically grown style of governance around a set of 
powerful symbols.104 The impact of culture upon politics was studied in this perspective. 
Political culture constituted an historical pattern of continuity more than fluidity or change. 
Chabal & Daloz (2006) advanced an alternative interpretative approach to depict the 
relationship between culture and politics that recognised people’s agency and captured the 
dynamics of cultural change. Building upon Clifford Geertz, they argued that culture mainly 
provided meaning to political agency.105 People have certain beliefs that influence political 
behaviour. Schaffer (1998), for example, found that Wolof speakers in Senegal understood the 
act of voting in the context of locally modified notions of democracy (“demokaraasi”). Voting, 
they believed, constituted an expression of solidarity ties amongst community members and an 
opportunity to obtain tangible support from patrons. Much more than a choice between 
candidates in a sturdy competition, people understood and used the institution of voting as an 
opportunity to reinforce cooperation and mutual ties. His study convincingly demonstrated the 
need to take popular perceptions, beliefs and understandings of political institutions, 
representation and accountability notions into account.  
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Figure 3: Context factors shaping “input-democracy”  
 
The following section operationalises the overall research question and ensuing sub-questions. 
On that basis, the research design is specified as well as the various research methods used.  
 
1.2. CONCEPTUAL AND OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK 
 
This thesis contributes to a wider body of literature that emerged after the collapse of Malian 
state authority and legitimacy in 2012. In-depth country-specific and regional studies greatly 
contributed to improving our understanding of the factors that underlay the series of tragic 
events that rose to the surface in that troubled year. These factors included the rise of high-value 
smuggling networks, the increased terrorist threat, the downfall of the Libyan regime, major 
governance challenges and other factors highlighted in the above. This thesis seeks to 
complement the existing literature by assessing how central aspects of democratisation affected 
the challenging process of state formation (and deformation) in the period preceding 2012. 
Following an exemplary democratic transition that ended decades of authoritarian and often 











Much of the socio-economic and monetary policymaking dialogue was shaped between donors 
and the government, outside the realm of the legislature. Parliamentarians often lacked vital 
information and the potential for parliamentary oversight was limited.  
External accountability mechanisms appeared to be weak. Dijkstra (2018), for example, 
noted that although Malian authorities failed to implement critical reforms that they had 
committed to, such as the establishment of an Independent Court of Auditors, the donor 
community refrained from holding them to account.112 This stemmed from the fact that 
cooperation in other policy areas was considered (more) satisfactory or because strategic 
interests were at play and donors preferred to maintain constructive ties with Malian authorities.  
In terms of vertical accountability relations, civil society organisations received more 
support from international donors than institutions performing key roles at the horizontal level 
of accountability, such as the legislature and the judiciary. However, similar patterns of external 
accountability prevailed to the detriment of domestic ties across Malian society. Many (largely 
urban-based) civil society institutions lacked effective communication and consultation 
channels within society, most notably the rural areas. Policy priorities of external funding 
partners strongly influenced their agenda, often to the detriment of local actors. The Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (2016) noted that some of the umbrella organisations in 
Malian civil society were:  
 
Not sufficiently connected with their respective constituency bases to be inclusive, 
participatory or accountable.113  
 
In fact, some of the most influential actors and networks that were strongly embedded in Malian 
society and provided effective forms of executive oversight along vertical lines developed 
outside the realm of official development aid, as is revealed in several of the following chapters.  
In sum, this section briefly sketched key features of the context in which democratisation in 
general and patterns of citizens’ mobilisation, interest representation and accountably ties in 
particular developed across the African continent (see Figure 3). Their influence on the 
performance of Malian political parties, the party system, the legislature and decentralisation is 
assessed in more depth throughout this thesis. 
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In a heterarchical political order, as noted above, the state operates as one institution amongst 
many non-state equals rather than obtaining a hierarchically superior position above other 
power poles in society. The analytical focus shifts from state authority to public authority. 
 
Figure 4: © Klute, G. et al. (2016) 
 
In the absence of a hegemonic force, a heterarchical order is inherently less stable than a 
classical hierarchical political order. Different power poles institute their authority in either 
cooperation, isolation or conflict with one another and alliances frequently shift over time.  
 
Hüsken and Klute (2015) contended:  
 
The notion of heterarchy is appropriate to describe the fluctuating, entangling and 
disentangling tribal, state like, Islamist and jihadist, youth, civil, organised crime, and 
militia-like forms of political organisation. This comprises varying political practices and 
rationales as well as different conceptions of power, rule, and legitimacy.114  
 
By 2018, the Malian state clearly operated as a “horizontal contemporary” rather than 
hierarchically superior institution vis-à-vis non-state actors in society. State expenditure, as 
noted in the above, reached a mere 20 per cent of the national territory. Meanwhile, a myriad 
of non-state power poles, including armed groups, local militias, self-defense groups, traditional 
and religious leaders had firmly anchored their authority across the rural areas.  
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Democracy, as shown in the previous section, primarily enhances state legitimacy by providing 
mechanisms that allow for political participation, representation and accountability. Hence, the 
central research objective of the thesis is to reveal: 
 
How the performance of key democratic institutions in the area of political participation, 
representation and accountability affected the legitimacy of the Malian state in the context of 
Mali’s emerging heterarchical political order (1992-2012)?   
 
More specifically, this thesis examines the performance of Malian political parties (and the 
party system), parliament and municipal democratic institutions in enhancing state legitimacy 
by shaping political participation, representation and accountability (1992-2012). This central 
research question is addressed in the core (middle) part of the thesis (Chapters 3-5). An 
introductory historical chapter first traces the historical roots of Mali’s heterarchical political 
order (1960-2012). It illustrates the changing power balance between state and non-state power 
poles over time with a particular focus on hybrid forms of security provision. The thesis ends 
with a reflection on the anchoring of a heterarchical order in the five-year period that followed 
the crisis (2013-2018). Based on this overarching research objective, the remaining part of this 
section introduces and operationalises the ensuing sub-questions and defines the central 
concepts for each of these three main sections.  
 
#1. The emergence of a heterarchical political order and hybrid security provision 
 
Research question 
What encouraged the emergence of Mali’s heterarchical political order? How have patterns of 
hybrid security provision evolved over time, to the point of state collapse?  
• How has the power balance between the Malian state and non-state actors engaged in public 
security provision shifted over time (vertically superior versus horizontally equivalent)?  
• How has the nature of cooperation between state and non-state actors evolved over time 
(complementary versus delegatory)? 
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A second difference constituted the scope of security. Scholars distinguished a narrow from a 
broad conceptualisation. The former approach perceived security primarily in terms of 
protection from violent threats. The broader approach defined security as the protection from a 
wide variety of threats. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), for example, 
adopted such a multidimensional approach and distinguished as many as seven different sub-
categories of security (e.g. economic security, food security, health security, environmental 
security, personal security, political security, community security).120 This thesis largely 
focuses on the supply side of security in a narrow sense. The main objective is to assess patterns 
of hybrid security provision over time. How local citizens perceived these various efforts 
requires additional empirical and historical research.   
 
Hybrid security 
The above theoretical outline revealed that non-state actors played a considerable role in public 
service delivery across the African continent (and elsewhere). “Nowhere is this more striking,” 
Bagayoko et al. (2016) noted, “than in regard to the core security, policing and justice functions 
of African states.”121 On the “supply side”, hybrid security arrangements are characterised by 
complex interactions between state and non-state actors. These actors either compete or 
cooperate for power, resources, legitimacy and thereby determine patterns of both security and 
insecurity.122 The hybrid security approach thus moves away from the state as sole security 
provider towards a more heterogeneous conceptualisation of public security. The interaction 
between state and non-state actors is assessed based on a concise operational framework. 
  
Operationalising hybrid security 
Three indicators are used to study the historical interplay between state and non-state actors in 
the security realm under subsequent Malian governments, to the point of state collapse in 2012.  
• The power balance refers to the position of the state vis-à-vis non state armed factions, either as 
vertically superior or horizontally equivalent;   
• The channels of cooperation allude to the interplay between state and non-state factions shaped 
through official channels (a peace process) or through non-official channels (personal networks);  
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121 Bagayoko, N., Hutchful, E. and Luckham, R. (2016) ‘Hybrid Security Governance in Africa: Rethinking the 
Foundations of Security, Justice and Legitimate Public Authority’, Conflict, Security and Development 16(1): 1-
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A survey conducted by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) revealed 
that respondents across the country perceived the Malian state as being incapable of providing 
basic social and security services, while non-state actors increasingly filled the void.115 Prior 
opinion surveys revealed that Malian citizens, much more than people in other West African 
countries, primarily raised their concerns with traditional and religious leaders.116 More in-
depth studies showed that villagers living in the border area between central and northern Mali, 
for example, almost entirely relied on these non-state actors for (a minimal provision of) social 
services and local infrastructure.117  
 In 2018, the Malian state clearly shared most of its core functions with non-state actors in 
the context of a heterarchical political order. Chapter 2 traces the emergence of this 
heterarchical order and zooms in on historical patterns of interaction between state and non-
state actors in the area of public security provision. 
 
Security defined  
Amidst the many definitions of and analytical perspectives on security, one important 
difference related to the main “referent object” of security that distinguished a state-centred 
approach from a human security perspective. Luckam and Kirk (2012) noted – in reference to 
Scott’s seminal work – that academic work on security long entailed “seeing like a state.”118 
The state apparatus obtained the primary responsibility to protect citizens. The underlying 
assumption was that “if the state is secure, then so too will those that live within it.”119 This 
approach thereby strongly focused on the “supply side” of security. Empirical studies, however, 
increasingly revealed its limitations. State security forces frequently failed to protect citizens or 
even committed abuses against their own citizenry. In this context, the concept of “human 
security” (and many related variations, including “citizen’s security” or “personal security”) 
gained prominence. The individual, rather than the state, was taken as the principal referent 
object and security was re-defined in terms of an “entitlement of citizens.” The analytical focus 
thereby shifted from the supply side towards the demand side of security.  
	
115 Tobie, A. and Chauzal, G. (2018) ‘State Services in an Insecure Environment: Perceptions among Civil Society 
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Redefine ‘State Breakdown’ Amidst 2012 Political Crisis’, Afrobarometer (Working paper No.155). 
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Analysis and Research’, Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 2(2): 1-30, p. 5. 
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between state and non-state actors potentially differs across sectors. Non-state actors such as 
international NGOs can, for example, play a central role in social service delivery while, at the 
same time, the state itself maintains a leading role in the area of public security provision. The 
assessment of hybrid security patterns cannot be extrapolated to other policy sectors.  
 Hence, additional research is required that complements the findings of this thesis to arrive 
at a more comprehensive understanding of public service delivery in the context of a 
heterarchical political order. 
   
Non-state armed groups loosely defined 
Non-state armed groups are generally categorised based on: (1) their level of internal cohesion 
and organisation; (2) the objectives they pursue; (3) their main adversaries; and (4) whether 
they (aim to) control territory. Although recognising the benefits of such categorisation for 
analytical purposes, a strict application to the Malian case is challenging in light of the highly 
dynamic nature of alliances, group membership and objectives. Non-state armed groups in Mali 
are characterised by multiple and overlapping goals while their (pro- or con) stance vis-à-vis 
the state changes over time. There are examples of influential local armed factions who changed 
their allegiance to a terrorist group, a secular secessionist group and a pro-government militias 
during the course of just one year. This thesis therefore adopts a broad encompassing definition 
of non-state armed groups as organisations motivated by political, economic, personal, 
communal or other goals, capable of using violence against or in cooperation with the state, 
other armed groups or civilians.125 The core objective is to study the historical interplay between 
state and non-state actors; not the functioning of non-state armed groups per se.  
 
#2. Democratisation in the context of an emerging heterarchical order 
 
 
Research question and sub-questions 
How have key democratic institutions affected the legitimacy of the state in the context of 
Mali’s emerging heterarchical order (1992-2012)? More specifically, what have been prevailing 
patterns of popular participation, representation and accountability provided through the party 
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• The nature of cooperation assesses whether security cooperation between the state and non-state 
actors is complementary or delegatory. In the former case, state and non-state representatives both 
participate in joint security efforts (e.g. patrols or assaults). In the latter case, the state transfers its 
formal authority to non-state actors.  
This last dimension is based on literature in the field of hybrid warfare.123 An important 
difference, however, is that this academic stream is largely focused on the motives of the state 
(or an external third party) to engage with non-state actors. Such an approach ignores the 
motives of non-state actors to align with or oppose the state. As a result of an alignment with 
state forces, local factions, for example, improve their position vis-à-vis other local 
stakeholders. Therefore, when Malian state and non-state actors engaged in complementary or 
delegatory relationships, this thesis reflects on the motives behind this engagement from both 
perspectives.  
 
Security as ‘proxy’ for national public service delivery? 
The first part of this thesis examines the emergence (Chapter 2) and subsequent anchoring 
(Chapter 6) of a heterarchical political order, in which the exercise of public authority in the 
public service involves the Malian state as just one institution amongst many non-state equals. 
It thereby zooms in on historical patterns of change and continuity in the area of public security 
provision in both northern and central Mali.  
 The conclusions drawn on this basis do not reflect nationwide patterns. Geographical 
inclusivity is only partially accounted for as the thesis follows the shifting sands of conflict in 
Mali. Chapter 2 is largely concentrated on hybrid security provision in the northern regions. 
Chapter 6 also examines the – even more heterogeneous – patterns of security provision 
encountered across central Mali as the level of security started to deteriorate. However, the 
thesis does not address hybrid security provision across Mali’s more stable southern regions. 
Initial research suggests that local coping mechanisms that emerged in response to state absence 
in those areas varied from the ones witnessed in the northern and southern regions.124      
 Moreover, the historical analysis of hybrid public service delivery is predominantly focused 
on patterns encountered in the security realm. These patterns do not necessarily reflect similar 
trends of hybrid statehood encountered in other policy areas. The power balance or task division 
	
123 For an overview of that literature and more elaborate typology of “hybrid warfare”, see: Rauta,V. (2019) 
‘Towards a Typology of Non-State Actors in Hybrid Warfare: Proxy, Auxiliary, Surrogate and Affiliated Forces’, 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 33(3):1-20, pp. 7-14. 
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or even political violence.129 I consider such activities to be a type of civic engagement rather 
than political participation. The focus of this thesis, as highlighted above, is restricted to the 
contribution of a select number of democratic institutions in shaping patterns of popular 
participation “designed to affect the choice of government personnel and/or policies.”  
 A central debate in the literature on political representation is related to the question of 
whether representatives act as “delegates,” who strictly follow the preferences of constituents 
or operate as “trustees” with a considerable level of discretionary powers and autonomy and 
mainly follow their own judgements.130 In practice, representative democracies feature a mix 
of both forms as no elected representative acts entirely independently or has the ability to 
consult citizens and determine voters’ preferences on all the political issues at stake.  
This is precisely why accountability mechanisms are crucial in a representative democracy 
where political actors take decisions on behalf of ordinary citizens. This concept gained much 
traction in the literature towards the end of the 1990s, as the advantages of the third wave of 
democracy remained well below expectation.  
Scholars revealed the prevalence of weak accountability mechanisms despite the democratic 
transitions, as highlighted in the above theoretical outline.  This thesis draws heavily on the 
definition and key dimensions of accountability advanced by Lindberg (2013) based on an 
extensive review of the literature.131 A relationship of accountability involves an actor or 
institution that must give an account (e.g. an MP) to someone else (e.g. constituents) about a 
specific matter (e.g. a policy). The principal components of accountability, as already 
highlighted, constitute the obligation of – in this example – the MP to inform constituents and 
justify his or her actions, while the latter obtain mechanisms to sanction the MP. Three key 
dimensions of accountability emerged in the literature: the source of accountability (are 
political representatives being held accountable internally, within an institution, or externally, 
by citizens); the degree of control that people have over representatives (although difficult to 
quantify); and the direction of accountability (vertical upwards, vertical downwards or 
horizontal).132 These dimensions are introduced and operationalised in more detail in the 
respective chapters.  
	
129 Deth, J.W. van (2014), p. 358. 
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Party system (Chapter 3) 
• What have been prevailing patterns of political participation and interest representation provided 
through the party system?  
• What explains the prevalence of one-party (1992-2002) and one-coalition dominance (2002-2012) 
in the Malian party-system? 
Parliament (Chapter 4)  
• How has the accountability performance of Members of Parliament (2007-2009) affected state 
legitimacy? 
• How have Malian Members of Parliament MPs performed their particularistic constituency-oriented 
duties and collective legislative and oversight tasks in the years before democracy’s decay? 
Decentralisation (Chapter 5) 
• Which social cleavages shaped political participation and interest representation at the local level 
during three consecutive local elections in one specific rural municipality (1999-2009)? 
• To what extent and in which ways have newly established formal accountability mechanisms at the 
heart of Mali’s ambitious decentralisation reforms affected state legitimacy (1999-2009)? 
Participation, representation and accountability 
The core part of this thesis assesses the performance of Malian political parties (and party 
system), parliament and municipal democratic institutions in enhancing state legitimacy by 
shaping political participation, representation and accountability (1992-2012).  
Political participation is widely regarded as the “elixir of life for democracy” but 
conceptualised in many different ways.126 The narrowest definition restricts political 
participation to individual behaviour designed to affect the choice of government through 
elections. However, most definitions move beyond the choice of government personnel and 
widened the analytical scope by including popular influence over the choices made by 
government personnel.127 Political participation is then defined as “individual or collective 
behavior designed to affect the choice of government personnel and/or policies.”128 Another 
definitional matter concerns the question of whether political participation is limited to 
activities directly expressed through the political system or whether it also encompasses “non-
political activities used for political purposes,” such as popular protests, civil society activism 
	
126 Deth, J.W. van. (2014) ‘A Conceptual Map of Political Participation’, Acta Politica 49: 349-367, p. 350. 
127 Conge, P. (1982) ‘The Concept of Political Participation’, Comparative Politics 20(2): 241-249. 
128 Verba, S. and Nie, N.H. (1972) Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality, New York: 
Harper and Row, pp. 2-3. 
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or even political violence.129 I consider such activities to be a type of civic engagement rather 
than political participation. The focus of this thesis, as highlighted above, is restricted to the 
contribution of a select number of democratic institutions in shaping patterns of popular 
participation “designed to affect the choice of government personnel and/or policies.”  
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42	
	
Party system (Chapter 3) 
• What have been prevailing patterns of political participation and interest representation provided 
through the party system?  
• What explains the prevalence of one-party (1992-2002) and one-coalition dominance (2002-2012) 
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• International: A concise analysis of the mechanisms of cooperation between Mali and international 
terms in terms of volume, internal distribution, policy priorities and working modalities;  
• Societal: Mostly centred on an assessment of the cleavages in society that are most influential in 
shaping participation, interest representation and accountability ties through the political system. 
• Political culture: Popular beliefs that affected political behaviour (e.g. perceptions about legitimacy; 
accountability; democracy; consensus versus opposition politics…). 
The main objective of this core part of the thesis is to assesses the performance of crucial 
democratic institutions and their contribution to enhancing state legitimacy in this particular 
context during the two decades that followed Mali’s exemplary democratic transition.  
However, the state is but one of a number of institutions exercising and legitimising  authority 
in Mali’s heterarchical order, as noted above. Influential non-state actors including traditional 
and religious leaders, non-governmental organisations, urban protest movements, youth 
networks and armed groups all play a major role in Malian society and institute their authority 
in reference to multiple sources of legitimacy. Each chapter will therefore also explore the 
interplay between democratic and other influential sources of legitimacy in a shift away from 
state legitimacy towards public legitimacy.  
 
#3. The anchoring of Mali’s heterarchical political order in the aftermath of the crisis  
 
Research question 
How has the power balance between state and non-state actors in Mali’s heterarchical political 
order evolved in the area of public security provision and decentralised administration in the 
aftermath of the crisis (2013-2018)? 
 
• A perspective “from below”: What has been the role of both state and non-state actors in ensuring 
basic protection amidst prevailing patterns of insecurity in northern and central Mali? Have security 
actors started to play a more comprehensive role in decentralised administration as a result? 
• A perspective “from above”: What has been the impact of the Malian peace process and prevailing 
patterns of hybrid security provision upon the power balance between state and non-state actors? 
• Democratic legitimacy: How have patterns of political participation, representation and 
accountability shaped democracy’s input to state legitimacy in the aftermath of the crisis?  
 
Basic legitimacy 
The notion of “basic legitimacy of protection from violence” plays an important role in this 
chapter. It suggests “those who are able to offer protection from violence are at the same time 
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In sum, this thesis primarily focuses on the contribution provided by a limited number of 
prominent democratic institutions in shaping patterns of political participation, representation 
and accountability. In line with the above theoretical outline, a complementary socio-cultural 
and institutional approach guided the analysis of these democratic institutions. 
 
Contextualising democratic institutions  
Malian political parties, the legislature and a municipal council are the institutions analysed in 
the core part of this thesis. The assessment of their functioning in daily practices moves well 
beyond the formal roles and responsibilities and also includes influential informal tasks that 
their representatives are expected to perform.  
The basic concept of an institution is commonly defined as the rules and procedures that 
structure social interaction by both constraining and enabling people’s behaviour. Many 
scholars refer to the work of Douglass North in this regard.133 He strongly emphasised the 
“constraining” aspect of institutions.134 Others, like Hodgson (2006), underlined the “enabling” 
side of institutions in a more explicit manner.135 By extension, formal institutions are defined 
as rules and procedures created, communicated and enforced through channels widely accepted 
as official and often codified in constitutions and legislation. The term official implies that the 
rules and procedures emanate from an authority, in this case, the state. This thesis addresses 
formal aspects of Mali’s democratic regime, which are defined as the “sets of political 
procedures – sometimes called the ‘rules of the political game’ – that determine the distribution 
of power.”136 Informal institutions are defined as socially shared values, usually unwritten, 
which are created and enforced outside officially sanctioned channels. This includes 
patrimonial sources of legitimacy or cultural beliefs. Representatives of Malian political parties, 
parliament and local democratic institutions are thus embedded in a broader “incentive 
structure” shaped by a variety of formal and informal factors that influence their functioning.  
All chapters address the following contextual factors:  
 
• Institutional: Relevant aspects of Mali’s democratic regime, most notably the formal powers vested 
in the executive and legislative branch of government; the electoral system; political parties’ 
regulation; as well as the institutional power balance between the different tiers of government; 
	
133 Cf. Levitsky, S. and Helmke, G. (2006) Informal Institutions and Democracy: Lessons from Latin America, 
Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, p.5. 
134 North, D.C. (1991) ‘Institutions’, ‘Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5(1):97-112. 
135 Hodgon, G.M. (2006) ‘What Are Institutions?’ Journal of Economic Issues’, 40(1):1-25. 
136 Bratton, M. and Van de Walle, N. (1997), pp. 9-10.  
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constitutional reform processes in Zambia and then became the lead author of a handbook 
presenting guidelines for international organisations supporting these processes in practice.140  
Building on the above theoretical and operational frameworks, the remaining parts of this 
chapter outline the research design and various methods used, highlight a number of important 
limitations of this thesis and provide a brief outline of the various chapters.        
  
1.3.1. Research design: Implications of a single-country case study 
 
This thesis focuses exclusively on Mali. As a research method, the case study has well-known 
limitations in terms of non-replicability, representativeness and generalisation. This section first 
clarifies why this research method was adopted and subsequently specifies the contribution it 
nonetheless provides to wider theory-building efforts.   
 The case study method aligns well with what I still consider to be a pioneering field of 
research focused on different aspects of newly emerging forms of political order across the 
African continent. The body of literature is rapidly expanding and innovative approaches are 
on the rise. However, prevailing theories, e.g. modernisation theory, and analytical frameworks 
remain too state-centric and unilinear, and have shown their limitations with respect to grasping 
the complex empirical dynamic across the continent. As a research method, the case study is 
particularly well suited to obtaining a rich analysis of such processes occurring within their 
specific context. Comparative studies pull together a large number of cases and define a limited 
number of independent and dependent variables. A case study, in contrast, enables one to 
observe and study multiple contextual variables in their natural setting. This is particularly 
relevant, for example, when studying aspects of public legitimacy, which really requires an in-
depth and context-specific analysis. Instead of examining broader patterns of correlation 
between a limited set of variables, a case study tends to be guided by research questions geared 
towards understanding how and why these interactions occur in a certain context. So-called 
theory-guided case studies are a clear example. Guided by a conceptual framework derived 
from theory, they focus on interpreting a specific case “rather than to generalise beyond the 
	
140 Vliet, M. van. (2009) Writing Autobiographies of Nations: A Comparative Analysis of Constitutional Reform 
Processes. The Case of Zambia. The Hague: NIMD; Vliet, M. van, Wahiu, W. & Magolowondo, A. (eds.) (2012) 
‘Constitutional Reform Processes and Political Parties: Principles for Practice’, The Hague – Leiden: NIMD, IDEA 
and ASC.  
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those with the best chances to accumulate power and position.”137 This final chapter builds on 
the historical analysis provided in the first part of this thesis that revealed the increased role of 
non-state actors in the security realm as well as the assessment of hybrid decentralised 
administration in the second part.  
 Now that the research questions, theoretical and operational frameworks have been 
introduced, the next section specifies the research design and methods. 
 
1.3. Research design and methods 
 
This thesis started as a project in the “IS-Academy” of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, which launched this initiative together with several research institutes and universities 
to increase knowledge about the functioning of, amongst others, fragile states.138 The Ministry 
awarded several four-year grants to full-time PhD students and a number of much smaller 
scholarships to practitioners, enabling them to conduct research on a part-time basis. I was part 
of this latter category and received support for a study on Malian statehood and democratic 
institutions. The expected academic output encompassed a number of individual publications, 
bundled in a PhD thesis at a later stage. This set-up, structured around individual articles, 
enabled practitioners to combine policy and academic work as it divided the entire workload 
into manageable, smaller parts with clear deadlines. However, this structure also restricted the 
cohesion of the entire research project. In order to circumvent this challenge and to improve the 
overall coherence of this thesis, all previous publications have been considerably revised and 
extended. Moreover, an overarching post-hoc introductory a well as concluding chapter have 
been drafted. The expected output from my research also included policy-oriented publications. 
 In this context, I conducted and supervised an empirical study comparing local 
accountability mechanisms between municipalities in five sub-Sahara African countries. After 
summarising the various country reports in a policy brief, which I presented during a meeting 
of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), I published the main 
results in an easily accessible brochure.139 Furthermore, the policy-oriented work included 
publications on constitutional reform processes. I first elaborated a policy paper on 
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Given my training as an anthropologist and development sociologist, participant observation 
constituted an important research method. I observed the implementation of Mali’s 
decentralization policies and the organisation of three consecutive municipal elections in the 
rural municipality of Karan in Southern Mali for almost a decade. I regularly visited the area, 
staying for periods ranging from a number of weeks to five months, and I developed relations 
of trust with many of my respondents. Mitchel (2006) emphasises the benefit of this method 
when it is deployed over a longer period and assesses how respondents “constantly renegotiate 
their position towards each other in a rapidly changing socio-political context.”143 This is 
exactly why participant observation proved so valuable when analysing patterns of both change 
and continuity in socio-political trends at the municipal level over a longer period. The method 
also enabled me to observe events and human behaviour in daily practice, rather than relying 
solely upon interviews or formal legislation alone, which boosted the validity of my research. 
There was a significant difference between the formal mandate of the newly established 
municipal council and its functioning in daily practice, which I was only able to analyse because 
of my prolonged presence on the ground. Participant observation also enabled me to discover 
local sociocultural institutions, such as the kabila (a family group or “clan” across generations) 
and kare (a generational group across families), that I had been unaware of at the start of my 
research, but which turned out to be very influential in shaping local political affairs.  
 A more profound reflection on methodological matters related to this case study is provided 
at the beginning of Chapter 5. I also used the method of participant representation while 
studying the functioning of Malian Members of Parliament. I attended many public sessions of 
the legislature listening to the issues they raised and debated. This provided valuable additional 
data that contextualised the outcome of my interviews. In addition, I joined the two top 
contenders of the 2007 presidential election on the campaign trail to gain a better understanding 
of their interaction with citizens and the campaign dynamics on the grounds. Obviously, the 
method has a number of disadvantages, which I explain in more detail in the next section. Yet, 
overall, participant observation proved a valuable addition to the many interviews I conducted.   
 Throughout the entire research project, I used structured interviewing as a research method, 
but also held many highly informal discussions with respondents. The semi-structured 
interviews with Malian parliamentarians, for example, contained open questions, but also many 
closed-ended questions to enable a quantitative analysis of behavioral trends. The interviews 
were largely based on a questionnaire developed by the African Power and Politics research 
	
143 De Vries, L.A. (2012), p. 28. 
48	
	
data.”141 However, science does remain a “generalising activity.”142 Despite the obvious 
limitations inherent to a case study as a result of its very small N, the method can nonetheless 
be designed in such a way that it can make a valuable contribution to the process of theory 
building – rather than theory building per se. A case study adds empirical data relevant to the 
testing of well-established theories or generates new insights in emerging fields of interest. This 
thesis examines or “tests” the impact of several factors, well-established in the literature, that 
influence the performance of democratic institutions. The combination of institutional and 
political with societal and cultural factors is of most interest in this regard.    
 The more exploratory dimension of the thesis concerns the heterogeneous context in which 
democratisation transpired in Mali. The thesis explores how the functioning of democratic 
institutions influenced the legitimacy of the Malian state in relation to other major power poles 
and sources of legitimacy in society. This explorative dimension of the Malian case study 
certainly obtains wider regional relevance considering the emergence of heterarchial orders in 
other countries across the Sahel, where the state operates as one institution amongst non-state 
equals. Finally, key components of this thesis were part of cross-country studies in order to 
improve the value of the Malian case study for comparative use and generalising efforts. This 
holds for the chapter on Malian Members of Parliament that builds upon (and extends) the 
methodology used in a previous case study in Ghana. Likewise, the chapter on one-party 
dominance was part of a comparative project involving all major regions in sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
1.3.2. Research methods 
 
The case study design allows for the use of a variety of research methods, including qualitative 
ones, such as interviews and participant observation, and an analysis of existing quantitative 
data and archival research. By applying such a combination of research methods and by 
checking and counterchecking findings through triangulation, I attempted to strengthen the 
overall research design. The empirical work of the thesis is based on a combination of the 
following methods: 1) participant observation; 2) semi-structured interviews and informal talks; 
3) the analysis of archives and existing data from surveys such as the Afrobarometer.  
	
141 Levy, J. S. (2008) ‘Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference’, Conflict Management and Peace 
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data.”141 However, science does remain a “generalising activity.”142 Despite the obvious 
limitations inherent to a case study as a result of its very small N, the method can nonetheless 
be designed in such a way that it can make a valuable contribution to the process of theory 
building – rather than theory building per se. A case study adds empirical data relevant to the 
testing of well-established theories or generates new insights in emerging fields of interest. This 
thesis examines or “tests” the impact of several factors, well-established in the literature, that 
influence the performance of democratic institutions. The combination of institutional and 
political with societal and cultural factors is of most interest in this regard.    
 The more exploratory dimension of the thesis concerns the heterogeneous context in which 
democratisation transpired in Mali. The thesis explores how the functioning of democratic 
institutions influenced the legitimacy of the Malian state in relation to other major power poles 
and sources of legitimacy in society. This explorative dimension of the Malian case study 
certainly obtains wider regional relevance considering the emergence of heterarchial orders in 
other countries across the Sahel, where the state operates as one institution amongst non-state 
equals. Finally, key components of this thesis were part of cross-country studies in order to 
improve the value of the Malian case study for comparative use and generalising efforts. This 
holds for the chapter on Malian Members of Parliament that builds upon (and extends) the 
methodology used in a previous case study in Ghana. Likewise, the chapter on one-party 
dominance was part of a comparative project involving all major regions in sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
1.3.2. Research methods 
 
The case study design allows for the use of a variety of research methods, including qualitative 
ones, such as interviews and participant observation, and an analysis of existing quantitative 
data and archival research. By applying such a combination of research methods and by 
checking and counterchecking findings through triangulation, I attempted to strengthen the 
overall research design. The empirical work of the thesis is based on a combination of the 
following methods: 1) participant observation; 2) semi-structured interviews and informal talks; 
3) the analysis of archives and existing data from surveys such as the Afrobarometer.  
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by the confidentiality of my diplomatic role and the obvious ethical complications of using 
these data in my thesis without prior consent of the many actors I spoke with at the time. 
However, the use of this information would also have been problematic in a methodological 
sense. I interacted with Malian and other stakeholders on behalf of the UN or The Netherlands. 
The context (and related incentives) in which my interaction with these actors took place was 
therefore very different from the manner in which I would have talked with these actors (if at 
all) as a researcher in an interview setting.   
 Before presenting the results of my research, the following section highlights a number of 
limitations of this thesis and then briefly recapitulates the outline.   
 
1.3.3. Limitations  
 
The previous sections already referred to some limitations of this thesis caused by the structure 
of this research project, built around a series of individual publications. The thesis offers a 
detailed analysis of the functioning of a limited number of democratic institutions and their 
influence upon state legitimacy rather than a comprehensive assessment. This section briefly 
highlights additional limitations.  
 The considerable influence of Islam in the political realm is a subject of critical importance 
in Malian society but was not addressed in the individual publications that provided the building 
blocks of this thesis. Although not assessed in detail, the political role of religion is nonetheless 
incorporated in this final thesis and illustrated by a number of tangible examples. I also included 
references to the work of other scholars in both academia and policy circles who addressed 
these developments at greater length.145 In a similar vein, this thesis highlights key socio-
economic trends – most notably centred on the wide urban–rural divide – but certainly does not 
offer a thorough analysis in this regard.   
 This dissertation also lacks a balanced gender perspective. A vast majority of representatives 
of political and sociocultural institutions, who constituted the primary target group of my field 
research, was male. In my interviews, I primarily aimed for a balance between my respondents 
in terms of geographical representation, political party membership or membership of a specific 
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programme in order to increase the comparative value of the case study. I deliberately chose to 
bring their voices into the wider academic field because this “actor-oriented” perspective adds 
value to prevailing institutional assessments of African legislatures.144 
 Informal discussions proved to be a particularly useful research method for discussing 
sensitive matters. Conversations about local conflicts or tensions provided highly valuable 
research data. Chapter 5, for example, demonstrates competing (and contradictory) power 
claims by local actors who referred to different repertoires in order to legitimise these claims.  
Gathering these multiple perceptions and examining how they played out in actual practice 
increased my understanding of underlying patterns of change and continuity.   
 My use of literature review constituted an important research method for the historical parts 
of this thesis as well as for Chapter 6. My own archival research was limited to the 
parliamentary archives, therefore, I relied heavily upon existing studies for most of the 
historical parts of this thesis. Nonetheless, I do believe that this part of the thesis adds value to 
the current body of literature. Not only because it combines francophone and anglophone 
literature on Mali, but also because of its analytical perspective. This thesis provides a unique 
long-term assessment of patterns of both change and continuity in hybrid security provision 
strategies by pulling together data from different periods in history and multiple sources into 
one analytical framework.  
 I gratefully exploited the results of the opinion polls conducted by the Afrobarometer and 
the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (Mali-Mètre) in Mali, which complemented studies published 
by fellow researchers, policy papers and news outlets. Publications by the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) provided particularly valuable data from rural 
areas in central Mali that are not easily accessible.  
 The final chapter, which focuses on the anchoring of Mali’s heterarchical political order in 
the period between 2013 and 2018, almost entirely relies on existing studies and public sources 
rather than empirical data and interviews. This is related to my position as a diplomat, first as 
an advisor to the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General (SRGR) in Mali and Head 
of MINUSMA; subsequently, as the Sahel Coordinator with the Netherlands Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. In these capacities, I encountered all relevant Malian and international 
stakeholders between 2013 and 2018. I gathered a wealth of data that would have certainly 
solidified the empirical foundations and scientific validity of Chapter 6. Nevertheless, I decided 
to keep my work as a diplomat separate from my role as researcher; a choice partly motivated 
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A flagship of democracy turned into a shipwreck of anarchy? 




Long perceived as a beacon of democracy on the African continent and a relatively stable 
anchor in a troubled region, the status of the Malian state radically altered in a short span of 
time. In early 2012, state authority withered in Mali’s northern regions as an opaque alliance of 
terrorists, former Tuareg rebels and drug smugglers took control of an area encompassing more 
than two thirds of the country’s territory. It thus seemed as though, almost overnight, a flagship 
of democracy had turned into a shipwreck of anarchy. 
However, the speed at which the Malian state lost control over the northern regions exposed 
the shaky foundations that underpinned state authority in general and security provision in 
particular. This chapter counters an analysis that interprets the troubled events in 2012 in terms 
of a sudden collapse of robust state authority. Instead, the chapter examines how subsequent 
regimes instituted state authority in relation to other power poles in society and traces the 
historical roots of Mali’s heterarchical political order. It zooms in on the historical interplay 
and changing power balance between state and non-state armed groups involved in hybrid 
security provision. This analysis is restricted to narrow hybrid security provision in northern 
Mali from above (“supply side”). It does not take popular perceptions of these efforts into 
account or address broader human security preoccupations from below (“demand side”).  
Three key dimensions guide the historical assessment of hybrid security provision. First, the 
chapter examines whether security cooperation between state and non-state actors occurred 
through official or unofficial channels. Secondly, the chapter assesses changes in terms of the 
form of cooperation. Did state defence and security forces and non-state armed groups engage 
in joint security efforts (complementary), or has the state relied on non-state actors to act on its 
behalf (delegatory). Finally, it examines shifts in the power balance between state and non-state 
actors in the security realm. Did the state obtain a vertically superior position, or was it merely 
a horizontal equivalent of non-state armed groups?   
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family or generational groups. It proved difficult to build up relations of trust with women, 
particularly at the local level, and to circumvent their limited inclusion in my research. This 
lack of a gender balance clearly constitutes an important limitation of this thesis.   
 Finally, it proved difficult to obtain access to and conduct empirical research about sensitive 
matters such as the rise of transnational criminality, the presence of radical Islamists in northern 
Mali or state infiltration in drug smuggling networks. I circumvented this difficulty to some 
extent by referring to publications of other scholars who had better access to important 
respondents in this respect. Hence, I certainly owe a debt of gratitude to researchers who 
gathered empirical data in these difficult circumstances.  
 
1.3.4. Outline of the book 
 
This thesis consists of three main sections. The first two sections focus on the period preceding 
the 2012 crisis, while the final part covers the five-year period thereafter. 
 The first part (Chapter 2) examines the emergence of Mali’s heterarchical order and 
illustrates hybrid patterns of public service delivery, with a specific focus on security. 
 The second and core part examines whether and how patterns of political participation, 
representation and accountability shaped through the party system (Chapter 3), the legislature 
(Chapter 4) and municipal democratic institutions (Chapter 5) shored up Malian state 
legitimacy, against the background of the emerging heterarchical order.     
 The third part (Chapter 6) examines the anchoring of Mali’s heterarchical order in the years 
that followed the 2012 crisis, despite considerable international efforts in support of the state.   
 In the general conclusions (Chapter 7), I return to the overarching research question and 
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managed to expand their influence over other clans in the Adagh area (today’s Kidal region) as 
a result of their strategic alliances with French authorities.153  
Colonial forces also relied on allied factions amongst local communities to ensure law and 
order. Archival research by Gremont (2012) illustrated that French colonial forces aligned with 
and armed local militias to combat other (nomadic) groups who tried to resist the colonial 
state.154 Ifoghas Tuareg established mixed military units with colonial forces to suppress revolts 
by other clans.155 In Arab communities, the Berabiche frequently collaborated with French 
colonial forces.156 In addition to such complementary hybrid security efforts, colonial forces 
relied on delegatory forms of cooperation to maintain order in the stretched-out Sahelian 
regions. They established auxiliary mobile police forces (‘gourmiers’), who recruited from 
amongst local warriors and noble factions.157 These forces surveyed the dispersed nomadic 
zones, collected taxes and went after those who rebelled against colonial oppression. Yet, the 
colonial administration remained the hierarchically superior command with a strong authority 
over these hybrid security practices.     
Throughout the seven decades of colonial rule (1890–1960), the scope of the colonial state 
remained limited in the northern regions of today’s Mali. French colonial authorities focused 
on the southern regions, in particular those areas with economic potential. As a result, most 
people residing in the North lacked vital connections to the colonial administration, 
francophone education system and other public services. Their livelihoods and sociocultural 
affinity depended more on networks across the Sahara towards northern Africa than the colonial 
epicentre towards the South. By the end of the colonial period, the French envisioned the 
establishment of the semi-autonomous Organisation Commune des Régions Sahariennes 
(OCRS), encompassing parts of today’s Algeria, Niger, Mauritania and northern Mali, in an 
attempt to safeguard an influence sphere in the Sahel. Many community leaders in northern 
Mali perceived the OCRS as a strategic opportunity to avoid becoming ruled by the emerging 
southern elites during a post-colonial era. They fiercely opposed their integration into a Malian 
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2.1. INTERMEDIARY AUTHORITIES UNDER COLONIAL RULE 
The northern parts of the Sahel, certainly the border area between Mali and Algeria, were 
amongst the last on the African continent to be colonised.147 Tuareg warriors fiercely resisted 
colonial penetration and the vast terrains with a dispersed population proved difficult to control. 
In this situation, the colonial administration relied on intermediary authorities to maximise its 
geographical scope at limited cost as it sought to institutionalise its dominance over society. In 
its search for reliable local allies, French authorities made use of the hierarchical social 
structures that characterised Malian communities. These were organised along both kinship 
lines (multiple clans, differentiation at the horizontal level) and into hierarchical status groups 
(ranging from noblemen to former slaves, differentiation at the vertical level). The hierarchical 
stratification among Tuareg communities consisted of, for example, noble warriors (imusgagh), 
free noblemen (ineslemen), free non-noblemen (imghad), craftsmen and bards (inadan) and 
(former) slaves (iklan).148 Many other communities consisted of similar “cultural fields of 
hierarchy.”149 The exact meaning of a clan or status group was locally contested and boundaries 
between social groups were fluid and subject to change.150 To create a more stable socio-
political order, French authorities formalised the clan-based system.  
They created the function of chef de canton and searched for candidates amongst aristocratic 
families to fulfil this critical function,151 thereby reshaping traditional leadership into an 
intermediary function between local subjects and the colonial state. The chieftaincy emerged 
into an “essential cog in the colonial system.”152 While the colonial state operated as the 
supreme hierarchical authority, it granted considerable levels of autonomy to its intermediary 
allies. In this context, it was important for local clan leaders to be recognised as the leading 
authority and privileged interlocutor in a particular region. In northern Mali, Ifoghas Tuareg 
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state administration. They replaced French administrators with Malian nationals, notably party 
rank-and-file, at a much greater pace than in neighbouring countries.161 They enforced the 
autonomy of the Malian army by closing French army bases and by rejecting mutual defence 
cooperation. Moreover, they pulled out of the regional monetary union, thereby delinking 
Mali’s currency from France.162 The authorities even went out of their way to obtain detailed 
information about Malian citizens residing in France, whom they encouraged to return home to 
contribute to the new state.163    
 Domestically, the independence party dominated and controlled the public sphere. The US-
RDA took a firm grip of the political, military, social and economic spheres by – as they put it 
– “weaving a dense spider’s web” across society.164 The regime officially banned influential 
Islamic organisations as it sought to weaken the position of religious leaders.165 In a crucial 
move to institute its political authority over society and to counter the influence of alternative 
power poles, the US-RDA had gradually restricted the role of the chef de canton in the years 
before independence. The Malian leaders questioned their legitimacy as intermediary leaders 
during the colonial era and eventually abolished the position altogether.166 Ideological notions 
and a general policy geared towards promoting equal citizenship underpinned these measures. 
Moreover, the US-RDA wanted to lift what they considered to be traditional impediments to a 
modern society and economy. However, the policy also aimed to further entrench the grip of 
the party-state over society. The new decentralisation policy replaced the central role of the 
local chief with a state appointed administrator, who, in turn, appointed a local village chief.  
 Nonetheless, US-RDA had to acknowledge that it was impossible to entirely bypass the 
intermediary role of local chiefs in the densely populated and largely pastoralist northern 
regions. In the run-up to independence, the US-RDA had consistently expressed its commitment 
to liberate former slaves, who constituted an important electoral constituency to the party, from 
“feudal” oppression in local hierarchies. The US-RDA profiled itself as a people’s party and 
gradually managed to build a solid support basis amongst the so-called former slaves across the 
northern regions. Many tribal leaders, in turn, became active members of the Parti Progressiste 
Soudanais (PSP), a real chief’s party.167 Once in office, Malian independence leaders indeed 
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state and pleaded their case with the French leadership, emphasising the profound sociocultural 
differences between northern and southern Mali. However, the French eventually aborted the 
OCRS project. The political leadership in Bamako had perceived the alignment of northern 
leaders with the colonial forces and the OCRS initiative with great suspicion.158 Once in office, 
they were determined to swiftly institute state authority across the entire newborn nation.  
 
2.2.  ANCHORING STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND HIERARCHY AT INDEPENDENCE   
 
The Union Soudanaise-Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (US-RDA) guided the country 
towards independence and, after a short-lived federation with Senegal, Mali was born as a 
country on 22 September 1960. Its leaders instituted a socialist inspired and highly centralised 
one-party regime, which they legitimised with a national unity discourse and modernisation 
agenda for the whole of society. Power was strongly vested in the hands of the party leadership 
and became increasingly personalised under President Modibo Keita.159 The regime was driven 
by a strong desire to position the Malian state as the hierarchical superior locus of authority in 
society, both on the basis of an anti-imperialist agenda vis-à-vis the former colonial forces as 
well as domestically over other power poles in society. There was not a great deal of political, 
economic or civic space outside the realm of the state and little room for dissent. Hence, at 
independence, a hierarchical political order emerged in Mali rather than a hybrid model in 
which the state shared core duties with non-state power poles. 
 In the immediate years after independence, the US-RDA party took full control of the state. 
Zolberg (1966) demonstrated that the party-state emerged as the prevailing political model 
across the West African region.160 In Mali, the US-RDA intended to supervise, control and co-
ordinate all the other instruments of government. State officials and party representatives jointly 
collected state taxes along with party membership fees. In a relatively short time, the party 
established local structures across Mali’s vast territory to ensure the channelling of its directives 
from the political centre towards the peripheries.  
 The independence leaders quickly asserted Malian state authority vis-à-vis the ex-colonial 
authorities. They opted for a radical break with the colonial past, in a much more profound way 
than most countries in the region. The US-RDA leadership took swift action to “Africanise” the 
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development.173 Yet, their sedentarisation policies threatened local economies and livelihoods. 
Many citizens in these areas felt increasingly alienated from the state.  
 On top of their efforts to anchor the authority of the party-state in a physical sense, Malian 
independence leaders invested in nation building. They promoted a “national myth” as a basis 
upon which citizens could relate to each other as Malians. However, they primarily rooted 
representations of a common political community in historical narratives of southern 
communities, notably the ancient Mali Empire. Various scholars noted the selective 
historiography and bias towards the Mande/Bambara cultural heritage in this regard.174 
President Modibo Keita was regularly portrayed as a descendant of Sundjata Keita, the alleged 
founder of the ancient Mali Empire in the thirteenth century.175  
 At the same time, Tuareg leaders across the North made efforts to enhance a sense of 
belonging amongst their different factions in clear opposition to this “southern” nationalist 
discourse. The Malian state that emerged at independence thus “harboured at least two nascent 
national ideas, if not more: the Malian nation and the Tamasheq nation.”176  
 It was not long before popular dissent mounted against the policies propelled and advanced 
in such a coercive manner by Mali’s independence leaders. It started with a first Tuareg 
rebellion in the northern regions. In the early 1960s, the highest leadership position (the 
Amenokal) amongst the Tuareg of the Kel Adagh near the Malian-Algerian border became 
vacant. Two brothers from the Ifoghas Tuareg clan were in the running to take up the position. 
The most popular candidate amongst local Tuareg factions aimed to reinforce relations with 
Algeria, Niger and France and to restrain the influence sphere of the Malian state in the northern 
regions. The US-RDA opposed France’s “imperialist” influence and strove for greater Tuareg 
autonomy, which frustrated the party-state’s centralisation efforts. The independence leaders 
actively supported the other brother, who was less popular locally but intended to solidify ties 
with the Malian state. This fuelled already mounting frustration towards the Malian state and a 
first armed rebellion broke out between 1962 and 1964.177 The army brutally crushed the revolt, 
allegedly killing over a 1000 people and poisoning drinking wells.  
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pursued their anti-slavery ideology, promoting equal citizenship as noted above, and reinforced 
support networks with historically lower ranked factions across the region.168 Moreover, it 
enabled “subordinate” factions to create their own administrative units at the local level in order 
to reinforce their autonomy vis-à-vis the traditional chieftaincy.169 Mali’s independence leaders 
were particularly keen to institute state authority in these areas because of the rapprochement 
made by several chiefs towards the French-projected Organisation Commune des Régions 
Sahariennes (OCRS). However, in daily practice, the party also relied on local chiefs as crucial 
intermediaries to exercise public authority and administer these distant and vast areas. In 
contrast to the overall policy and prevailing practice in other parts of the country, they therefore 
continued to collaborate with chiefs in the remote northern regions.170  
 Beyond centralisation in the political realm, the US-RDA nationalised the economy and 
created dozens of state enterprises. State companies secured a monopoly on the export of 
primary products. The introduction of a national currency, the Franc Malien, enabled the 
government to regulate and tax transnational trade, to the great annoyance of many merchants 
who resorted to smuggling their goods.171 Mali’s independence leaders aimed to transform the 
agricultural sector into a modern, socialist, peasant economy. Amselle (2002) portrayed the rise 
of a state bourgeoisie enforcing (and thereby exploiting) the rural areas to contribute to socialist 
accumulation.172 The US-RDA perceived small-scale agriculture as an impediment to 
development and instituted forced labour on collective fields through a system of local 
agricultural cooperatives. Farmers perceived these efforts as oppressive, exploitative and 
reminiscent of the colonial era and tried to wriggle out of the forced labour schemes. As a result, 
the state-led efforts turned out to be highly unproductive and the commercialisation of cereals 
diminished over time. Highly personalised – including family-based – support networks 
between the party-state and privileged entrepreneurs in the commercial realm emerged. Yet, the 
vast majority of non-privileged economic actors increasingly mobilised against the authorities.  
 The limited socio-economic efforts undertaken in the North focused on “rationalising” the 
cattle industry by settling nomadic pastoralists. The US-RDA also perceived pastoralism, as 
practiced by many Tuareg and Fulani in northern and central Mali, to be an obstacle to national 
	
168 Whitehouse, B. (2017) ‘How Did Mali Get There: (Part 1: Echoes of Decolonization)’, 5 May 2017. 
169 Molenaar, F. et al. (2019) ‘The Status Quo Defied: The Legitimacy of Traditional Authorities in Areas of 
Limited Statehood in Mali, Niger and Libya’, Clingendael, August 2019 (Research Report).  
170 Lecocq, B. (2003) ‘From Colonialism to Keita: Comparing Pre- and Post-Independence Regimes (1946-1968)’, 
Mande Studies, 5: 29-47. 
171 Craven-Matthews, C. and Englebert, P. (2018), p. 9. 
172 Amselle, J.L. (2002) ‘La corruption et le clientélisme au Mali et en Europe de l’Est. Quelques points de 
comparaison’, Cahiers d’Études Africaines 4(72): 629-642, p. 631.	
59	
	
development.173 Yet, their sedentarisation policies threatened local economies and livelihoods. 
Many citizens in these areas felt increasingly alienated from the state.  
 On top of their efforts to anchor the authority of the party-state in a physical sense, Malian 
independence leaders invested in nation building. They promoted a “national myth” as a basis 
upon which citizens could relate to each other as Malians. However, they primarily rooted 
representations of a common political community in historical narratives of southern 
communities, notably the ancient Mali Empire. Various scholars noted the selective 
historiography and bias towards the Mande/Bambara cultural heritage in this regard.174 
President Modibo Keita was regularly portrayed as a descendant of Sundjata Keita, the alleged 
founder of the ancient Mali Empire in the thirteenth century.175  
 At the same time, Tuareg leaders across the North made efforts to enhance a sense of 
belonging amongst their different factions in clear opposition to this “southern” nationalist 
discourse. The Malian state that emerged at independence thus “harboured at least two nascent 
national ideas, if not more: the Malian nation and the Tamasheq nation.”176  
 It was not long before popular dissent mounted against the policies propelled and advanced 
in such a coercive manner by Mali’s independence leaders. It started with a first Tuareg 
rebellion in the northern regions. In the early 1960s, the highest leadership position (the 
Amenokal) amongst the Tuareg of the Kel Adagh near the Malian-Algerian border became 
vacant. Two brothers from the Ifoghas Tuareg clan were in the running to take up the position. 
The most popular candidate amongst local Tuareg factions aimed to reinforce relations with 
Algeria, Niger and France and to restrain the influence sphere of the Malian state in the northern 
regions. The US-RDA opposed France’s “imperialist” influence and strove for greater Tuareg 
autonomy, which frustrated the party-state’s centralisation efforts. The independence leaders 
actively supported the other brother, who was less popular locally but intended to solidify ties 
with the Malian state. This fuelled already mounting frustration towards the Malian state and a 
first armed rebellion broke out between 1962 and 1964.177 The army brutally crushed the revolt, 
allegedly killing over a 1000 people and poisoning drinking wells.  
	
173 Keita, K. (1998) ‘Conflict and Conflict resolution in the Sahel: The Tuareg insurgency in Mali’, Small Wars & 
Insurgencies, (9) 3: 102-128. 
174 Charbonneau, B. and Sears, J.M. (2014) ‘Fighting for Liberal Peace in Mali? The Limits of International 
Military Intervention.’ Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, (8)2-3: 192-213. Lecocq, B., (2010). 
175 Amselle, J.L. (2002), p. 638. 
176 Lecocq, B. (2010), p. 27. Kel Tamasheq (“those who speak Tamasheq”) is a term primarily used in reference 
to pan-Tuareg mobilisation. 
177 Boilley, P. (1999), pp. 317-350. 
58	
	
pursued their anti-slavery ideology, promoting equal citizenship as noted above, and reinforced 
support networks with historically lower ranked factions across the region.168 Moreover, it 
enabled “subordinate” factions to create their own administrative units at the local level in order 
to reinforce their autonomy vis-à-vis the traditional chieftaincy.169 Mali’s independence leaders 
were particularly keen to institute state authority in these areas because of the rapprochement 
made by several chiefs towards the French-projected Organisation Commune des Régions 
Sahariennes (OCRS). However, in daily practice, the party also relied on local chiefs as crucial 
intermediaries to exercise public authority and administer these distant and vast areas. In 
contrast to the overall policy and prevailing practice in other parts of the country, they therefore 
continued to collaborate with chiefs in the remote northern regions.170  
 Beyond centralisation in the political realm, the US-RDA nationalised the economy and 
created dozens of state enterprises. State companies secured a monopoly on the export of 
primary products. The introduction of a national currency, the Franc Malien, enabled the 
government to regulate and tax transnational trade, to the great annoyance of many merchants 
who resorted to smuggling their goods.171 Mali’s independence leaders aimed to transform the 
agricultural sector into a modern, socialist, peasant economy. Amselle (2002) portrayed the rise 
of a state bourgeoisie enforcing (and thereby exploiting) the rural areas to contribute to socialist 
accumulation.172 The US-RDA perceived small-scale agriculture as an impediment to 
development and instituted forced labour on collective fields through a system of local 
agricultural cooperatives. Farmers perceived these efforts as oppressive, exploitative and 
reminiscent of the colonial era and tried to wriggle out of the forced labour schemes. As a result, 
the state-led efforts turned out to be highly unproductive and the commercialisation of cereals 
diminished over time. Highly personalised – including family-based – support networks 
between the party-state and privileged entrepreneurs in the commercial realm emerged. Yet, the 
vast majority of non-privileged economic actors increasingly mobilised against the authorities.  
 The limited socio-economic efforts undertaken in the North focused on “rationalising” the 
cattle industry by settling nomadic pastoralists. The US-RDA also perceived pastoralism, as 
practiced by many Tuareg and Fulani in northern and central Mali, to be an obstacle to national 
	
168 Whitehouse, B. (2017) ‘How Did Mali Get There: (Part 1: Echoes of Decolonization)’, 5 May 2017. 
169 Molenaar, F. et al. (2019) ‘The Status Quo Defied: The Legitimacy of Traditional Authorities in Areas of 
Limited Statehood in Mali, Niger and Libya’, Clingendael, August 2019 (Research Report).  
170 Lecocq, B. (2003) ‘From Colonialism to Keita: Comparing Pre- and Post-Independence Regimes (1946-1968)’, 
Mande Studies, 5: 29-47. 
171 Craven-Matthews, C. and Englebert, P. (2018), p. 9. 
172 Amselle, J.L. (2002) ‘La corruption et le clientélisme au Mali et en Europe de l’Est. Quelques points de 
comparaison’, Cahiers d’Études Africaines 4(72): 629-642, p. 631.	
61	
	
It was only a challenge from within that toppled the regime. In 1968, a military coup ousted the 
independence leaders from power amidst the increasingly dire economic circumstances and 
mounting social resistance.  
 
2.3. HYBRID PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY IN THE REALM OF SOCIAL SERVICES 
 
Two, at first sight, paradoxical tendencies characterised the second Malian republic (1968-
1991). On the one hand, its military leaders instituted a centralised autocratic regime, restricted 
civil liberties, ruled with a firm hand and sought to maintain the state as the main authority in 
society. On the other hand, actors operating outside the realm of the formal state increasingly 
performed key social services. Although hybrid patterns in the exercise of public authority in 
social service delivery emerged, the state continued to dominate security provision.   
 After the coup, Mali’s new leadership initially established an authoritarian military regime 
that in 1979 was substituted with a one-party regime. From then on, the Union Démocratique 
du Peuple Malien (UDPM) and its leader Moussa Traore dominated Malian politics. As the 
Secretary-General of the party and only candidate during successive presidential elections, 
Traore was re-elected every five years. Local sections of the party proposed candidates for the 
legislative elections but the decision-making authority over the final candidate list rested with 
the party’s Central Executive Bureau. The authorities co-opted the powerful class of state 
bureaucrats that they had inherited from the previous regime by keeping many of the national 
state companies intact, despite their inefficacies.183 Fay (1995) illustrated how the party-state 
gradually established a system of governance based on predation and redistribution.184 The 
authorities maintained a support base amongst influential power brokers across all strategic 
sectors in society in return for their loyalty. At the local level, the Malian state relied heavily 
on tribal hierarchy. Local chiefs regained their prominent role in conducting local affairs as 
state intermediaries and managed to reinforce their own position because of their allegiance to 
the regime. The informal political strategy of co-optation pursued by the UDPM raised public 
debt but was successful in political terms for many years. 
 The northern regions, still perceived as “le Mali inutile” (the useless part of Mali) in 
economic terms, received very little support.185 The military regime “contented itself with the 
	
183 Bennett, V.P. (1975) ‘Military Government in Mali’, Journal of Modern African Studies, (13)2: 249-266. 
184 Fay, C. (1995), pp. 21-2. 




The locally recruited mobile (camel-mounted) police forces (“gourmiers”) found themselves in 
a particularly difficult situation, being deployed to fight their own kin. Accustomed to the 
terrain, they constituted an important actor in security efforts geared towards suppressing the 
rebellion. However, after the brutalities displayed by the army, many gourmiers jumped ship 
and joined the rebellion.178 After the rebellion, Malian authorities refrained from holding the 
army accountable for the many atrocities it committed. On the contrary, they imposed military 
rule in the northern regions. Military staff fulfilled key functions in the state administration – 
from governors to schoolteachers – in these areas. The Adagh area remained isolated from the 
political, economic and social development in the rest of postcolonial Mali.179  
While the rebellion in the North was brutally suppressed, popular resistance continued to 
mount against the authorities across the rest of the country. Citizens perceived the state as 
increasingly predatory and depicted the authorities in similar local terms as the former colonial 
regime.180 Farmers and many entrepreneurs vocally protested against the failing economic 
policies and coercive governance style. The capacity of the Malian state to realise its leading 
role in the political, economic and social realms was limited and many of the initiatives it 
launched proved counterproductive in socio-economic terms. Numerous state-led efforts went 
against the very grain of local livelihoods and economies. They reduced citizens to subjects of 
forced labour and provoked firm resistance across the newborn country. Again, the US-RDA 
relied on repression and intimidation tactics to maintain its grip over society. They sent political 
opponents to prisons in remote areas and the party deployed an informal militia (the “army of 
the party”) – which was better funded, trained and equipped than the army – across the 
country.181 They empowered so-called brigades de vigilance, composed of urban youngsters 
attached to the party, to conduct policing tasks at the local level.182 These actors were not fully 
integrated in the state structures but rather operated at the interface between party, state and 
society. 
Although hybrid security practices occurred during the first republic, the Malian state largely 
dominated the security realm. This reflected the broader ambition of Mali’s independence 
leaders to position the party-state as the central and hierarchically superior institution in society. 
The party-state constituted the primary institution exercising public authority in the public 
service. The room for manoeuvring of other power poles in society remained highly restricted. 
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the wake of these budgetary constraints, President Traore called upon the Bretton Woods 
institutions for financial support. International donors assisted Traore but made their support 
conditional on considerable cuts to public expenditure and demanded stringent administrative, 
economic and social reforms. In line with the broader framework of the Structural Adjustment 
Programmes, Malian authorities froze public wages, discharged civil servants, established 
performance-based criteria in the public service, ended food subsidies and cut social services. 
By the late 1980s, the purchasing power of urban households was down to half of the 1962 
level.190 Despite the fact that many citizens struggled to make ends meet amidst dire socio-
economic conditions, corruption scandals that involved senior state officials were at the order 
of the day. Craven-Matthews and Englebert (2018) noted that: 
  
By the mid-1980s, […] regime members were accused of having stashed away $1 billion in 
foreign bank accounts (by then about 25 percent of gross domestic product).191  
 
Unsurprisingly, popular protests against the authorities swell. Citizens attacked state edifices 
and targeted properties of the regime’s economic collaborators in the capital city Bamako.192 
The state equally faced mounting security challenges in the northern regions. After the 
devastating droughts, numerous Tuareg youngsters migrated to Libya and Algeria, as noted 
above, and many had joined the ranks of the national armies. Whereas kinship and hierarchical 
differences obstructed the construction of a strong common identity in Mali, these migrants 
were all regarded as Tuareg’s away from home. There was more that united than separated 
them. Many returned home and helped prepare a renewed rebellion in revenge for the brutal 
repression of the rebellion in the early 1960s, led by their father’s generation, and subsequent 
military rule over the northern regions.  
 In 1990, they launched several successful attacks against the Malian army. Retaliatory 
actions by the army caused many civilian casualties, which only further eroded state legitimacy 
and encouraged other youngsters in the region to join the ranks of the rebellion.  
Traore now faced fierce resistance in the capital city and well-trained rebels in the remote 
northern regions. With support from Algerian officials, he quickly negotiated a way out of the 
northern crisis and signed an agreement in the town of Tamanrasset in January 1991.193 State 
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outer control of the region to prevent any further upheaval.”186 Many communities in the area 
lacked strong informal connections to the political centre that were crucial to advancing local 
interests during the UDPM era. The severe droughts that peaked in 1973-4 and again a decade 
later reinforced deep levels of popular mistrust vis-à-vis the central authorities across the 
northern and central regions. The droughts literally destroyed the pastoral economy, thereby 
inciting rapid urbanisation and sedentarisation. Many youngsters fled the area and settled in 
neighbouring countries where a considerable number joined the ranks of the armed forces. The 
Malian state completely mishandled the crisis across the northern and central regions. Citizens 
perceived the “dysfunctional and corrupt management of external resources by central 
authorities,” with great bitterness.187  
 It was in this period that international organisations and NGOs gradually took on key 
statehood functions. First, by providing humanitarian aid and subsequently by expanding their 
scope to development cooperation encompassing a broader range of social services. This 
widened the already considerable gap between the Malian government, the state and society. 
The droughts and subsequent responses, Mann (2015) contended, thereby redefined “what 
government was and could be.”188 He demonstrated that a form of nongovernmentality emerged 
whereby NGO’s increasingly performed different state functions. Yet, his nuanced assessment 
of this period moved beyond a zero-sum analysis or dichotomy between state and non-state 
governance. The increased role of non-state actors in providing public service delivery also 
enhanced the state in several ways. For example, it enabled the UDPM to focus on other 
dimensions of governance. This certainly held for its performance in the area of security. While 
the role of the state diminished in the area of socio-economic service delivery, its military 
presence in northern Mali remained considerable. The regime gradually dismantled many local 
mobile security units. The army also continued to play a leading role in administrating the area.  
 While the role of non-state actors in delivering social services rose to prominence, the ability 
of the state to finance development initiatives and to preserve its pyramid of clientelistic support 
networks became increasingly constrained throughout the 1980s. The subsidies provided to 
highly inefficient and unprofitable state companies together with the expensive civil service 
wage bill had overstretched public expenditure.189 Import tariffs and high export taxes had 
restricted trade through official channels and the smuggling economy flourished as a result. In 
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after the coup. Mali witnessed an exemplary democratic transition. The political space opened 
up after decades of one-party rule and many new political parties registered in the aftermath of 
the transition. The democratically elected authorities respected civil liberties, new media outlets 
blossomed and numerous civil society organisations registered during the 1990’s. Moreover, 
the authorities designed one of the most ambitious decentralisation programmes on the 
continent. Mali emerged as a leading example of democracy on the African continent.   
 Nevertheless, patterns of continuity in the political realm also prevailed. The institutional 
set-up of Malian democracy continued to concentrate powers in the executive branch of 
government. In fact, the formal political system could be characterised as “super-presidential,” 
as the Malian president had few colleagues on the continent with an equal number of powers 
vested in the presidency. Furthermore, the party system continued to be dominated by a 
dominant party (ADEMA) and a de facto party-state emerged throughout the 1990s. The next 
chapters of this thesis provide an in-depth analysis of the democratic regime and party system. 
This section focuses on the expanding role of non-state actors in the area of security provision 
throughout the democratic era. It particularly focuses on the security response to renewed 
conflict in the northern regions and the ensuing peace process. A hybrid political order further 
anchored and broadened as state and non-state actors shared the core duty of security provision.  
  During the democratic transition, the “National Pact” replaced the Tamanrasset agreement 
that was hastily signed by former President Traore.196 The peace deal aimed at bridging Mali’s 
North–South divide by: orienting more development funds to the northern regions; 
decentralising governance responsibilities and means; creating the new administrative region 
of Kidal where key Tuareg rebellion leaders resided; reducing the presence of the Malian 
military across the North; and reintegrating former rebels into the army and society.197 
However, armed conflict against the Malian state continued during the first years of the 
democratic regime. Fighting amongst northern factions – the “Krieg im Krieg” (the war within 
the war) as Klute and von Trotha (2000) called it – also escalated.198 Tensions amongst Tuareg 
factions had already mounted during the democratic transition phase. The Tuareg Ifoghas 
faction monopolised the seats allocated to the Tuareg community during the National 
Conference, the Monitoring Committee of the Tamanrasset peace agreement and positions in 
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authorities made significant concessions to the rebellion by granting the northern regions a 
specific status with high levels of administrative autonomy. Moreover, they promised that 
almost 50 per cent of Mali’s national infrastructural investment funds would be devoted to the 
northern regions. Locally recruited staff would replace army officers in the regional state 
administration and the army would vacate its military posts near Tuareg camps. Combatants of 
the armed groups would be integrated into the national army.194 Those northern factions that 
were associated with the agreement welcomed it. However, other constituencies, most notably 
Songhay sedentary factions, complained that the deal failed to address their interests and 
rewarded those who had rebelled against the state. Opposition against the Tamanrasset accord 
was equally fierce in Bamako. People particularly criticised the granting of autonomy to the 
northern regions and questioned its impact on Mali’s territorial integrity. 195 
 Meanwhile, wider protests against the UDPM’s poor socio-economic performance, the lack 
of democratic space and rampant corruption mounted. The “street” emerged as an important 
space to enforce political change. Different interest groups teamed up. Graduated youth who 
could not find work in the downsized state administration created the Association of Qualified 
Youth Demanding Work. Petty traders in the informal sector who were tired of being harassed 
by corrupt police officers, student movements, the trade unions, newly formed associations 
demanding a democratic opening all joined in. As the street became an import political arena, 
the social forces marching on it turned into a powerful political force. The armed forces 
violently repressed the protests and opened fire on the demonstrators in March 1991. Parts of 
the army eventually sided with the protesters and ousted President Traore in a military coup. 
After 70 years of colonial rule and over 30 years of authoritarian rule, Mali was about to institute 
a democratic regime.  
  
2.4. INSTITUTING A HYBRID POLITICAL ORDER UNDER DEMOCRATIC RULE 
 
A military-led transitional government paved the way for a national conference during which 
more than 700 delegates discussed the institutional foundations of the new democratic era. The 
conference drafted a new constitution, an electoral law and political parties’ act. A popular 
referendum adopted the constitution and multi-party elections were organised barely a year 
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In addition to this prevalence of hybrid security practices through unofficial channels, security 
cooperation through official channels advanced during the implementation phase of the 
National Pact. France supported the establishment of a number of official military units 
composed of both army soldiers and (former) Tuareg rebels who conducted so-called mixed 
patrols.202 Moreover, approximately 2500 rebels integrated into the army and civil service while 
an additional 9500 ex-combatants received financial support and training for their socio-
economic reintegration into society.203 The numbers integrated, although considered too few by 
some and too many by others, did improve interethnic contacts within the army’s structures.204 
Yet, the disarmament of rebels was only partially successful as combatants handed over light 
weaponry but kept a significant arsenal sequestered. Importantly, the withdrawal of the army 
from numerous northern sites, as stipulated by the peace agreement, significantly reduced the 
geographical scope of the state. Certainly because alternative security arrangements foreseen 
by the peace accord, the so-called Special Security Units, were never operationalised. As the 
army vacated several military sites across the northern regions, the state would come to rely 
ever more on non-state armed groups to counter security threats in the area. 
 In sum, non-state actors enlarged their role in hybrid security provision practices in northern 
Mali throughout the 1990s. The Ifoghas chieftaincy managed to position itself into an 
“intermediary position” of domination, governing internal local and regional affairs while 
monopolizing external ties with the central state and international organisations.205 It obtained 
a considerable level of discretionary authority between the state (above) and citizens (below). 
Though increasingly relying on delegatory forms of security cooperation, at distance, the state 
was still positioned, hierarchically, above its intermediary partners up North.  
This power balance altered during the course of the next decade. The withdrawal of state forces 
from several sites in northern Mali weakened state presence. More importantly, however, the 
rise of high-value transnational networks facilitated major sources of income and arms to the 
northern armed groups beyond the state. At the same time, several “glocal” jihadist groups 
became anchored in the socio-political fabric of northern Mali, as the next section demonstrates. 
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the transitional government.199 Other Tuareg clans, including the Imghad and Idnane, felt 
excluded and contested this Ifoghas dominance. Their rank-and-file became important 
constituencies of the Armée Révolutionnaire de Libération de l’Azawad (ARLA). This armed 
group not only fought against the Malian state, but also pursued a regional emancipatory 
process vis-à-vis the Tuareg Ifoghas. Tuareg factions from the areas between Timbuktu, Gao 
and Menaka dominated another armed group, the Front Populaire pour la Libération de 
l'Azaoud (FPLA). Ifoghas Tuareg, in turn, emerged as the principal constituency of the 
Mouvement Populaire de l’Azawad (MPA). Because the National Pact predominantly centred 
on Tuareg rebels and Malian authorities, the sedentary Songhay inhabitants and former (black) 
Tuareg slaves in northern Mali felt ignored. A former army colonel helped to establish the 
Mouvement Patriotique Ganda Koy (MPGK), often simply referred to as the Ganda Koy 
(literally “masters of the land”) to cater to their interests. During much of the first half of the 
1990s, northern armed groups continued fighting each other and the Malian army. Violent 
conflicts led to an estimated death toll between 6000 and 8000 people and soured relations 
between and amongst northern communities.  
 Hybrid security patterns came to the fore as the Malian state aligned with specific actors in 
the conflict to counter other armed groups. The Ifoghas dominated MPA defeated the ARLA 
and FPLA with the help of the Malian army. Different sections in the army also supported the 
Ganda Koy.200 The Malian state thereby managed to exert considerable influence over events 
in northern Mali through unofficial (complementary and delegatory) forms of cooperation with 
loyal armed groups. The Ifoghas leadership of the MPA, in turn, managed to uphold and further 
enhance its dominance, if not regional hegemony, over other Tuareg factions as a result of its 
strategic partnership with the Malian state. In fact, the Ifoghas chieftaincy appropriated a 
number of rights and key public functions of the state in the Adagh region. Klute and von Trotha 
(2000) conceptualised the emerging state of affairs as a form of “para-statehood.”201 Through a 
process of informal decentralisation, or privatisation, the Ifoghas Chieftancy assumed the 
national state’s monopoly on the use of violence in the most northern region. It mediated 
between the region its internal and external affairs, controlled external financial resources and 
thereby secured their dominance over other local factions. This constituted a move away from 
(direct) complementary forms of cooperation to more (indirect) delegatory arrangements.  
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military expenditure.211 The drugs were transported by road but also flown into the region. In 
November 2009, a burned-out Boeing 727-200 (originating from Venezuela) carrying an 
estimated 10 tonnes of cocaine was found near Gao.212 Although the number of cocaine flights 
remained elusive, a US security official referred to a “growing fleet” of jets, and interviews 
with local observers suggested that multiple flights were taking place.213 Moroccan cannabis 
constituted a particularly lucrative contraband passing through northern Mali. Hence, the region 
was integrated into smuggling networks operating at a truly global scale and the value of the 
contraband was unmatched by any other product. This raised the stakes in terms of obtaining 
control over territory across northern Mali, or at least the high-value goods passing through 
strategic territorial junctures.  Consequently, rivalry within and amongst northern factions 
intensified. Moreover, the precarious power balance that had characterised relations between 
the Malian state and various competing northern factions altered.  
 Conflicts between competing smuggling networks, tied to local factions, amplified. In 
December 2007, for example, Ifoghas Tuareg stole seven cars loaded with cocaine from Arab 
smugglers, almost inciting a violent response from a large group of Arabic youngsters.214 A 
year later, local Ifoghas and Arab Berabiche community leaders just managed to avoid violent 
confrontations over smuggling routes between community members. Members of competing 
Saharawi and Malian Arab smuggling networks did clash regularly.215 Moreover, violent 
confrontations between “aristocratic” Ifoghas and Kounta factions, on the one hand, and 
traditionally “subordinate” Tuareg and Arab clans, on the other hand, transpired as a result of 
disputes linked to the smuggling economy. Similar tensions were witnessed in local and 
regional political institutions when former “vassals” turned drugs money into campaign funds 
in an attempt to improve their political representation.  
 In order to protect their drugs convoys and profits derived from the trade, smugglers 
established their own militias or aligned with existing armed groups. The arms trade flourished 
alongside drug smuggling and Mali witnessed an inflow of heavy weaponry.216 It was the 
downfall of Colonel Gaddafi, however, that constituted a real game changer when it came to 
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2.5. TRANSNATIONAL NETWORKS AND THE RISE OF A HETERARCHICAL POLITICAL ORDER 
 
Throughout the first decade of the new millennium, the intermediary form of para-statehood 
gradually gave way to an even more heterogeneous political order in northern Mali. A wide 
variety of “tribal, Islamist and jihadist, youth, civil, organised crime, and militia-like forms of 
political organisation” became anchored in the socio-political fabric of the region.206 Actors 
across northern Mali obtained access to considerable rent-seeking opportunities and heavy 
weaponry through transnational networks. The balance of power between state and non-state 
actors shifted as a result. In an analytical sense, the state lost its vertically superior position 
managing ties with intermediary para-states, powerbrokers and armed proxies. Instead, it 
became one of the horizontally equivalent institutions competing for influence in northern Mali. 
A heterarchical political order thus emerged. 
 During the 2000s, northern Mali became a vital hub for global drugs smuggling networks 
and the nerve centre of a regional kidnapping industry. Intercontinental drug networks 
benefitted from the social infrastructure underpinning the ancient trading and smuggling 
networks. Subsidised consumer goods from both Libya and Algeria had long been sold across 
the region, while transnational cigarette smuggling networks had risen to prominence in the 
1980s. Demands for, in particular, small arms increased throughout the 1990s.207 Ellis (2009) 
traced the historical roots of West Africa’s role as “transit point” in transnational drug networks 
to the early 1960s.208 In 2007, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 
assessed that 25 per cent of cocaine entering the European market arrived via West Africa.209 
By 2009, this figure had dropped to an estimated 17 per cent and possibly even less in the year 
after.210 However, as these data were primarily based on actual cocaine seizures, which were 
modest in comparison to the likely cocaine flows affecting the continent, it remained difficult 
to obtain an accurate picture of the actual quantities involved. In 2008, officials confiscated 750 
kilograms of cocaine in a single arrest, equalling the value of one third of Mali’s total annual 
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ties – and the informal militias established by the latter to protect their smuggling interests.223 
Yet, the strong “crime-terror” nexus often referred to in relation to AQIM remained 
unwarranted and appeared conflated. Flexible alliances of convenience characterised these 
partnerships. AQIM’s offshoot, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), 
maintained much stronger links with traffickers.224  
	 	How did Malian authorities respond to these rising challenges? President Amadou Toumani 
Touré (ATT), who had made a successful political comeback during the 2002 elections, relied 
on what the International Crisis Group aptly referred to as a policy of “remote-control 
governance through dubious criminal and mafia intermediaries” in the northern regions.225  
 In response to two successive Tuareg rebellions that erupted in 2006 and 2007, delegatory 
forms of security cooperation with non-state actors, though unofficial channels, now clearly 
prevailed. The Malian defence forces, largely confined to urban pockets and isolated military 
camps, played a limited role. The Touré regime relied on private militias that well-known 
(mostly Arab) traffickers had established to secure their drugs transports and protect their zones 
of influence in the smuggling economy. At times, the army sent senior military officers to train 
these irregular forces.226 Malian army representatives also occasionally commanded these 
militias, despite the fact that these forces maintained close ties with AQIM.227 In response to a 
small but violent rebellion that erupted in 2007, a lieutenant and former Tuareg rebel, Elhajj Ag 
Gamou, established an unofficial military unit composed of (Imghad) clan affiliates. His group 
secured victory against the rebels in 2009.228  
 By now, Mali’s recurrent hybrid security practices rested on increasingly shaky foundations. 
State officials almost entirely outsourced security provision to local “Big Men” and their 
militias. In sharp contrast, armed groups opposing the Malian state considerably reinforced their 
military capabilities, the numbers of recruits and weaponry.  
During the first half of the year 2012, the Malian state descended into a deep crisis at the centre 
and completely collapsed in the northern regions. From January onwards, a renewed Tuareg 
revolt incited an unprecedented series of dramatic events. In the run-up to the rebellion, former 
Tuareg rebel leaders succeeded in overcoming various factional differences.  
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the availability of military equipment. Some of the criminal networks engaged in drug 
trafficking also started smuggling Libyan arms.217 More importantly:  
 
Hundreds of ethnic Tuareg fighters left Libya during and after the 2011 conflict and drove 
across the desert to northern Mali, and took with them arms that had not previously been 
common such as anti-tank weapons, mortars, and heavy machineguns.218  
 
These weapons did more than boosted the military capacity of Tuareg-led armed groups; the 
UN also reported that arms originated from Libya “significantly reinforced” terrorist groups 
operating in Mali.219 From 2003 onwards, Algerian Islamic radicals started using the region as 
a safe haven. Many scholars have indicated the arrival of some 500 to 1000 representatives of 
the Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC), established by the most radical 
Islamic militants of the Algerian bloody civil war.220 Following a change of leadership, the 
GSPC reinforced its ties with Al-Qaeda and formally rebranded itself as Al-Qaeda the Islamic 
Maghreb (AQIM) in early 2007. The group established a lucrative kidnapping industry and 
primarily targeted Westerners, whom they released in exchange for significant ransom 
payments. This multi-million-dollar industry targeted more than 50 people between 2003 and 
2011.221 These ransom payments constituted the most important source of revenue and 
bolstered AQIM in northern Mali. Kidnappers initially captured most hostages in Algeria, 
Mauritania or Niger and subsequently negotiated their release from northern Mali. Sidibe 
(2012) noted that AQIM also benefitted from established networks with drug traffickers: 
“AQIM escorts drug convoys and provides security to the destination, and in turn, drug 
traffickers provide AQIM with funds.”222 AQIM leaders notably solidified relations with 
Berabiche Arabs in and around Timbuktu – with whom they shared both linguistic and cultural 
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On 6 April 2012, the MNLA declared Azawad an independent state and subsequently tried to 
assert its authority over northern Mali. The territorial delineation of the term Azawad is subject 
to different interpretations and strategic considerations. The MNLA demarcated Azawad within 
Mali’s original colonial boundaries in order to avoid direct opposition to its independence 
project from neighbouring countries. It pushed its occupation southwards well beyond the Niger 
River – often considered as the internal border between northern and southern Mali – up to 
Douentza.234 The MNLA entered into negotiations with Ansar Al-Din and established a 
government to rule over the new state. For a while, it seemed as though a long-lasting dream 
had finally come true for the rebel leaders. However, “the MNLA’s sovereignty was limited by 
the competition of powerful non-state armed actors deeply embedded into the local social 
structure, such as communal militias and jihadist groups.”235  
 Indeed, it soon became clear that the MNLA did not control northern Mali. While the MNLA 
had claimed responsibility for the ousting of the Malian army in strategic northern areas in its 
savvy media campaign, reality on the ground had been different. A group of seasoned scholars 
noted that the “[a]ssaults on Aguelhoc, Tessalit and Kidal were all carried out by an alliance of 
Jihadi-Salafi movements […] who did not directly claim their victories.”236 Lacher (2012) 
demonstrated that the MNLA never really controlled Timbuktu, as influential local Arab drug 
smugglers aligned their militias behind AQIM instead of the Tuareg rebels.237 Moreover, 
popular legitimacy of a Tuareg-led independent state was extremely limited across northern 
Mali, most notably in the town of Gao, where Songhay militias – who had fought bitterly against 
Tuareg factions throughout the 1990s – were dominant. The looting and misbehaviour of 
MNLA rank-and-file only further reduced their popularity in the area.  
In July 2012, just three months after the fall of the Malian state, jihadist groups ousted the 
MNLA from most urban areas across northern Mali. During the second half of that year, AQIM, 
MUJAO and Ansar Al-Din became the leading actors governing northern Mali. The groups 
dismantled the state bureaucracy, imposed a monopoly of violence and established their own 
judicial and administrative system while putting in place favourable (tax) policies for traders, 
smugglers and pastoralists. Molenaar (et al., 2019) demonstrated that the customary “qadi” – a 
highly respected traditional religious figure in reconciliation and justice, administering verdicts 
based on Islamic sharia law – particularly gained influence in this period across northern 
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In October 2011, they established the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad 
(MNLA) together with the National Movement of Azawad (MNA), which regrouped a younger 
generation of Tuareg. The return of many well-armed Tuareg fighters from Libya “catalysed” 
the rebellion. The MNLA initially managed to establish a broad coalition amongst the different 
Tuareg factions. Important to note, though, is that despite this enhanced cooperation, internal 
unity amongst the Tuareg was far from complete. Government allied factions, notably the 
“subordinate” Imghad, remained loyal to the Touré regime and hundreds of fighters returning 
from Libya also joined the military ranks. Moreover, one of the principal leaders of the previous 
rebellion, Iyad Ag Ghali, established his own resistance movement. He failed to convince 
fellow Tuareg leaders to establish an independent Tuareg state under sharia law. Iyad Ag Ghali 
had become an early convert to the largest Muslim missionary organisation Tablighi Jama`at 
and was later expelled from Saudi Arabia, where he worked at the Malian consulate, for 
maintaining contact with Sunni extremists.229 He called his own group Ansar Al-Din 
(“Defenders of Faith”) and recruited from amongst the Ifoghas Tuareg and Kounta Arabs. 
 On 17 January 2012, the MNLA launched its first attack in northeastern Mali. The little that 
was left of the Malian army faced – in the words of the Malian Minister of Foreign Affairs – 
around a thousand well trained fighters “with heavy machineguns mounted on all-terrain 
vehicles, forming a potent insurgent weapon that combined mobility and firepower.”230 The 
Tuareg rebels now pursued independence from Mali rather than increased autonomy.231  
 On 22 March 2012, a group of disgruntled junior officers and soldiers staged a chaotic 
military coup. Ordinary citizens did not take to the streets to defend their democratically elected 
president. In an opinion poll conducted shortly afterwards, more than six out of ten people in 
Bamako expressed their support for the military coup.232 Afrobarometer surveys confirmed this 
sentiment of considerable popular dissatisfaction with Malian authorities, the democratic 
regime and the state.233  
 The military coup in March 2012 engendered a power vacuum at the centre of the state. The 
military junta arrested senior army generals, the chains of command broke apart and rebel 
groups took full control over strategic areas in northern Mali as soldiers fled southwards. 
Government-aligned Tuareg and Arab militias moved into exile in both Niger and Mauritania.  
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listening to music, smoking or watching football and the obligation for men to accompany their 
(veiled) women in public only further alienated ordinary citizens from their new authorities.  
 While MUJAO and AQIM dominated Gao and Timbuktu respectively, Ansar Al-Din’s 
stronghold was Kidal, where its leader Iyad Ag Ghali had been a prominent figure for many 
decades. His organisation benefitted from the financial support provided by AQIM and 
recruited many new Tuareg members after the marginalisation of the MNLA. Senior people 
within the traditional hierarchies aligned with his organisation but local opposition against the 
radical Islamist orientation was also fierce. Tuareg women, known for their prominent role in 
public life, repeatedly protested despite harsh reprisals.  
  Meanwhile, the prolonged crisis at the centre of the state frustrated any viable move to 
counter events in the northern regions. Diplomatic pressure raised by the Economic Community 
of West African States (ECOWAS) and the wider international community eventually 
spearheaded the establishment of an interim government in Bamako.  
 In April 2012, three weeks after the military coup, Dioncounda Traore was sworn in as 
interim president. Finding a solution to the security challenges in the North remained 
unfeasible, however, as different political factions and junta leaders continued to compete for 
influence.  
 In January 2013, the situation drastically altered when the Islamists overplayed their hand. 
Ansar Al-Din fighters moved across the “border” separating northern and southern Mali, in an 
attempt to gain control over the strategic airport near Sevare. This would pose considerable 
challenges to any future international military intervention. 
 On 11 January, French forces suddenly and swiftly launched a military campaign to dislodge 
the radical Islamists from the northern regions, at the request of Mali’s interim president. The 
French managed to drive many Islamists out of the principal urban areas with targeted airstrikes 
and the deployment of more than 4000 boots on the ground, although numerous Islamists went 
into hiding in the rural areas. It goes well beyond the scope of this chapter to provide an analysis 
of the military intervention. Nevertheless, two points are particularly relevant as background to 
Chapter 6, which assesses the “internationalisation of hybrid security practices” in more detail.  
 First, although being invited by the Malian state, French forces also collaborated with the 
MNLA because the group obtained useful knowledge of the terrain and positions of radical 
Islamists across northern Mali. Many citizens, however, perceived this cooperation as a clear 
breach of the country’s sovereignty, certainly in light of the MNLA’s recent attempt to achieve 
independence from the Malian state by means of military force.  
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Mali.238 The three organisations coordinated efforts amongst themselves but maintained a 
considerable degree of autonomy.239 Tapping into supranational and local support networks, 
each of these actors asserted control over a specific stronghold.  
 In Gao, the MUJAO top leadership consisted of radical Islamists from Mauritania, Algeria 
and Mali. However, the group also attracted jihadists from Sudan, the Western Sahara, Saudi 
Arabia and Tunisia, and also recruited in neighbouring villages.240 The resources gained 
through global drug smuggling and kidnapping networks  were of critical importance to its 
leadership and enabled the organisation to recruit widely. Various reports equally suggested 
that people from neighbouring villages joined out of religious conviction.241 MUJAO 
legitimised its authority not only in reference to repertoires related to the “global jihad.” It also 
made use of symbols from the ancient Songhay Empire in a move to raise popular support, 
which the Tuareg rebels had clearly lacked in Gao.242  
 AQIM’s primary focus constituted Timbuktu. While preserving its image as the regional 
branch of Al-Qaeda, the top leadership of AQIM was very much aware of the need to anchor 
itself in the social-cultural environment of northern Mali. In a letter sent to the AQIM and Ansar 
Al-Din leadership in northern Mali, the principal AQIM leader Abdelmalek Droukdel 
expressed his frustrations with their strict adoption of sharia law because it alienated local 
citizens from the organisation. He lamented their failure to develop and maintain strategic 
alliances with other influential actors in northern Mali.243  
The Islamists in both Gao and Timbuktu initially gained some degree of popular legitimacy 
beyond the (modest) group of religious supporters because of their capacity to restore order 
after the Tuareg revolt. Nevertheless, this support rapidly dwindled. Local opposition to their 
strict application of sharia law was widespread and voiced by influential traditional and 
religious authorities, women’s and youth associations.244 Malian organisations and media 
outlets recorded hundreds of human rights abuses, varying from residents being stoned to death, 
having their limbs amputated or jailed for offences against sharia law. The prohibition of 
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and hybrid forms of public services. The chapter particularly focused on historical patterns of 
security provision under successive Malian governments. It examined changes in the interplay 
between state and non-state actors based on three dimensions: (1) the power balance (the state 
as vertically superior vs horizontally equivalent); (2) the channel (official vs unofficial); and 
(3) the nature of cooperation (complementary vs delegatory).  
Over time, Malian state authorities progressively delegated security provision to non-state 
actors as the presence of the Malian Defence and Security forces reduced across northern Mali. 
In the 1990s, efforts to formalise security cooperation between state and non-state actors 
through the official channels of a peace process made considerable headway. However, 
informal channels of hybrid security cooperation eventually prevailed. The vertically superior 
position of Malian armed forces over non-state armed groups gave way to a power balance in 
which the army was just one institution amongst equals in the wider context of the heterarchical 
order. By 2013, Mali’s increasingly heterogeneous security realm involved a myriad of local 
militias with or without links to traffickers, terrorist groups, armed groups, the army and 
international forces. Chapter 6 provides an analysis of the anchoring of Mali’s heterarchical 
order in the five-year period after the 2012 crisis. Despite considerable international efforts in 
support of the Malian state, non-state actors actually further expanded their role in security 
provision and other public services provided at the local level.    
Before looking forward, the following chapters first examine the functioning of key 
democratic institutions in the period preceding the 2012 crisis. The next chapter assesses 
patterns of political participation and representation as shaped through the party system and 




Secondly, French forces were soon drawn into existing local conflicts. Tensions between 
Tuareg and Arab (smuggling) factions, particularly in the Kidal region mounted, as Arab 
leaders feared being dominated and sidelined because of the French-Tuareg “alignment.”245 
Chapter 6, as indicated, provides a more detailed analysis of the different alignments between 
international and local military forces.  
 By the end of January 2013, public security provision obtained an increasingly 
heterogeneous character and involved a range of state and non-state actors at the local, national 
and international level, who were tied together in complex and dynamic relations. The Malian 
state obtained an increasingly marginalised role in shaping hybrid security provision. 
 
2.6. CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
This chapter traced the roots of Mali’s heterarchial political order. At independence, the 
country’s leadership set out to firmly institute state authority in society and left very little scope 
for other power poles. They positioned the state as the central and hierarchically superior locus 
of authority. The party-state enforced its authority in an institutionalised manner by creating a 
large state bureaucracy with tentacles across all sectors. Huge state enterprises, for example, 
emerged in the economic realm. Subsequent regimes largely relied on informal networks with 
influential and loyal power brokers across society to maintain their power basis in society. 
However, the state’s ability to maintain and fund these (unproductive) clientelistic ties and 
networks of patronage became increasingly restricted over time. This chapter revealed that the 
role of the state in public service delivery gradually decreased. Firstly in the area of a number 
of social services and subsequently in the security realm too. In contrast, non-state actors 
increasingly boosted their authority. The material resources and immaterial sources of 
legitimacy that became available through transnational networks played a key role in this 
regard.246 During the first decade of the millennium, non-state actors increasingly operated as 
horizontal contemporaries of the organs of the state and a heterarchical political order gradually 
emerged across northern Mali.  
 Hence, the state shared more and more core duties with non-state power poles over time. 
The analytical focus thereby shifts from state authority and state services to public authority 
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Furthermore, popular beliefs and citizens’ expectations about the role and responsibilities of 
political parties also potentially influences the trajectory of one-party dominance. This certainly 
applies to Mali where President Touré repeatedly linked one-coalition dominance in the party 
system to the cultural virtues of consensus in Malian society. These are all factors that influence 
the trajectory of party systems “from below.”  
The conclusions reflect on how patterns of political participation and representation as shaped 
through the party system affected state legitimacy in the context of Mali’s heterarchical order.  
 
3.1. THE TRAJECTORY OF ONE-PARTY TO ONE-COALITION DOMINANCE 
 
The Alliance for Democracy in Mali (ADEMA) secured two thirds of parliamentary seats in 
the 1992 elections and nearly four fifths in the 1997 polls. Similar to other countries on the 
African continent, a highly fragmented opposition equally characterised the Malian party 
system.248 ADEMA was therefore in a good position to win the next round of elections in 2002. 
The party controlled the presidency and had a majority of seats in parliament while the 
opposition was weak and divided. Throughout sub-Saharan Africa, opposition parties struggled 
to regain electoral terrain in the context of a dominant party system.249 The first two multi-party 
elections thereby provided a solid foundation for the emergence of a one-party dominant system 
in Mali, which arises once a political party maintains its dominance after three consecutive 
elections.  
 However, the 2002 elections failed to institute a one-party dominant system as ADEMA 
secured less than a third of the available seats. In the run up to the presidential elections, fierce 
competition between senior party representatives over the succession of President Konaré, who 
was forced to step down after completing his two terms in office, tore the party apart. A 
“reformist” faction within ADEMA internally sidelined former prime minister and party 
chairperson Ibrahim Boubacar Keita (IBK). Together with a number of close allies, Keita 
decided to break away and formed his own political movement, which he later transformed into 
the party Rally for Mali (RPM). An entire network of national, regional and local party 
representatives jumped ship. IBK thereby effectively divided the ADEMA vote during the 
much-disputed first round of the 2002 presidential elections.250  
	
248	Van de Walle, N. (2003) ‘Presidentialism and Clientelism in Africa’s Emerging Party Systems’, Journal of 
Modern African Studies, 41(2): 297 – 321.	
249 Bratton, M. and Van de Walle, N. (2002).	






The party system and democratisation 




The previous chapter briefly mentioned Mali’s exemplary democratic transition in the early 
1990s that followed three decades of authoritarian and predatory rule. Members of a National 
Conference jointly designed a democratic institutional framework that steered the country to 
multiparty elections in 1992. Associational life subsequently blossomed and many political 
parties officially registered. The democratically elected leaders respected political, civil rights, 
and guaranteed press freedom. At first sight, the transition thereby provided an ideal setting in 
which a balanced multi-party system could flourish that ensured robust popular participation, 
interest representation and executive accountability. 
 However, the Malian party system was characterised by prevailing patterns of one-party and 
one-coalition dominance, the (near) absence of a parliamentary opposition and persistently low 
levels of popular participation during the two decades that succeeded the democratic transition. 
 This chapter first provides an overview of this remarkable trajectory of the Malian party 
system. The following core part then aims to explain the endurance of one-party and one-
coalition dominance in the Malian context. In line with the theoretical and operational outline, 
a complementary socio-cultural and institutional approach guides this analysis.  
Well-known institutional factors in the literature include executive dominance, the electoral 
system and political parties’ legislation. Together with the impact of international aid, these 
constitute critical factors that influenced the trajectory of a party system “from above.” The 
chapter then moves to the wider socio-cultural context in which the multi-party system 
developed and assesses patterns of citizens’ mobilisation and interest representation. The 
relevance of different social cleavages (e.g. class, ethnicity, religion, and region) for the support 
basis of Malian parties is explored.  
	
247 This chapter constitutes a considerably extended version of a previous publication that was part of a comparative 
analysis of the remarkable endurance of one-party dominance across the African continent. Cf. Vliet, M. van 
(2013) ‘Mali: From Dominant Party to Platform of Unity’, in: 247 Doorenspleet, R. and Nijzink, L. (2013) One-
Party Dominance in African Democracies, Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Factors identified by the 
editors based on a substantial review of the literature of relevance to the trajectory of one-party dominance in Mali 
are reflected in the operational framework of this thesis.   
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of the dominant party now found their way back into business under a new label. While a formal 
classification of Mali’s party system pointed to a dramatic change in the 2002 elections, a great 
deal of continuity was actually witnessed on the ground in terms of the centrifugal forces around 
the executive.  
In the run-up to the 2007 elections, political parties confronted the question whether to field 
their own presidential candidate or to support the incumbent president’s quest for a second term 
in office. Two major party splits had weakened ADEMA, but it still controlled more than 30 
per cent of seats in parliament and its political networks covered almost the entire national 
territory. Yet, the incumbent president obtained a privileged access to state resources, appeared 
on national television more often than the weatherman did and was backed by the business 
community. Furthermore, the costs of political isolation in case of an electoral loss against the 
incumbent were considerable. Once condemned to the opposition benches, parties lose their 
valuable connections to the resourceful centre and, as a consequence, their support networks. 
ADEMA therefore opted for a “middle way” strategy. They acknowledged the limited chance 
of defeating incumbent candidate Touré. They therefore became a driving force behind the 
establishment of a “grand coalition” of more than forty political parties. This Alliance for 
Democracy and Progress (ADP) aimed to improve the position of political parties during a 
second mandate of independent President Touré. During ATT’s first mandate, political parties 
obtained only a limited number of ministerial positions in comparison to the civic movements 
and personal affiliates of the president.254 By increasing their joint electoral weight in the run-
up to the elections, the parties reinforced their control over key ministries after the elections to 
the detriment of civic associations and people from Touré’s personal network. From that 
position of strength, they could subsequently start preparing the “open seat” elections in 2012. 
The 2007 elections and ADEMA’s “middle way” strategy again revealed the major difference 
between an “open seat” election and electoral contests in which incumbents do participate. The 
ADP coalition indeed secured a solid electoral victory in 2007. One-coalition dominance thus 
prevailed during Touré’s second mandate (2007-2012). It did not amount to a full parliamentary 
consensus as three small but vocal opposition parties also secured parliamentary representation.   
 Before examining the incentives “from above” that encouraged the endurance of one-party 
and one-coalition rule in Mali, the following section provides a brief historical background of 
the party that dominated the Malian party system during the 1990s. In contrast to many other 
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Prior to the second round, he mobilised his supporters against ADEMA – the party he had just 
broken away from – and thereby paved the way for independent presidential candidate Amadou 
Toumani Touré (ATT) to win the presidential elections.251 Re-aligning themselves with the 
likely winner, numerous senior ADEMA representatives openly supported Touré against their 
own candidate, Soumaila Cissé, in the run-up to the second round of elections. Obviously 
frustrated by this lack of support from his own party, he left ADEMA and created the Union 
for the Republic and Democracy (URD) in 2003. A considerable number of party 
representatives followed him too.252 After these realignments, Touré indeed secured victory in 
the 2002 elections. These elections thereby illustrated a broader pattern identified by 
Cheeseman (2010), i.e. that so-called open seat elections, in which an incumbent ruler does not 
participate, appeared to pose particular challenges for ruling parties on the African continent.253 
These challenges are often related to internal wrangles between persons and factions seeking to 
secure the party ticket for these elections.  
The end of one-party dominance did not bring about a balanced party system with a strong 
opposition. In fact, one-coalition dominance merely substituted one-party dominance. ATT’s 
electoral platform consisted of a broad and loose alliance of regional power brokers, a myriad 
of civic associations and some smaller parties. As an independent candidate, he lacked a solid 
support base in parliament. He therefore invited all main political actors to partake in a grand 
coalition on condition that they all accepted his authority. Following years of political 
polarisation, he reiterated the need for political stability and a unified socio-economic agenda. 
ATT legitimised one-coalition dominance in reference to core social values of unity, harmony 
and cooperation. These references were, however, also linked to a constellation of power 
relations and material interests. The grand coalition enabled President Touré to curtail 
alternative centres of political power and boosted his own authority. In addition, it allowed a 
wide range of political actors to secure access to state resources and nurture their support 
networks. Former opposition leaders gratefully accepted his invitation that (re-)established their 
access to the resourceful political centre and enabled them to nurture personalised support 
networks. Leading politicians of the ADEMA era also realigned with the new – politically 
independent – president who ruled based on full parliamentary consensus after the 2002 
elections. Many of the political networks that had jointly operated under the institutional cover 
	
251 The elections were marked by serious irregularities, with 28 per cent of the votes annulled by the constitutional 
court. 
252 Cissé suspected former President Konaré to have backed the candidature of Touré. 
253	Cheeseman, N. (2010) ‘African Elections as Vehicles for Change’, Journal of Democracy, 21(4): 139-153. 
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Already before the 1992 elections, significant tensions between the PMT and PMRD factions 
arose within ADEMA. While PMRD was a more intellectually and ideologically oriented 
movement, which had always kept its distance from the military regime, PMT representatives 
were more pragmatic and some, including President Konaré, had served as ministers under the 
military regime. The ensuing internal wrangles fuelled several breakaways and party splits, of 
which the creation of the Movement for the Independence, Renaissance and Integration of 
Africa (MIRIA) in 1994 by ADEMA’s vice-president and a number of other senior PMT 
representatives was the most noteworthy.  
This brief historical sketch provides some background to the demise of ADEMA as a 
dominant party in 2002. The young party was weakly institutionalised, faced considerable 
internal wrangles and had witnessed several breakaways before the major splits in the early 
2000s. However, the main objective of this chapter is not to understand why ADEMA lost its 
dominance over the party system. The principal subject of interest is to unravel why one-party 
dominance and one-coalition dominance prevailed. The next section first examines several 
well-known institutional factors in the literature.  
 
3.3. INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE 
 
One-party dominance in Mali emerged after almost thirty years of one-party rule. Under 
previous authoritarian regimes, power was centralised in the hands of the president while 
boundaries between the ruling party and the state were blurred. This continued to be the case 
after the democratic transition. Executive dominance constituted a clear pattern of continuity 
from the authoritarian into the democratic era.260 Both Siaroff (2003) and Van Cranenburgh 
(2008) convincingly showed that Mali’s “semi-presidentialism” label obtained little 
explanatory value about the actual degree of presidential power.261 In fact, the Malian president 
had very few colleagues on the entire African continent with equally strong institutionally 
anchored powers. Mali’s democratic regime could justifiably be referred to as “super-
presidential” rather than semi-presidential. While the system was based on the French 
	
260	Sears, J.M. (2007); Jourde, C. (2008) ‘The Master is Gone, but Does the House still Stand? The Fate of Single-
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75-90.  
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African dominant parties that obtained a lengthy historical track record as liberation or 
resistance movements, ADEMA was a young and weakly institutionalised dominant party.255  
 
3.2. HISTORICAL LEGACY 
 
ADEMA emerged out of the democratic movement that played a pivotal role in ending 
authoritarian rule in 1991, before it won the 1992 elections. The party’s main constitutive blocks 
were: (1) the Malian Party of Labour (PMT); (2) the Malian Party for Democracy and 
Revolution (PMDR); and (3) the Committee to Defend Democratic Freedoms in Mali 
(CDLDM). Urban elites connected to Malians living in Senegal and France dominated the 
PMT. The trade unions constituted the party’s main support basis in Mali.256 The most 
influential branch of the PMDR originated amongst Malians residing in the Soviet Union. In 
1986, these two movements, together with CDLDM and several representatives of the former 
ruling party Sudanese Union-African Democratic Rally (US-RDA), established the National 
Democratic People’s Front (FNDP). This broad platform, the Malian Student Association 
(AEEM) and the National Congress for Democratic Initiative (CNID), mobilised Malians 
against military rule in the early 1990s.257  
The military regime violently put down a protest march in central Bamako in March 1991, a 
military coup led by Lieutenant-Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré (ATT) deposed General 
Moussa Traore.258 The movements that had cooperated in the framework of the FNDP decided 
to establish a political party, ADEMA, and divided National Executive Committee positions 
amongst themselves. The merger of these groups created a substantial electoral basis in the run-
up to the 1992 elections. The new party attracted members of the educated elite at the local, 
regional and national level. Teachers and nurses occupied important positions in the party 
structures at the grassroots.259 After heated internal debates, the party also decided to co-opt 
numerous regional and local power brokers who had collaborated with the former regime.  
	
255 Doorenspleet, R. and Nijzink, L. (2013). 
256 In the early 1970s, the trade unions publicly demanded that the military return to the barracks on various 
occasions and hand over power to a civilian government. Many of their leaders were jailed by the Traore regime. 
Camara, B. (2001) ‘Le Processus Démocratique au Mali depuis 1991. Entre Fragmentation de l’Espace Politique 
et Coalitions: Quels Sont les Impacts de la Démocratisation sur la Condition de Vie des Maliens’, available at: 
https://www.bakarycamara.ml/processus.pdf.   
257 For a more detailed analysis of the groups that were mobilised and the issues around which this popular protest 
was organised, see: Fay, C. (1995) ‘La Démocratie au Mali, ou le Pouvoir en Pâture’, Cahiers d’Études Africaines, 
35(137): 19-53. 
258 Officially, 106 people were killed and 708 injured. See: Amundsen, I. (2002) ‘Towards Democratic 
Consolidation: Party Politics in Mali’, Paper presented to the African Studies Association 43rd annual meeting. 
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Vengroff (1993) demonstrated that under a system of proportional representation, ADEMA 
would have obtained 43 parliamentary seats, instead of the 73 seats it actually secured in the 
1992 elections.267 The opposition, on the other hand, would have done much better if a system 
of proportional representation had been in effect. US-RDA would have secured 21 seats instead 
of the eight seats it obtained, whereas RDP would have won ten rather than six seats. Moreover, 
the fact that the presidential elections were organised a few months prior to the parliamentary 
elections also had an impact. It created strong incentives for local and regional power brokers 
to align themselves with the party that won the presidency and thereby further entrenched one-
party dominance. Not surprisingly, electoral reforms became one of the main demands of an 
increasingly frustrated opposition following the first round of elections in the early 1990s.  
President Konaré accommodated some of these requests. The number of seats of the National 
Assembly increased from 116 to 147 and the number of single-member constituencies was 
reduced to the advantage of multi-member constituencies. The latter move benefitted smaller 
parties as it encouraged larger parties to establish electoral alliances in the run-up to elections.  
Yet, the dominant party, ignoring protests by other parties, also used its parliamentary 
majority to allow the 1997 balloting to take place in a highly controversial context. They 
initially rushed a new electoral law through parliament in 1996, which the Constitutional Court 
subsequently annulled. ADEMA then initiated a process of inter-party dialogue and agreed to 
establish an Independent Electoral Commission. The Commission, however, proved unable to 
prepare the elections in the short time available. After a chaotic first round, the Constitutional 
Court saw no other option but to officially annul the results.268 The opposition parties demanded 
that all major problems related to the electoral process, such as the major challenge of an 
unreliable voters register, would be resolved before a new round of elections took place. 
ADEMA ignored this wish and set a date for new elections in just a month’s time. Several 
opposition parties boycotted these elections and both President Konaré and ADEMA secured a 
substantial but controversial victory.269  
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constitution, the mandate vested in the executive was stronger in the Malian case. French 
advisors provided input to the draft constitution, which delegates of the National Conference 
discussed.262 Cissé (2006) even regarded Mali’s 1992 constitution as a pale copy of the French 
1958 constitution.263 However, both political systems differ in several ways, especially with 
regard to the power balance between the executive and legislative branch of government. In 
Mali, for example, a two thirds majority in parliament was required to censure the government, 
whereas a simple majority can pass a vote of no confidence in France. The next chapter provides 
a more detailed analysis of executive – legislative ties in Mali. The most relevant point in the 
context of this chapter is that control over the presidency provided ruling parties and coalitions 
with considerable benefits and encouraged the endurance of one-party dominance. 
Controlling an extremely powerful presidency indeed provided ADEMA major advantages 
compared to other parties and many opportunities to entrench its dominance. The party provided 
local and regional power brokers with jobs in the government administration and strategically 
distributed spoils of the state. ADEMA maintained a strong grip on key economic activities, 
particularly in the lucrative cotton and gold sectors. One group of senior ADEMA 
representatives was popularly known as the “clan CMDT”, as they occupied the strategic 
positions in the national cotton company. By the end of their second term in office, ADEMA 
controlled 90 per cent of the directorships of ministries and key management positions in public 
enterprises.264 ADEMA also obtained privileged access to state media. The national television 
and radio company (ORTM) extensively covered party activities and perspectives. This 
preferential treatment by the state media was most effective in the early years of the ADEMA 
government. The explosive growth of independent community radio stations slightly countered 
this advantage in subsequent years.265  
Secondly, ADEMA greatly benefitted from the electoral system in place. The National 
Conference adopted a majoritarian system of closed party lists in both single- and multi-
member constituencies (contingent on the number of inhabitants).266  
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3.4. INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
 
International development aid, as shown in the introductory chapter, affects the power balance 
between the different branches of government on the receiving end. Mali obtained around three 
times more aid than other African developing countries in terms of the percentage of its GDP. 
Between 1967 and 2013, it secured an average of 15 per cent of its GDP from aid.275 The amount 
of aid received in the 1990s was more limited than during the 2000s, when worldwide 
campaigns for the Millennium Development Goals mobilised additional support. During the 
first decade of the new millennium, international donors supported Mali with approximately 
$5.6 billion and aid covered around 25 per cent of all public expenses by the Malian 
government.276 Only an estimated one per cent of this support aimed to reinforce democratic 
institutions. Reviewing aid modalities in Mali, Van de Walle concluded that: 
 
While the role of domestic institutional mechanisms of accountability seemed critically 
important to democratic consolidation, they appeared to be often ignored or undermined in 
Mali by the modalities of aid delivery.277  
 
This section only briefly touches upon the most direct influences on one-party dominance.  
First, international donors did not stand up for key democratic principles at important junctures 
of Malian democracy. The 1997 elections constituted a striking example. The newly established 
Electoral Commission was largely unprepared to ensure a level playing field for all candidates 
and to adequately organise the polls in the short time frame that it was given. Even the voting 
register was outdated and incomplete. A request by Malian parties to postpone the elections 
was denied. A united block of opposition candidates then decided to boycott the polls. 
Nonetheless, donors readily accepted the results and quickly turned the page, despite their 
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Thirdly, the Political Parties Act influenced the trajectory of Mali’s party system. The National 
Conference established minimal criteria for the registration of political parties, reflecting the 
desire to open up the political space after decades of one-party rule.270  
Participants of the National Conference still fiercely objected public funding for political 
parties. Nevertheless, the government introduced it in 2000. Parties without representation in 
parliament became entitled to a basic amount of state funding. The Political Parties Act and the 
system of public funding of political parties thereby contributed to a fragmented party 
system.271 More than 25 parties registered between April 1991 and December 1991. A decade 
later, 120 parties had received a registration card.272 In parliament, nine smaller parties initially 
surrounded the dominant party, ADEMA. This number dropped to seven in 1997. This high 
level of fragmentation seems to have contributed to ADEMA’s initial dominance.273 When 
ADEMA lost its dominant position in 2002, the fragmentation of the party system increased 
again. During the elections in 2007, 15 political parties gained parliamentary representation.  
Finally, the presidential term limit strongly influenced the Malian trajectory of one-party 
dominance. Cheeseman (2010) revealed a broader trend across the African continent whereby 
ruling parties found it more challenging to secure victory in  “open seat” elections as compared 
to those polls in which the president in office participated.274 It appeared to be much more 
problematic to maintain a grip on power, despite having privileged access to state resources, 
during open seat elections. The fact that the incumbent Malian President Konaré was not 
allowed to stand in 2002 not only created opportunities for opposition candidates, but also 
incited succession challenges within ADEMA that eventually led to a party split. ADEMA’s 
dominant position indeed abruptly ended in the context of the 2002 open seat elections but was 
then, as noted above, substituted by one-coalition dominance.  
In addition to the above institutional factors, the international context also contributed to the 
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Aid equally reinforced the incentives political actors faced to rally around the executive. They 
had a strategic interest to be associated to – and influence the distribution of – all the 
development resources made available through the executive. Baudais and Chauzal (2006) 
contended that this particularly – but certainly not exclusively – held for those political elites 
who had been sidelined during the decade of one-party dominance under ADEMA.281 The one-
party coalition established under President Touré enabled them to reconnect with the formal 
centre of political gravity and its resources. These connections to the state played an important 
role in the efforts political parties undertook to mobilise and sustain their support base and to 
respond to the incentives they faced “from below,” as the following sections demonstrate. 
 
3.5. SOCIAL CONTEXT 
 
One of the most remarkable characteristics of Mali’s representative democracy, as an indirect 
system geared to ensure the expression of popular will, was the persistently low levels of 
popular participation recorded in successive elections. A mere 20 per cent of Malians 
participated in the elections throughout the 1990s and these figures only slightly increased 
during the following decade as voter turnout reached 26 per cent in the 2002 elections and 32 
per cent in 2007.282  
Malian citizens displayed limited interest in political affairs compared to citizens in other 
African countries. In fact, Mali revealed the lowest levels of political interest in any country 
surveyed in the Afrobarometer up until the year 2000. Very few people declared themselves to 
be “very interested” (10 per cent) or “somewhat interested” (24 per cent) in politics and 
government. Almost two thirds (64 per cent) proclaimed that they were simply “not 
interested.”283 Moreover, Malian citizens maintained very little contact with democratically 
elected officials in the period between elections compared to people in other West African 
countries. They raised most of their concerns with other power poles in society, like traditional 
(29 per cent) or religious leaders (per cent) rather than contacting a political party representative 
(9 per cent), a Member of Parliament (5 per cent) or central state representative (3 per cent).284 
People also trusted traditional and religious leaders much more than political actors. In 2008, 
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Jourde (2008) noted that: 
 
Even a country like Mali, in which the legislative and presidential elections of 1997 were 
clearly unsatisfactory in terms of fairness and freeness, never faced any significant 
pressure. In fact, as the opposition parties boycotted an electoral contest they legitimately 
saw as too flawed, the president got re-elected with a “one-party style” score of 85% […] 
and yet he was not the subject of the usual foreign “concerns” following the election.278  
 
This seemed to reflect a broader pattern as donors refrained from taking measures in response 
to the apparent failure of the Malian government to implement (agreed upon) measures that 
would have bolstered domestic accountability, partly because cooperation in other areas was 
successful or the strategic interests at play.279 On a structural level, aid equally exacerbated 
executive dominance and further enhanced the position of the president:  
 
Interventions intended to build up state capacity typically assist the ruler. While the 
intention may be to build an institution, the outcomes are typically to provide more resources 
to the ruler […], and to create opportunities for patronage through institutions that provide 
employment, contracts and projects.280 
 
The impact of aid not only stemmed from the amount of funding involved, but also from the 
working procedures between international donors and the Malian government. Much of the 
policy dialogue and monitoring of this cooperation primarily involved senior state 
representatives and international organisations. Institutions like the legislature played a 
marginal role and obtained limited access to information. Hence, decisions about key socio-
economic policies and programmes primarily stemmed from a dialogue between donors and 
the government and not through a domestic democratic decision-making process. The next 
chapter provides a more detailed analysis of the impact of aid on executive – legislative ties.  
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The first democratically elected President, Alpha Oumar Konaré, made it a personal quest to 
support and improve the functioning of the education sector. Enrolment figures for primary 
schools indeed augmented from 26 per cent at the democratic turn to 36.4 per cent in 1999. 
Throughout the next decade, primary school enrolment further improved and attained 55.6 per 
cent in 2004 and then 75.4 per cent in 2010. However, this considerable progress in quantitative 
terms was not accompanied by qualitative improvements or significant advancements in 
superior levels of education. By the end of 2018, only a third of the Malian population was able 
to both read and write.  
There was a particular disparity in terms of access to education and a wide range of other 
public services between the urban and rural areas.289 During the first two decades that followed 
Mali’s democratic transition, the urban-rural divide widened significantly. Urban poverty rates 
dropped from 72.7 per cent (1989) to 37.2 per cent (2001) and 31.8 per cent (2006) but rural 
poverty remained almost unaltered. Differences between the capital city Bamako and the rural 
zones were particularly profound.290 This is certainly not to suggest a homogenous socio-
economic urban setting. The previous chapter already illustrated the very different urban 
interests groups, including well-educated youth without jobs, petty traders, student and trade 
movements, which joined forces to oust the authoritarian regime in the early 1990s.  
Sears (2007) analysed the complexities of social class formation during the democratic era 
and distinguished a small “upper political elite” and “upper middle class” from an emerging 
middle class of petty bourgeoisie and the vast majority of rural masses (e.g. farmers, herders or 
fishers, migrant workers).291 In a wider context characterised by a largely informal and 
predominantly agricultural economy with weakly organised interest groups, individual parties 
did not mobilise support along the socio-economic cleavage. The support base of Mali’s main 
political parties was not at variance at all in terms of class. The policy manifestos of the leading 
parties, which all emerged from ADEMA, did not appeal to distinct socio-economic interests 
groups in society either. In fact, the Malian party system was not an arena where class-based 
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71 per cent indicated having a lot of trust in religious leaders and 65 per cent in traditional 
leaders while the ruling party, opposition and parliament obtained scores of respectively 21 per 
cent, 17 per cent and 32 per cent.285  
Hence, the anchoring of Mali’s “super-presidential” democratic regime into society seemed 
“super-limited.” The above theoretical outline denoted political participation as the “elixir of 
life for democracy.” In Mali, it seemed to characterise democracy’s breathlessness instead. 
Most citizens were not mobilised through the party system but relied on alternative authorities 
in the context of Mali’s hybrid political order. The remaining part of this section examines these 
restricted patterns of citizens’ mobilisation and representation through the party system. It first 
assesses the relevance of different social cleavages (e.g. class, ethnicity, religion) in this regard. 
 
Class 
The previous chapter illustrated how a small group of “native” citizens, connected to the 
colonial administration and francophone education system, emerged as a dominant political 
class after independence. These linguistic and educational factors remained crucial socio-
economic factors shaping – by restricting – patterns of political participation. Urban upper-
middle-class francophone men dominated the National Conference that defined the institutional 
pillars Mali’s democratic regime.286 French remained the official language and Van de Walle 
(2012) aptly noted that Mali was: 
 
Among the very few democracies in having a majority of its citizens unable to speak the 
language of government and public administration.287   
 
Education levels and illiteracy levels restricted political participation through the party system 
in a similar vein. Bleck (2011) revealed the well-known positive correlation between education, 
political knowledge and participation for the case of Mali.288 Even pupils attending primary 
school supported their parents in liaising with political and state representatives as a result of 
their ability to speak French. Yet, despite the considerable efforts undertaken after the 
democratic transition illiteracy rates remained sky-high and participation rates very low.  
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as the most common type of party.296 However, the fact that ADEMA, as the dominant party, 
attracted support from different ethnic groups did not reveal much about how this mobilisation 
occurred. Highly personalised and geographically oriented relationships proved particularly 
influential, as the next section reveals.   
 
Politics of proximity 
An increasing number of empirical studies revealed the importance of geographical proximity 
as a factor shaping patterns of voter mobilisation across the African continent.297 In Mali, 
personalised clientelistic networks also influenced the relationship between political parties and 
local power brokers. In fact, support networks amidst local hierarchical structures constituted a 
decisive factor in voter mobilisation.298 In other words, informal ties between national elites 
and local traditional chiefs or other influential power brokers proved crucial for establishing 
and maintaining a support basis. In his dissertation on Mali’s process of democratisation, Sears 
(2007) underlined that “the links to regions of origin are key to political mobilisation and 
economic redistribution.”299  
During the 1992 elections, for example, President Konaré won in all but nine constituencies. 
Not coincidentally, these nine electoral districts were the home constituencies of his direct 
competitors.300 Independence party US-RDA is marginalised on the political scene today but 
managed to keep one parliamentary seat in Timbuktu. Indeed, the hometown of its leader. As 
one party president explained:  
 
Politics is first of all real knowledge of a social milieu’, a ‘reservoir of confidence,” and 
a “whole social network that puts itself at your disposal because you too have known 
how to be sociable and to be in symbiosis, in phase with society.301  
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Thurston (2018) noted that the Bamako-based political elite formed an exclusive: 
 
Single broad network rather than rival camps offering the Malian people genuine choices 
about the future of the country.292  
 
While there were some notable exceptions in this regard, it certainly reflected the general 
pattern encountered under one-party (1992-2002) and one-coalition (2002-1012) dominance. 
In sum, socio-economic factors strongly impacted – i.e. restrained – political participation. 
However, they did not constitute the main social cleavage around which political representation 
was shaped. The question remains, then, how did this small network of well-educated, 
francophone, urban political elite, mobilise rural support?  
 
Ethnicity 
Ethnic cleavages have played a prominent role in research on African political parties and party 
systems. Considering the ethnic heterogeneous character of many African polities, scholars 
expected the emergence of highly fragmented party systems after the introduction of multiparty 
democracy. However, “ethnic parties” hardly developed across the continent or in Mali. Several 
studies confirmed that the vast majority of parties could not be labelled as an “ethnic party.”293 
Although Malinke people voted more often for RPM than any other party, the RPM obtained a 
much broader ethnic support base.294 While URD was sometimes considered to be a Songhai 
party, owing to the ethnic background of many of its senior party members, its actual support 
base revealed that it could not be classified as an ethnic party. The National Congress for 
Democratic Initiative (CNID) actually constituted the only party that did qualify as an ethnic 
party.295 During the 1990s, the dominant party, ADEMA, attracted supporters from different 
ethnic groups. No particular ethnic group considered the party to be “theirs.” In other words, in 
the context of a relatively heterogeneous society, ADEMA established itself as a multi-ethnic 
party. This reflected a broader trend on the continent where so-called ethnic congress parties – 
a multi-ethnic party based on an elite coalition between two or more ethnic groups – emerged 
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support. At times, religious leaders endorsed specific political candidates and actively raised 
support amongst their followers in the run-up to elections. Successive presidents and political 
actors also frequently consulted religious actors. In general, however, religious leaders 
maintained a certain distance from the electoral process and exerted their influence indirectly. 
As Lebovitch (2019) noted: 
 
The history of Islamic organisations and activism in Mali since the colonial period is 
largely one of a pursuit of autonomy from the government, as well as indirect power 
through social influence and pressure rather than elections.305  
 
Nevertheless, from that position, they actively participated in and shaped the outcome of public 
debates. Soares (2006) illustrated the proactive stance of religious leaders on several issues of 
morality, such as the opening of nightclubs and bars during Ramadan, the widespread practice 
of gambling, gender issues or the opening of a pornographic cinema in Bamako. This public 
role became ever more pronounced and visible after Mali’s transition to democracy as many 
new media outlets became available.306 In the run-up to the 2002 elections, the public and 
political role of Islamic leaders further increased.307 During three mass rallies, they called upon 
their followers to support candidates who embodied “Islamic values.” The next chapter 
provides another illustrative example of a highly effective campaign by religious leaders against 
a progressive Family Code adopted by the Malian parliament in 2009. Beyond issues related to 
public morality or the role of religion in society, religious leaders also played a prominent role 
in propagating matters related to governance in general and anti-corruption in particular.  
 Clearly, religion constituted a particularly strong mobilising force in Malian society. Not 
officially from within the formal democratic system or as a cleavage of individual party support; 
rather, more from the outside inwards, in an indirect yet certainly no less influential way. In 
this regard, Thurston (2013) aptly noted:   
 
French-educated technocrats and career politicians may dominate elections and 
government bureaucracies, but Muslim preachers and leaders of mass-based religious 
organizations will continue to constitute powerful pressure groups […].308 
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Several political parties with a small, localised support base have been able to secure 
parliamentary representation over time. In such a context, political parties merely provided 
senior politicians with the institutional tools to maintain and nourish personalised and 
geographically concentrated support networks. Failure by the leader of a smaller party to 
nurture these networks often led to a re-orientation of clients towards another political 
entrepreneur. Fearing precisely that scenario, the leader of a smaller party active in the Mopti 
region decided to merge with ADEMA, thereby securing a continued flow of resources for his 
personalised network.302 These highly personalised dynamics lay at the root of many party 
scissions and reconfigurations. As Bleck (2010) noted, Malian citizens did not strongly identify 
with a particular party and often switched parties.303  
In sum, highly personalised bonds between urban elites and local power brokers, rather than 
institutionalised interactions through political parties, played an important role in shaping 
(restricted) patterns of voter mobilisation and representation along geographical lines. The 
following section provides a brief assessment of the role of religion, arguably one of the most 
important mobilising forces in Malian society. 
 
Religion  
Islam played a central role in the day-to-day life of a vast majority of Malian citizens and an 
increasingly important public role during the two decades that are the focus of this chapter. 
People relied on religious jurisprudence to regulate family affairs (heritage, marriage and 
disputes).304 Religion also played a key – if not leading – role in mass mobilisation in Malian 
society. Different Sunni and Sufi currents emerged over time and their leaders became strong 
voices in society with a significant influence in the public sphere. Anyone who ever attended 
religious gatherings led by one such leader, frequently organised in one of Bamako’s football 
stadiums, witnessed the number of people they appealed to. Religion, in all its varieties, was 
firmly anchored in Malian society across the entire national territory, including the most remote 
rural areas. Yet, the official role of religion in Mali’s formal democratic system is limited and 
restricted. The 1992 constitution anchored the “laïcité” of the Malian state, in accordance with 
its French counterpart. The predominantly urban francophone National Conference participants 
blocked an attempt to permit the creation of Islamic political parties. Religion, or different 
religious streams, also did not constitute a cleavage around which individual parties mobilised 
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Public opinion data revealed that Malian political culture is not a fertile breeding ground for 
political competition:  
 
The Malian conception of democracy is largely communitarian. It centre on a set of political 
values such as equality and justice’, ‘mutual respect’, ‘unity’ and ‘working together.’ […] 
Malians prefer social consensus and national unity to political and economic competition.311  
 
Likewise, two thirds of the Malian population took the view that “opposition parties should 
concentrate on cooperating with government and helping it develop the country,” rather than 
“regularly examine and criticize government policies and actions.”312 Moreover, the 
expectation that politicians take care of their followers prevailed over the notion of critical 
political scrutiny by Malian citizens. The importance of receiving tangible top-down assistance 
often overrides the provision of bottom-up accountability. Sears (2007) noted that: 
 
While poorer Malians want more economic democracy, they generally agree with the 
paternalistic, authoritarian, and hierarchical norms, practices and institutions that could 
make such redistribution happen […].313 
  
Other surveys revealed that large majorities of Malians did not to see a role for themselves in 
holding elected officials to account in the period between elections but delegated this 
responsibility to other political actors instead. Two thirds of the population endorsed the 
statement that “people are like children; the government should take care of them like a parent,” 
while a third believed that “[g]overnment is like an employee; the people should be the bosses 
who control the government.”314 Clearly, patrimonial forms of (upwards) accountability 
prevailed over democratic forms of (downwards) accountability. Political elites faced 
particularly strong incentives “from below” to take care of and cater for the needs of their 
(restricted) geographical support base. In the eyes of Malian citizens, state legitimacy 
predominantly depended on the personal performance of individual political leaders.315  
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This short reflection on the role of religion only adds to the restricted social anchorage of the 
party system in Malian society. Very basic but influential factors such as language, education 
and religion restrained political participation through the official intermediary channels. Indeed, 
Beck (2011) contended:  
 
[I]n the democratic context, the Malian political landscape remains dominated by a 
Francophone-educated elite despite its majority Muslim population.309    
 
The next section further explores the socio-cultural anchorage of the party system with a 
particular focus on prevailing popular beliefs and expectations of parties and politicians.  
 
Political culture 
Following Mamdani’s (1996) seminal Citizens and Subject, the previous chapter highlighted 
the “bifurcated” nature of political domination during the colonial era and the different types of 
rule in urban (civilian) and rural (communitarian) areas. The urban-rural divide, as shown in 
the above, remained one of the most central cleavages in Malian society ever since. This also 
applied to popular perceptions about democracy and the role of political parties that 
considerably varied along the urban-rural divide. The Afrobarometer noted in 2000:  
 
Any liberal interpretations are concentrated among urban, educated, non-poor groups. In 
this respect, Mali’s urban elites, like other Africans, are adopting universal political 
values while its rural masses remain attached to indigenous, culturally specific 
conceptions of democracy.310 
 
Indeed, Mali’s party system generally developed in a socio-cultural context in which virtues of 






309  Bleck, J. (2011) ‘Schooling Citizens: Education, Citizenship, and Democracy in Mali’, August 2011, 
Dissertation Cornell University’, p. 54.   
310 Bratton, M. Coulibaly, M. & Machado, F. (2000), table 8. 
97	
	
Public opinion data revealed that Malian political culture is not a fertile breeding ground for 
political competition:  
 
The Malian conception of democracy is largely communitarian. It centre on a set of political 
values such as equality and justice’, ‘mutual respect’, ‘unity’ and ‘working together.’ […] 
Malians prefer social consensus and national unity to political and economic competition.311  
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“regularly examine and criticize government policies and actions.”312 Moreover, the 
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political scrutiny by Malian citizens. The importance of receiving tangible top-down assistance 
often overrides the provision of bottom-up accountability. Sears (2007) noted that: 
 
While poorer Malians want more economic democracy, they generally agree with the 
paternalistic, authoritarian, and hierarchical norms, practices and institutions that could 
make such redistribution happen […].313 
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participation and representation through the party system. Only a small minority of citizens 
participated in elections or maintained contact with party representatives. Very basic but 
influential factors such as language, education and religion contributed to the deep divide 
between political elites and the day-to-day life of most Malian citizens. Exclusive networks 
between national political elites and local power brokers primarily shaped political mobilisation 
and representation. Patrons prevailed over policies and personal ties trumped institutionalised 
partisan politics. The party system did not effectively bridge the state society devide. Most 
citizens, certainly across the rural areas, continued to rely on other power poles in Mali’s 
heterarchical political order where indigenous and religious sources of legitimacy remained 
particularly influential. 
In fact, the party system further exacerbated popular disillusionment with the state as many 
citizens increasingly contested the elitist pillars of politics. After two decades of multi-party 
democracy, an overwhelming majority of citizens felt that the country’s political parties 
pursued only selfish interests.316 During the 1990s, popular frustration with the elitist form of 
democracy advanced by ADEMA steadily mounted.317 A decade later, people reproached 
political elites to take care of themselves more than anything else as corruption figures steeply 
mounted. Moreover, Malian citizens primarily pointed in the direction of their own political 
elites rather than foreign terrorists or Tuareg rebels in explaining the implosion of state authority 
in 2012.318 At the local level, youngsters questioned the legitimacy of local powerbrokers who 
long monopolised ties with national political elites. De Bruijn and Both (2017), for example, 
illustrated that Fulani youngsters in central Mali gradually realised that neither their elites, nor 
the state had ever really done anything for them.319 Yet, this chapter clearly revealed that Mali’s 
party system did not provide accessible and effective intermediary political channels to raise 
and express such popular discontent. The next chapter extends this analysis and examines the 
role of the Malian legislature in holding an increasingly discredited executive branch of 
government accountable. Accountability constituted the third democratic pillar expected to 
reinforce state legitimacy together with political participation and representation.  
The chapter examines the performance of Malian parliamentarians in the years preceding 
democracy’s decay in 2012.   
	
316 FES (2013) ‘Mali-mètre N.03’, available at: http://www.fes-mali.org/index.php/mali-metre; Whitehouse, B. 
(2013) ‘Mali’s Coup, One Year On’, available at: http://bridgesfrombamako.com/.  
317 Results of an opinion poll, summarized by Sears (2007), pp. 188-9. 
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Rallying around the powerful executive constituted a strategic choice for political actors in such 
a context, certainly in light of prevailing popular perceptions against opposition politics and in 
favour of national consensus. This was exactly how President Touré justified and sold his grand 
parliamentary coalition. Touré contended that his consensual form of democracy was based on 
mutual consent, inclusivity and enabled constructive cooperation in the public interest. 
However, such a stance offered a much too static – and romanticised – interpretation of political 
culture and democratic practice. It obscured the lack of participation by a majority of Malian 
citizens and the narrow particularistic interests that dominated the party system. The next and 
final section provides a brief reflection on the impact of the party system upon state legitimacy 
in the context of Mali’s heterarchical order.  
 
3.6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The trajectory of one-party dominance in Mali has been quite extraordinary. Ever since Mali’s 
democratic transition in the early 1990s, strong “centrifugal” forces have characterised the party 
system as all main political actors persistently rallied behind a powerful executive. ADEMA 
dominated the party system during the first decade of multi-party politics. The “open seat” 
elections in 2002 marked the end of ADEMA’s dominance but a balanced party system with a 
strong opposition did not emerge; instead, a dominant coalition merely replaced the dominant 
party.  
The Malian case, firstly, confirmed the impact of well-known institutional factors in 
enhancing the trajectory of one-party dominance “from above.” The particularly strong – 
historically rooted – powers vested in the presidency clearly expedited the endurance of one-
party and one-coalition dominance. The electoral system also proved particularly advantageous 
to the emergence of one-party dominance in the polls of 1992.  
Moreover, political leaders faced strong incentives “from below” that encouraged them to 
rally around the executive locus of political power. Opting for a role in opposition role was not 
a particularly attractive option from the point of view of a political leader in such an institutional 
and social context. Hence, one would expect one-party or one-coalition dominance to prevail 
in one form or another in the future. Chapter 6 provides a brief analysis of how the party system 
evolved during the post-coup period (2013-2018).  
Finally, this chapter demonstrated that the party system did not make a significant 
contribution to (the “input side” of) state legitimacy during the first two decades following 
Mali’s democratic transition. The chapter revealed highly restricted patterns of political 
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A similar pattern prevailed in rural areas.324 International media widely covered corruption 
scandals in the Malian health sector, in particular in relation to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria. Mismanaged and fraud in the public administration moved well 
beyond a number of isolated incidents, however. In 2010, Mali’s Auditor General reported a 
loss of income of around 50 million euros because of mismanagement and fraud in the 
administration. The next annual report revealed an amount of 15 million euros of public 
expenditure that was unaccounted for or missing.325 The Auditor drew these conclusions based 
on an inspection of a limited number of public institutions. Therefore, the total amount of 
mismanaged funds must have been even higher. Yet, the authorities provided almost no judicial 
follow-up to the reports presented by the Auditor General. This fuelled popular perceptions that 
public officials who broke the law were not punished and that the judiciary “granted preferential 
treatment according to class and income.”326  
In this context, scholars qualified the (chaotic) military coup in Mali as a “guardian coup” 
that served to protect the interests of ordinary citizens against civilian mismanagement.327 In 
great contrast to the early 1990s, when citizens withstood fierce state repression and took to the 
streets demanding a return to democracy, there was no public outcry to defend the 
democratically elected president this time around. On the contrary, an opinion poll conducted 
shortly after the military coup revealed that two thirds of citizens in Mali’s capital Bamako was 
actually pleased with the ousting of Touré.328 At the same time, most people  held the political 
elites – much more than the northern rebellion, the coup leaders or terrorist organisations – 
responsible for the chaos the country experienced in 2012.  
This chapter provides an analysis of the legislature’s performance some years before 
democracy eventually collapsed. It seeks to unravel the actual contribution of the legislature in 
shaping patterns of accountability, thereby underpinning Malian state legitimacy.  
The first section defines the stage upon which parliamentarians performed their core duties. 
In line with the previous chapter, it addresses factors that influenced the context in which they 
operated “from above” and “from below.”  
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The legislature and democratisation  






Parliaments lie at the very heart of democracy as they fulfil their responsibilities of law making, 
overseeing the executive and linking citizens to the policymaking process. The legislative 
branch of government performs a leading role in shaping democratic accountability. Its 
members play a unique dual role in this regard. They are expected to hold the executive 
accountable on behalf of all citizens and are, at the same time, accountable to the constituents 
they represent. Strong parliaments proved “an unmixed blessing for democratisation” in post-
communist societies and significantly contributed to democratic consolidation in Latin 
America.321 African legislatures have generally been much less successful, however, in 
strengthening democracy. In fact, the Malian legislature was situated at the very centre of 
democracy’s decay during the 2000s.  
 Both state authority and legitimacy eroded during this period. Popular satisfaction rates with 
democracy steadily dropped and frustration with the Touré-led administration intensified. 
Popular disenchantment stemmed in particular from the regime’s tolerant stance on corruption 
and the significant privileges granted to those aligned to the political centre.322 State authorities, 
as highlighted in Chapter 2, allowed loyal allies in northern Mali and senior officials to profit 
from the criminal economy in an attempt to weaken armed groups that opposed the state. The 
Touré regime also allocated large plots of land to politically well-connected investors based on 
opaque deals kept secret from the larger public.323 Touré regime cronies acquired land titles on 
the outskirts of Bamako, ignoring the rights of local residents.  
	
320 This chapter is based on a previous publication: Vliet, M. van. (2014). ‘Weak Legislatures, Failing MPs, and 
the Collapse of Democracy in Mali’, African Affairs, 113 (450): 45-66. It has been adapted and extended in the 
context of this dissertation.  
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University Press. 
322 Hussein, S. (2013) ‘Mali: West Africa's Afghanistan’, The RUSI Journal, 158(1): 12-19. 
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The Malian case is anything but an exception to this broader pattern, as already briefly noted in 
the previous chapter. The institutional imbalance between the executive and legislative branch 
of government appeared to be particularly prominent in sub-Saharan African countries 
governed under a semi-presidential system of which Mali is a case in point. The Malian 
president had few colleagues on the continent with an equally strong, formally anchored 
mandate.   
 A broader analysis of executive-legislative ties further illuminates the challenging context 
in which Malian Members of Parliament (MPs) operated. Although they had a number of 
official tools at their disposal to hold the executive answerable, they lacked effective 
instruments to enforce sanctions upon the executive.333 They could not dismiss individual 
ministers and faced considerable thresholds to censure the entire cabinet. The ability of the 
president to dissolve parliament further restrained MPs from using this right in daily practice 
as they had often made considerable personal investments to become elected (see below). 
Although ministers were appointed from outside parliament, they participated in parliamentary 
committee meetings when legislative matters were discussed and had substantial influence over 
the parliamentary agenda that was elaborated “respecting the issues prioritised by the 
government.”334 Internal capacity challenges also constrained the performance of the Malian 
legislature. Most parliamentary committees have one assistant at their disposal and some basic 
ICT facilities but lacked their own budget to, for example, organise study visits across Mali or 
to commission detailed advisory reports. Furthermore, the official requirement to clarify ways 
in which the government should fund specific legislative amendments constituted a significant 
obstacle in light of the limited support that was available.  
 
One-party and one-coalition dominance 
A second factor emerging from the literature that restricted the performance of collective 
parliamentary tasks “from above” relates to the political context. In numerous African 
countries, executive-centred politics thrived in a setting of one-party dominance. Various 
studies revealed the limited potential of parliamentarians to critically scrutinise the executive 
and proactively engage in legislative actions in such a political environment.335  
	
333 Answerability and enforceability constitute the two pillars of accountability. See Lindberg, S.I. (2009) 
‘Accountability: The Core Concept and Its Sub-types’, African Power and Politics Project (Working paper, No.1).  
334 Malian National Assembly, Internal Rules and Regulations (article 54).  
335 Salih, M.M.A. (ed) (2005) African Parliaments: Between Governance and Government. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan; Rakner, L. and Van de Walle, N. (2009) ‘Opposition Parties and Incumbent Presidents: The New 
Dynamics of Electoral Competition in Sub-Saharan Africa’, in Lindberg, S. (ed.) (2009) Democratisation by 
Elections: A New Mode of Transition?, Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press.  
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The core part of the chapter provides an empirical analysis of the performance of individual 
parliamentarians. This assessment takes into account formal responsibilities in the area of: (1) 
executive oversight; (2) legislation; (3) constituency development, as well as the informal task 
of: (4) maintaining clientelistic support networks. The Malian legislature is thus  
(re-)conceptualised as a hybrid institution that comprises both formal and informal duties, as 
clarified in the introductory chapter and in accordance with Lindberg’s (2010) earlier study of 
the Office of a Ghanaian Parliamentarian (see below).329 This section also examines the tasks 
Malian parliamentarians prioritised and how the different duties affected each other. 
The chapter ends with a short reflection on the impact of prevailing patterns of democratic 
accountability provided through the legislature upon the legitimacy of the state in relation to 
other power poles in Mali’s heterarchical political order.  
This study adopted several research methods to obtain data about the performance of the 
various parliamentary duties in daily practice. In-depth interviews with 15 parliamentarians by 
the end of 2009 were complemented with archival research, observation of a budgetary session 
and constituency visits.330 Before turning to the outcome of this empirical assessment, the stage 
upon which Malian MPs operated is elaborated. 
 
4.1. MALI’S HYBRID LEGISLATURE CONTEXTUALISED  
Executive-legislative ties 
Much of the academic literature focuses on the broader institutional context in which African 
legislatures operate. The centralisation of power around the presidency emerged as one of the 
principal factors restraining the performance of African parliaments.331 Based on a review of 
the literature, Nijzink et al. (2006) concluded that: 
 
Powerful presidents seem to be one of the most important reasons why modern parliaments 
in Africa are generally regarded as weak institutions.332  
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The Malian case is anything but an exception to this broader pattern, as already briefly noted in 
the previous chapter. The institutional imbalance between the executive and legislative branch 
of government appeared to be particularly prominent in sub-Saharan African countries 
governed under a semi-presidential system of which Mali is a case in point. The Malian 
president had few colleagues on the continent with an equally strong, formally anchored 
mandate.   
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government.”334 Internal capacity challenges also constrained the performance of the Malian 
legislature. Most parliamentary committees have one assistant at their disposal and some basic 
ICT facilities but lacked their own budget to, for example, organise study visits across Mali or 
to commission detailed advisory reports. Furthermore, the official requirement to clarify ways 
in which the government should fund specific legislative amendments constituted a significant 
obstacle in light of the limited support that was available.  
 
One-party and one-coalition dominance 
A second factor emerging from the literature that restricted the performance of collective 
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The core part of the chapter provides an empirical analysis of the performance of individual 
parliamentarians. This assessment takes into account formal responsibilities in the area of: (1) 
executive oversight; (2) legislation; (3) constituency development, as well as the informal task 
of: (4) maintaining clientelistic support networks. The Malian legislature is thus  
(re-)conceptualised as a hybrid institution that comprises both formal and informal duties, as 
clarified in the introductory chapter and in accordance with Lindberg’s (2010) earlier study of 
the Office of a Ghanaian Parliamentarian (see below).329 This section also examines the tasks 
Malian parliamentarians prioritised and how the different duties affected each other. 
The chapter ends with a short reflection on the impact of prevailing patterns of democratic 
accountability provided through the legislature upon the legitimacy of the state in relation to 
other power poles in Mali’s heterarchical political order.  
This study adopted several research methods to obtain data about the performance of the 
various parliamentary duties in daily practice. In-depth interviews with 15 parliamentarians by 
the end of 2009 were complemented with archival research, observation of a budgetary session 
and constituency visits.330 Before turning to the outcome of this empirical assessment, the stage 
upon which Malian MPs operated is elaborated. 
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Aid has done little in favour of democratisation or enhanced horizontal accountability, i.e. 
the establishment and strengthening of checks and balances able to control the executive 
branch of power. Budget support in particular acted as a strategic rent for the incumbent 
regime, which in Mali in the 2000s was increasingly discredited domestically.339  
 
Burnell (2012) underlined that international aid entrenched relations of external accountability 
from receiving governments towards international donors, often to the detriment of internal 
accountability relations vis-à-vis their own citizens and the legislature.340 Gould et al. (2005) 
previously depicted this pattern based on their groundbreaking work, which illustrated that the 
elaboration of international Poverty Reduction Strategies often undermined the consolidation 
of democratic forces, structures and ideas in developing countries.341 In addition to domestic 
factors, this external dimension reinforced the rise of what Mkandawire (2010) called 
“choiceless democracies” across the African continent.342  
 Beyond these factors shaping the context in which Malian MPs operated “from above”, the 
manner in which the legislature was rooted in society – the broader “incentive structure” 
confronting individual parliamentarians as well as prevailing popular expectations – influenced 
the way parliamentarians behaved in daily practice.343 The following section briefly highlights 
the impact of the formal electoral system in place as well as the informal institutions of 
clientelism/patrimonialism and the politics of proximity in this regard.   
 
Electoral system 
By shaping the manner in which political representation is institutionalised, an electoral system 
significantly influences the relationship between individual parliamentarians and ordinary 
citizens. In Mali, parliamentary elections were held under a two-round majority run-off system 
in either single or multi-member electoral districts, depending on the number of inhabitants. In 
such a context, individual parliamentarians were confronted with a strong incentive to represent 
the interests of their electoral constituency at the national level and to provide constituency 
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The previous chapter presented and analysed one-party dominance by the Alliance pour la 
Démocratie au Mali - Parti Africain pour la Solidarité et la Justice (ADEMA-P.A.S.J.) 
throughout the 1990s. One-coalition dominance substituted one-party dominance as politically 
independent President Touré established a “platform of national unity” after his victory in the 
2002 elections. President Touré often portrayed Mali’s consensual model of democracy as an 
African alternative to the Western style of democracy that thrived on competition and rivalry. 
He claimed that his consensual model not only guaranteed stability, but also contained effective 
checks and balances. “There are strong debates in parliament but at the end of the day disunity 
is avoided,” he stated, adding, “while there is no hostile opposition, there is parliamentary 
control and the majority controls the government.”336 However, the analysis provided in the 
previous chapter confirmed an earlier conclusion drawn by Sears (2007) that Malian democracy 
was not effective in “combining consensus and pluralism, but rather seeks consensus at the cost 
of pluralism.”337 In other words, the pressure for parliamentarians to remain loyal to rather than 
critically scrutinise the executive persisted after the 2002 elections.  
 In a number of African countries, larger opposition parties and backbenchers from the ruling 
party had, by then, established “coalitions of change” that started pushing for institutional 
strengthening of the legislature.338 In Mali, however, the vast majority of opposition benches 
remained vacant throughout the last two decades and patterns of parliamentary loyalty towards 
the executive prevailed.  
 
International context  
The international context constituted a third factor restricting the potential of many African 
legislatures to fulfil their oversight and law-making tasks, certainly in the most aid-dependent 
countries. In Mali, international aid had covered an important component of the national budget 
throughout the previous decade, as illustrated in the previous chapter. Donors provided almost 
40 per cent in the form of direct budget support. The previous chapter equally pointed at the 
“democratic deficit” of the ways in which international agencies and bilateral donors provided 
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legislature as a hybrid institution generating both formal and informal responsibilities for its 
members. The relevance of this re-conceptualisation of the legislature moves well beyond 
Ghanaian borders. Cheeseman (2009) revealed the institutionalisation of informal networks 
between Kenyan parliamentarians and their constituents because of elite pressure “from above” 
and incentives “from below.”351  
 Much of the academic literature considered the collective oversight and legislative duties of 
parliamentarians as crucial for the overall process of democratisation. Likewise, the prevalence 
of clientlistic ties by parliamentarians was perceived as detrimental to the overall performance 
of the legislature and its contribution to democracy. Lindberg (2010), however, again nuanced 
this perspective. He revealed that the clientelistic demands faced by individual Ghanaian 
parliamentarians also contributed to collective parliamentary actions. The persistent pressure to 
fund the healthcare bills of individual constituents, for example, encouraged them to 
collectively adopt a nationwide healthcare insurance system. The interplay between the various 
parliamentary functions was not inevitably a negative one and therefore needs to be examined 
empirically. For this reason, the following sections not only provide an overview of the various 
core functions performed by Malian parliamentarians, but also offer an assessment of their 
interplay in daily practice.  
 
4.2. THE PERFORMANCE OF MALI’S HYBRID LEGISLATURE IN DAILY PRACTICE  
 
Candidate selection and electoral campaigns 
Becoming adopted as a parliamentary candidate and elected to office obviously precedes the 
actual performance of various parliamentary duties. Analysing the principal dynamics during 
this pre-electoral period provided nonetheless important background information on the kinds 
of incentives MPs were likely to face once in office. The monetisation and personalised 
character of the relations between potential candidates and constituents was already apparent 
throughout this phase. Having been formally adopted by local party branches, the majority of 
parliamentarians indicated that a track record in the party at either local or national level was 
an important selection criterion in the run-up to the 2007 elections. However, many MPs also 
mentioned one’s individual financial capacity and family status. Parties expected all MPs to 
fund the largest share of their own campaigns, making financial capacity an indispensable 
	
351 For an illustration in the case of Kenya, see: Cheeseman, N. (2009) ‘Kenya Since 2002: The More Things 
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services.344 Ordinary citizens perceived these latter responsibilities as the key priorities of 
Malian MPs. Although there was substantial popular support for the collective oversight and 
legislative tasks by parliament, popular pressure to fulfil individual constituency-oriented 
responsibilities clearly prevailed. Roughly three quarters of Malian citizens believed that 
“parliament needed to make the laws because it is composed of people’s representatives” and 
almost two thirds also “wanted the president to explain in parliament on a regular basis how tax 
money is spent.”345 However, ordinary citizens did not consider these collective tasks, 
particularly critical to the wider process of democratisation, a strong priority. Adopting 
legislation was still regarded as a principal parliamentary duty by 26 per cent of the population 
but less than one in ten Malians regarded executive oversight as a priority function. The formal 
task that Malian citizens primarily expected their parliamentarians to engage in was to represent 
constituency interests at the national level.346  
 
Informal institutions 
A vast body of literature also revealed the prevalence of highly personalised, clientelistic 
networks in shaping the way ordinary citizens were linked to the decision-making process in 
many African societies.347 Across the entire continent, large segments of society expected their 
representative to take care of them in a “parental” way.348 Highly personalised political 
networks historically bridged the state-society divide in Mali, too.349 The previous chapter 
demonstrated the importance of geographically oriented networks between national political 
elites and local power brokers. These informal networks have long been considered an 
alternative that people relied on in the wake of poorly functioning formal institutions.  
However, in his innovative study of the various tasks that Ghanaian citizens held their 
parliamentarians accountable for on a day-to-day basis, Lindberg (2010) adopted another 
analytical perspective. He considered the distribution of public goods in clientelistic networks 
to be an integral part of the parliamentary institution.350 Hence, he “re-conceptualised” the 
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win support amongst swing voters by promising job opportunities, constituency development 
programmes and by dishing out small sums of cash.  
 
Performing four core parliamentary duties 
First, responding to clientelistic demands constituted a core duty of Malian MPs. Once elected 
into office, many constituents expected personal financial support from their parliamentarians. 
“Parliamentarian in Mali is becoming the Secretary General of social demands,” as one MP 
noted.354 Malian parliamentarians categorised the actors who primarily expressed these kinds 
of demands in the following order of priority: (i) local party representatives; (ii) people who 
actively supported the MP on the campaign trail; and (iii) ordinary citizens. Malian 
parliamentarians strategically selected and ranked the people they supported through the 
provision of private goods: (i) campaign supporters; (ii) family members; and (iii) traditional 
leaders. Although this latter group rarely asked for such support, many parliamentarians 
regularly offered money and services to influential local leaders in order to maintain their 
backing. Nevertheless, Malian MPs mostly distributed private goods and services to those 
people who had assisted them during the 2007 electoral campaigns. They particularly invested 
much time and energy in lobbying the executive to provide (relatives of) these strategic 
supporters with a job in the state bureaucracy. One MP stated that: “I particularly try to find job 
opportunities in the ministries controlled by my party.” 355 One of his colleagues indicated that 
he had already “provided thirty youngsters with an internship and had managed to offer six 
close friends a job over the last years.”356 Ordinary citizens frequently demanded their 
parliamentarian to cover school fees, arrange accommodation for students in the capital city, to 
pay hospital bills or to find them a job within the state bureaucracy. While Malian MPs often 
provided small amounts of cash to these constituents, they restricted the distribution of 
substantial personal favours to a small network of family members, campaign supporters and 
local leaders. Most parliamentarians indicated that it was simply impossible to cover the large 
number of personal requests. When they visited their constituency, they faced, on average, over 
70 demands for private assistance from individual constituents. Instead of responding to all 
these individual requests, they tried to arrange for constituency development projects 
simultaneously supporting many people.  
	
354 Interview MP N.10, Bamako, 17 December 2009. 
355 Interview MP N.4, Bamako, 10 December 2009. 
356 Interview MP N.5, Bamako, 11 December 2009. 
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criterion for selection. Equally, clan and cast membership played a role for many 
parliamentarians; one explained that: 
 
In my locality, I am the “protégé” of the families that traditionally obtain authority and they 
have a lot of influence within the constituency.352  
 
The relevance of dynamics related to the “politics of proximity” introduced in the previous 
chapter also surfaced in the interviews with MPs. In geographically larger multi-member 
constituencies, political party affiliation did not primarily guide the establishment of coalition 
lists. Instead, the candidate list strategically united individual candidates who maintained a 
personal support networks in different geographical “sub-entities”:    
 
Together, we cover all the important areas in our constituency. I take care of my home village 
and five surrounding villages while my coalition partners [on the electoral list] take care of 
their own home areas within the constituency.353  
 
Once adopted as a parliamentary candidate, financial resources played a crucial role during the 
electoral campaigns. All but one of the incumbent MPs included in the survey indicated that 
their campaign budget had at least tripled compared to the previous elections in 2002. Five 
parliamentarians spent less than 15,000 euros, four between 15,000 and 30,000 euros, another 
four between 30,000 and 75,000 euros, while one parliamentarian invested 120,000 euros in a 
vast and scattered constituency during the 2007 legislative campaigns. Although some 
parliamentarians personally covered most of their expenses, the majority relied on their social 
network for financial support (family and friends rather than party or businesses). One 
parliamentarian from a northern constituency already noted the infiltration of drug money into 
the 2007 electoral campaigns. The financial sponsors, as will be shown below, had a strong 
influence on parliamentarians after they had been elected into office.  
 Asked why they believed people had voted for them, the vast majority of parliamentarians 
mentioned their personal ability to provide constituency service. A promise of development 
projects was considered the most effective campaign message, followed by a commitment to 
support individual constituents who faced financial challenges. Malian MPs primarily tried to 
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criterion for selection. Equally, clan and cast membership played a role for many 
parliamentarians; one explained that: 
 
In my locality, I am the “protégé” of the families that traditionally obtain authority and they 
have a lot of influence within the constituency.352  
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constituencies, political party affiliation did not primarily guide the establishment of coalition 
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personal support networks in different geographical “sub-entities”:    
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and five surrounding villages while my coalition partners [on the electoral list] take care of 
their own home areas within the constituency.353  
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 Asked why they believed people had voted for them, the vast majority of parliamentarians 
mentioned their personal ability to provide constituency service. A promise of development 
projects was considered the most effective campaign message, followed by a commitment to 
support individual constituents who faced financial challenges. Malian MPs primarily tried to 
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I maintain a close relation with the president and often discuss problems that have arisen 
in my constituency with him directly. He then usually intervenes.357  
 
Two other colleagues revealed that: 
 
For setting up a community school and other services in your constituency, you need 
signatures and funds from the minister of education. It certainly helps if your party is friends 
with that minister.358  
 
One of the wards in my constituency did not have access to electricity. So I went to see 
president Touré. I told him there were households in my constituency who had their doors 
decorated with his campaigning poster but lacked access to electricity. The president 
personally called the director of the national electricity company in my presence and gave 
instructions. If the President had not intervened, we would still be waiting today. But now, 
they have electricity. So, you see, access to the president is crucial for developing my 
constituency.359  
 
In case a parliamentarian did not directly benefit from his or her alignment with the executive, 
there were still subtle advantages to point out. An MP explained: 
 
Even though I haven’t played a role in ensuring that a particular road is now being improved 
in my constituency, it still looks good on me and I can at least claim to have contributed.360  
 
Moreover, a majority of parliamentarians indicated that being able to provide a tangible service 
to one’s electoral constituency was the achievement they were most proud of. Only one MP 
mentioned a legislative act in this respect and none referred to a particular oversight success. 
All the others referred with pride to a range of constituency accomplishments from the provision 
of medicines to local healthcare centres, a successful lobby bringing electricity to one’s home 
region, water sanitation projects or the procurement of an ambulance for the constituency.361 In 
	
357 Interview MP N.13, Bamako 19 December 2009. 
358 Interview MP N.1, Bamako 8 December 2009. 
359 Interview MP N.10, Bamako 17 December 2009. 
360 Interview, MP N.3, Bamako 9 December 2009. 
361 A similar pattern was witnessed when MPs were asked which of their colleagues’ achievements they 
appreciated most.  
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Secondly, all parliamentarians interviewed – without exception – prioritised this task of 
constituency service and constituency representation in daily practice. However, they lacked an 
official financial instrument, such as a Constituency Development Fund, to provide such 
services themselves. Malian parliamentarians therefore relied on their informal networks across 
the executive branch of government to make these constituency needs both known and to 
address them. The 2010 budgetary session attested to this as many parliamentarians not only 
proactively voiced the needs of their constituency but also tried to persuade the executive to 
prioritise these concerns within next years’ budget. The following example is illustrative:  
 
During the 2007 campaigns, President Touré promised to invest in the construction of new 
secondary schools in the area of Yanfolila. But today, there are still 900 students packed in 
only three secondary school buildings. Will the government invest more in building classes 
over here in 2010?  
 
Members of Parliament from different electoral constituencies also teamed up in order to 
represent matters of common, regional, interest:  
 
We, as MPs from Bandiagara and Douentza, are very concerned about the routes between 
Bandiagara, Mopti and Douentza. Already in 2008, there was a promise to have these routes 
improved but this has not been done. What has the government planned to do next year in 
order to address this concern?  
 
The vast majority of parliamentary interventions during the budgetary session concentrated on 
these very particularistic constituency needs. Parliamentarians were seen cooperating but they 
also competed amongst each other to have their constituency priorities addressed by the 
executive.  
 Maintaining constructive working relations within the executive branch of government was 
considered essential for representing constituency needs effectively  and for providing 
constituency services. No less than three quarters of the parliamentarians interviewed indicated 
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By comparison: only four written and 15 oral questions were recorded during the first 
legislature (1992-1997).363 Furthermore, eight government interpellations took place between 
2002 and 2007 and six had been set-up between 2007 and 2009. The issues tabled varied from 
the challenges faced in the education sector, the consequences of the worldwide financial crisis 
for the Malian economy and issues related to fiscal/monetary policies. The legislature secured 
one rare oversight success in forcing the executive to alter the 2010 budget following the sale 
of Mali’s national telephone company. The government obtained significant additional revenue 
after selling 51 per cent of the shares of Mali’s national telephone company SOTELMA to 
Maroc Telecom. The executive allocated these funds to different budgetary lines without 
formally consulting parliament. Frustrated by their exclusion, opposition Members of 
Parliament organised a press conference and requested that the Minister of Finance respond to 
oral questions in parliament. President Touré tried to calm tempers but parliament nonetheless 
adopted an amendment to ensure that the additional resources were integrated into a revised 
version of the 2010 budget.  
In sum, as members of a hybrid institution, Malian parliamentarians performed a wide range 
of tasks that were obviously not given the same priority in daily practice. They devoted most 
of their time and energy to performing individual constituency-oriented tasks. The following 
section demonstrates that in order to achieve success in this priority area, parliamentarians had 
to curb their responsibility to hold the executive accountable. In other words, a negative 
interplay prevailed between the individual and collective duties of Malian MPs.   
  
4.3. THE INTERPLAY AT PLAY: PARTICULARISTIC AND COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITIES    
 
As noted at the start of this chapter, in Ghana, recurrent demands faced by MPs to pay the 
healthcare bills of individual constituents prompted improvements in national insurance 
schemes. In Mali, constituency-based interests also inspired collective action in a number of 
cases. The above-mentioned effort by MPs to obtain a revised 2010 budget from the Malian 
government is a good example. Parliamentarians motivated their request to include revenues 
earned from the sale of Mali’s national telephone within a revised 2010 budget as follows:  
 
	
363 Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (2008) L’Assemblée Nationale du Mali sous la troisième république. Un guide à 
l’usage des élus, des citoyens et des partenaires extérieurs. Bamako: Imprim Color. No data were available about 
the number of written questions between 2002 and 2007 in the parliamentary archive. 
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line with prevailing popular expectations and the campaign promises made, Malian 
parliamentarians were seen to prioritise their constituency representation and service-delivery 
tasks in daily practice. The performance of these constituency-oriented tasks strongly 
influenced their collective law-making and oversight tasks. Before presenting the interplay 
between these different parliamentary tasks, however, an overview of those collective 
responsibilities that are particularly crucial to the overall democratisation process are presented.      
Thirdly, the performance of collective law-making tasks was concentrated during the two 
parliamentary sessions that ran from the first Monday in April (for a maximum of 90 days) and 
the first Monday in October (up to 75 days). Going through the parliamentary archives, it 
appeared that Malian MPs – like many of their colleagues in the world – rarely used their right 
to initiate legislation. They drafted six bills (propositions de loi) between 2002 and 2007, most 
of which focused on the working conditions and salaries of Members of Parliament themselves. 
Between 2007 and 2009, four bills were elaborated that addressed specific policy matters. The 
Malian parliament was active in amending legislation proposed by the executive, although a 
number of other African parliaments have also been proactive in this respect.362 The Malian 
parliament amended around 25 per cent of the projets de loi during Touré’s first mandate and 
altered 20 per cent between 2007 and 2009. Malian parliamentarians also frequently formulated 
so-called policy recommendations, which did not require detailed budgetary justifications. MPs 
adopted more than 40 recommendations (in total) during the parliamentary sessions in October 
2008 and April 2009. The recommendations covered a wide range of policy matters in the 
judicial, agricultural, transport and banking sector. The legislative performance of Malian 
parliamentarians thus appeared moderate but not as weak as one might have expected given the 
political and institutional restrictions presented in the previous section. More in-depth research, 
particularly on the performance of legislative committees, is nonetheless required to arrive at 
more robust conclusions in this respect. 
Fourthly, Malian parliamentarians rarely used the oversight instruments at their disposal 
although there has been a gradual increase since the early 1990s. They primarily used these 
instruments to obtain clarifications (answerability) from the executive, whom they rarely 
sanctioned (enforceability). Thirty-eight oral questions were recorded between 2002 and 2007. 
Sixteen oral and seven written questions were presented to government between 2007 and 2009.  
	
362 Barkan, J.D. (ed.) (2009). 
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recommendations adopted between 2007 and 2009. The executive almost routinely accepted 
these recommendations, but MPs had limited possibilities to verify their degree of 
implementation. The prime minister, however, did not want to discuss these matters in 
parliament in front of the cameras and raised pressure on the Speaker to allow cabinet to respond 
in writing. Many MPs favoured an open debate but, not wanting to harm their ties with the 
executive, abstained from protesting. Collective parliamentary oversight was equally restricted 
on matters of national security. An MP representing a northern constituency indicated that he 
formally requested the Minister of Defence to come to parliament to discuss the rising presence 
of Salafists in his electoral constituency. President Touré, however, personally demanded local 
notables in this constituency to force the MP to withdraw his request:  
 
We finally did the consensus thing and I spoke to the Minister of Interior behind closed 
doors.366 
 
Other MPs complained that the French National Assembly debated Mali’s security challenges 
more openly than the country’s own parliament. However, many admitted abiding by executive 
pressure and refrained from addressing the matter in public sessions.  
The obstacles opposition parliamentarians faced when performing their individual 
constituency-oriented tasks further illustrated the importance of maintaining constructive ties 
with the executive. During the 2010 budgetary session, an opposition MP who served as a 
minister in a previous cabinet complained about an infrastructural problem in his constituency. 
A long-time serving colleague from the ruling coalition stood up and responded, “he should 
stop complaining.” Having failed to address the problem while in government himself, “the MP 
could not expect the current government to solve his problems now.” The comment was made 
with a slightly ironic tone and generated laughter in the House. Nevertheless, opposition MPs 
did face considerable challenges to performing their constituency-oriented tasks. One 
parliamentarian indicated that his lengthy career as a senior civil servant granted him access to 
several ministries, despite the fact that his party was in opposition. Other opposition MPs 
encountered significant obstacles. One MP recalled that during the 2007 campaigns, 
“constituents were told by our competitors that their constituency could not develop if they 
voted for us, the opposition.”367 Another colleague indicated that:  
 
	
366 Interview MP N 14, Bamako, 19 December 2009. 
367 Interview MP N.11, Bamako, 18 December 2009. 
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I am not from the opposition, but my people are suffering and we need to use this money 
effectively. We need to be involved as parliamentarians.  
 
Where I live, people have no access to television. We could have used this money to assist 
them. […] I just want my locality to be able to develop together with the rest of Mali.  
 
Moreover, numerous parliamentarians revealed that constituency-based demands to improve 
local healthcare centres and to address pertinent land issues had encouraged them to jointly 
adopt nationwide policy recommendations in these areas.  
Yet, the collective actions undertaken were primarily those that also benefitted individual 
constituencies. Malian MPs were much more hesitant to adopt collective measures that could 
harm their individual ties with the executive. In fact, the empirical assessment revealed a very 
strong trade-off between collective and individual parliamentary tasks. This seriously hampered 
the legislature’s collective oversight responsibilities. In other words, the prevailing pattern 
witnessed in the years before democracy collapsed constituted a negative relation between 
particularistic representative tasks on the one hand and collective oversight tasks on the other 
hand. As noted above, Malian parliamentarians relied on their informal networks across the 
executive branch of government to perform their constituency-oriented tasks in the absence of 
an official instrument such as a Constituency Development Fund. In return, representatives of 
the executive branch expected them to refrain from critical scrutiny, at least in public, of 
sensitive political subjects as the following observations by Malian MPs illustrated:  
 
I go and see the minister in person. Questioning him in public will frustrate him. He will get 
angry with you and then he is not going to assist you anymore.364  
 
We, as Members of Parliament from the ruling majority, are always expected to 
automatically defend every minister. Political discipline has become increasingly important 
and has limited our room for manoeuvring. We are expected to shut up.365  
 
Another clear-cut example concerned the failed attempt of the Malian legislature to have an 
open debate with the prime minister about the implementation of the parliamentary policy 
	
364 Interview MP N.12, Bamako, 19 December 2009. 
365 Interview MP N.1, Bamako 8 December 2009. Interestingly, the room for manoeuvre was considered greater 
during President Touré’s first mandate (2002-2007), which was characterised by a full parliamentary consensus.   
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in relation to their husbands;  abolishing the legal status of religious marriage; a rise in the age 
of marriage to counter child marriage; as well as changes in heritage rights amongst married 
couples. The National Assembly adopted the revised version of the Code in August 2009, 
almost unanimously. International donors had tied their overall financial support to the Malian 
state to tangible improvements in the area of gender equality.369 Parliamentary approval took 
place shortly before a new transfer of international aid was scheduled. However, within a short 
space of time, religious movements mobilised over 50,000 people in Bamako to protest these 
changes. They set-up highly visible media campaigns and blamed MPs for having voted in 
favour of a text that did not reflect “traditional” or religious values prevailing in Malian society. 
Then president of the umbrella of Islamic organisations in Mali and one of the most influential 
religious leaders, Imam Mahmoud Dicko, stated:  
 
They have spoken of marriage as being a secular act. We have said it is too much for a 
country like Mali where everyone is a believer. There are no non-believers in Mali. In 
one manner or another, people believe […] To say in this country that marriage is a 
secular act and to make it a law, it is not a good thing, it truly insults Mali.370  
 
Their campaigns proved highly effective and the government withdrew the Code. Barely two 
years after having approved the progressive Family Code, the legislature unanimously adopted 
a revised version that took into account most of the objections raised by religious leaders.371 
The course of events reinforced popular perceptions that both the legislature and the state were 
out of sync with wider society. In contrast, Bergamaschi (2014) noted that religious leaders:  
 
Consolidated their power as spokespersons of average citizens and accumulated political 
capital.372  
 
Hence, the democratic decision-making process regarding the Family Code weakened state 
legitimacy more than it enhanced it. It reinforced the position of non-state power poles vis-à-
vis the state.  
	
369 Siméant, J. (2014) ‘Contester au Mali. Formes de la mobilisation et de la critique à Bamako’, Karthala : Paris, 
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Civil servants are often afraid to assist us. We therefore have far less opportunities to ensure 
the needs of our constituents are known at the right places and to ensure that relevant state 
institutions take action.368  
 
Well aware of the consequences for one’s potential to safeguard both individual and 
constituency interests, the vast majority of parliamentarians from the ruling coalition indicated 
that they took care not to fall out of grace with the executive.  
In sum, the Malian legislature often refrained from holding an increasingly discredited 
executive accountable and played a modest role in the legislative domain. This performance 
was clearly linked to the wider incentive structure in which parliamentarians were embedded. 
Both formal (electoral system) and informal (clientelism/patronage, politics of proximity) 
incentives incited MPs to focus on constituency-related matters. Their dependence on an 
omnipotent executive to achieve results in these priority areas only further eroded their already 
limited potential to provide executive oversight (at least in public).  
So far, this chapter has focused exclusively on the (dis)incentives confronting Malian MPs 
and how these, in turn, affected their limited role in performing collective legislative and 
oversight duties. The following and final section expands this narrow scope. It reveals how 
other influential power poles considerably shaped the legislative process and executive 
oversight.  
 
4.4. THE LEGISLATURE IN THE CONTEXT OF A HETERARCHICAL POLITICAL ORDER 
 
The exercise of public authority in the context of Mali’s heterarchical order involved both state 
and non-state actors who legitimised their authority in reference to multiple sources. None of 
the actors constituted a hegemonic force in society and public authority was thus shaped through 
constant interactions between these actors and multiple legitimising repertoires. As noted in the 
introductory chapter, Sears (2007) referred to Mali’s “triple heritage” of indigenous, religious 
and Western democratic aspects with respect to the  struggle for legitimacy.  
This interplay also characterised the legislative process, as the revision of Mali’s Family Code 
in 2009 clearly illustrated. In that year, Malian authorities elaborated a revised Code that 
included substantial progressive changes encouraging gender equality. Modifications included 
the formal repeal of the so-called obedience clause – referring to the inferior status of women 
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in relation to their husbands;  abolishing the legal status of religious marriage; a rise in the age 
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Their campaigns proved highly effective and the government withdrew the Code. Barely two 
years after having approved the progressive Family Code, the legislature unanimously adopted 
a revised version that took into account most of the objections raised by religious leaders.371 
The course of events reinforced popular perceptions that both the legislature and the state were 
out of sync with wider society. In contrast, Bergamaschi (2014) noted that religious leaders:  
 
Consolidated their power as spokespersons of average citizens and accumulated political 
capital.372  
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Civil servants are often afraid to assist us. We therefore have far less opportunities to ensure 
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reinforce a common narrative and to organise themselves. As a result, consciousness about their 
marginalised position increased. Those youth groups, De Bruijn and Both (2017) noted, “most 
actively challenge the existing frames of legitimacy” and engaged in a “search for alternative 
legitimate orders.”376 Some moved in the direction of alternative orders propagated by non-state 
armed groups, militias or terrorist groups, as Chapter 6 further demonstrates.  
Clearly, protests against the political elites had a very heterogeneous character and moved in 
different directions. A profound analysis of these diffuse responses is certainly beyond the 
scope of this thesis. Nonetheless, the common point of departure for these diverse trajectories 
constituted a shared sense amongst protestors that the Malian democratic system failed to 
channel their interests and contestations with the state.     
 
4.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Based on an analysis of the performance of different parliamentary tasks, this chapter revealed 
that Mali’s hybrid legislature refrained from holding an increasingly discredited executive 
accountable in the years preceding the 2012 coup. The case study confirmed and illustrated 
well-known institutional (executive dominance), political (one-party/coalition dominance) and 
international (aid) challenges that restricted executive oversight. In line with the electoral 
system in place and wider societal expectations, particularistic tasks clearly prevailed in daily 
practice. Becoming an MP in Mali, as highlighted in the above, was like “becoming the 
Secretary General of social demands.” In this context, a strong trade-off between collective and 
particularistic parliamentary tasks prevailed. MPs relied on constructive ties with – and 
informal networks across – the executive branch of government to fulfil their particularistic 
tasks. Hence, the hybrid legislature functioned as an extension of the executive branch of 
government geared towards the redistribution of national resources along particularistic – and 
geographically centred – interests. The national interest and the delivery of public goods played 
a marginal role, merely a by-product of prevailing particularistic interests. When MPs faced 
similar constituency demands, this potentially incited collective action in the national interest. 
Nevertheless, if joint action jeopardised their personal or particularistic interests, MPs refrained 
from intervening collectively. In practice, actors operating outside the official channels and 
beyond democratic institutions provided the bulk of executive oversight.  
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A similar pattern characterised the interplay between state and non-state actors in the area of 
executive oversight. This chapter has illustrated the highly restricted role of the legislature in 
this regard. In such a context, actors operating outside the official democratic channels – almost 
inevitably – played a prominent role in holding the executive accountable. In the early 1990s, 
the “street” in Mali’s capital Bamako emerged as a pivotal political space when protest marches 
led by different youth constituencies and other urban factions eventually triggered a military 
coup that ended authoritarian rule (ref. Chapter 2). Siméant (2014) illustrated how a wide 
variety of urban interest groups, ranging from trade unions, various youth associations, anti-
globalisations movements, small op position parties, have taken to the streets ever since.373 
While the issues raised during such demonstrations varied, poor state performance in the socio-
economic realm was central to many of them. With the exception of a very small parliamentary 
opposition, political parties and parliament refrained from critically holding the executive to 
account on such issues. The streets constituted the primary political space for their expression. 
Popular protests once more played a major role in inciting regime change in 2012. This time 
around, it started with a march in Kati led by women married to soldiers who had lost their lives 
in the emerging conflict in northern Mali. They wanted to hold the political and military 
hierarchy accountable for having failed to provide the soldiers with adequate weapons, basic 
rations and a minimum of support. As they marched towards the presidential palace in Bamako, 
their movement turned into a broad-based demonstration that spread to other cities. This march 
of the “war widows” provided the “initial spark” that ultimately led to the chaotic military coup 
that ousted President Touré.374  
After the coup d’état, youth groups continued to play a particularly important role in holding 
political leaders accountable. Rap groups like Les Sofas de la République and many other 
musicians encouraged urban youngsters, through music and social media, to hold their corrupt 
leaders to account.375 Similar initiatives had been taken in neighbouring countries where groups 
like Y’en a marre in Senegal and Le Balai Citoyen in Burkina Faso successfully held their 
political elites accountable at important junctures in the democratic process. In rural areas, as 
briefly highlighted in the previous chapter, youth networks increasingly contested the position 
of local elites who had long monopolised (informal) ties with political elites at the national 
level. Improved access to social media enabled these youngsters to share experiences, to 
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Decentralisation and democratisation  





During the 1990s, the Malian government set out to transfer central state responsibilities and 
resources to newly established local municipal authorities supervised by locally elected 
councils. Thousands of villages and nomad fractions were regrouped into 703 municipalities 
after an extensive process of administrative and territorial restructuration.  
 These ambitious decentralisation reforms aimed to enhance state legitimacy and spearhead 
economic development by reinforcing democratic accountability at the local level. The 
literature on decentralisation and accountability – addressed in more detail below – predicts 
such positive outcome provided that: (1) elected officials at the local level (‘actors’); (2) obtain 
considerable influence (‘power’); (3) over essential policy areas (‘domains’); while (4) being 
held accountable by ordinary citizens (‘downward’ accountability).  
Hence, a central research question concerning the actual implementation of decentralisation 
reforms in Mali is whether and to what extent it engendered downwardly accountable elected 
municipal actors with significant domains of discretionary power.  
In addressing this research question, the analysis presented in this chapter moves beyond a 
merely institutional approach. Mali’s decentralisation reforms were obviously not implemented 
in a socio-cultural vacuum. The newly created municipal council encountered several informal 
power poles that played a leading role in local governance affairs long before the roll-out of the 
decentralisation programme in the 1990s. This included the influential council of elderly at 
village level, which legitimised its authority in very different ways than through a popular 
mandate obtained in elections. This chapter therefore addresses the research question from an 
anthropological perspective. It is based on in-depth fieldwork around the first (1999), second 
(2004) and third (2009) local elections in Karan, a village some 90 kilometres south of Mali’s 
capital Bamako. This longitudinal empirical research examined how patterns of interaction 
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President Touré often presented Mali’s consensus democracy as an alternative to a 
confrontational western-type characterised by dissent and opposition. The consensus model, he 
argued, mobilised and unified different interest groups in society, thereby boosting state 
authority and legitimacy. However, the analysis presented in the previous and current chapter 
points in a different direction. If Mali’s consensus democracy displayed a sense of unity, that 
was largely because dissent had to be expressed though alternative channels beyond – and often 
in opposition to – the state. While intended to enhance state legitimacy, the democratic structure 
actually reinforced non-state power poles in Mali’s heterarchical political order.  
The next chapter moves beyond the national democratic system and provides an analysis of 
Mali’s ambitious decentralisation reform package. It is based on extensive empirical research 
at the local level. This enabled a more in-depth understanding of the actual interplay between 
state and non-state actors, material and immaterial resources, and ways in which this interaction 






Decentralisation and democratisation  





During the 1990s, the Malian government set out to transfer central state responsibilities and 
resources to newly established local municipal authorities supervised by locally elected 
councils. Thousands of villages and nomad fractions were regrouped into 703 municipalities 
after an extensive process of administrative and territorial restructuration.  
 These ambitious decentralisation reforms aimed to enhance state legitimacy and spearhead 
economic development by reinforcing democratic accountability at the local level. The 
literature on decentralisation and accountability – addressed in more detail below – predicts 
such positive outcome provided that: (1) elected officials at the local level (‘actors’); (2) obtain 
considerable influence (‘power’); (3) over essential policy areas (‘domains’); while (4) being 
held accountable by ordinary citizens (‘downward’ accountability).  
Hence, a central research question concerning the actual implementation of decentralisation 
reforms in Mali is whether and to what extent it engendered downwardly accountable elected 
municipal actors with significant domains of discretionary power.  
In addressing this research question, the analysis presented in this chapter moves beyond a 
merely institutional approach. Mali’s decentralisation reforms were obviously not implemented 
in a socio-cultural vacuum. The newly created municipal council encountered several informal 
power poles that played a leading role in local governance affairs long before the roll-out of the 
decentralisation programme in the 1990s. This included the influential council of elderly at 
village level, which legitimised its authority in very different ways than through a popular 
mandate obtained in elections. This chapter therefore addresses the research question from an 
anthropological perspective. It is based on in-depth fieldwork around the first (1999), second 
(2004) and third (2009) local elections in Karan, a village some 90 kilometres south of Mali’s 
capital Bamako. This longitudinal empirical research examined how patterns of interaction 
	
377 This chapter is based on an earlier publication: Vliet, M. van (2011) ‘Family Matters: The Interplay between 
Formal and Informal Incentives for Accountability in Mali ’s Local Communities’, in: Chirwa Danwoord and Lia 
Nijzink (eds.) (2011), Accountable Governments in Africa: Perspectives from Public Law and Political Studies. 
Cape Town: UCT Press. Several parts have been extended and adapted in the context of this thesis. 
120	
	
President Touré often presented Mali’s consensus democracy as an alternative to a 
confrontational western-type characterised by dissent and opposition. The consensus model, he 
argued, mobilised and unified different interest groups in society, thereby boosting state 
authority and legitimacy. However, the analysis presented in the previous and current chapter 
points in a different direction. If Mali’s consensus democracy displayed a sense of unity, that 
was largely because dissent had to be expressed though alternative channels beyond – and often 
in opposition to – the state. While intended to enhance state legitimacy, the democratic structure 
actually reinforced non-state power poles in Mali’s heterarchical political order.  
The next chapter moves beyond the national democratic system and provides an analysis of 
Mali’s ambitious decentralisation reform package. It is based on extensive empirical research 
at the local level. This enabled a more in-depth understanding of the actual interplay between 
state and non-state actors, material and immaterial resources, and ways in which this interaction 




deconcentration, which would have entailed a transfer to the local level of centrally appointed 
personnel and agencies with continued reporting lines to their superiors in Bamako. In other 
words, through deconcentration, a national government merely represents itself at the local level 
but remains in control of policies and budgets, thereby maintaining a strong form of upwards 
accountability. Instead, Malian authorities envisaged a true process of devolution, which 
involved a real transfer of authority, responsibilities and resources to more autonomous 
subnational layers of government. The democratically elected political leadership replaced an 
authoritarian regime that had been in power for almost 25 years. They acknowledged that the 
need to restore state legitimacy and decentralisation became an important strategy in this 
respect.381 The need to contain recurrent rebellions in the northern regions constituted another 
motive guiding the ambitious reforms. By allowing the northern regions greater autonomy, the 
territorial boundaries of the country could be safeguarded.382  
 In 1993, Malian authorities established the Mission de Décentralisation (MDD) with a 
mandate to develop a legal framework for the implementation of the ambitious decentralisation 
programme. It did not take long for the government to discuss tangible proposals envisaging: 
(1) a profound restructuration of Mali’s administrative hierarchy; (2) the creation of elected 
bodies at regional, district and local level;383 and (3) the exact mandate of the new municipal 
institutions.384 The local administration teams included a mayor, three civil servants and 
secretaries to the municipality.385 Following this preparatory legislative work, the authorities 
officially endorsed the creation of 683 new local municipalities – regrouping thousands of 
villages – in 1996.386 They scheduled the first municipal elections in 1999. The discretionary 
authority of local governments included policy areas such as municipal policing, public health, 
sanitation, civil registration, local infrastructure, transport and tax collection. 387 These newly 
established municipalities encompassed multiple villages in order to reach a certain scale that 
improved administrative efficiency and ensured a solid (tax) income basis. However, in the case 
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between both state and non-state actors and multiple sources of legitimacy shaped decentralised 
administration over a longer period.  
The chapter starts with a short recap of the key concepts and theoretical framework presented 
in the general introduction to this thesis. The next section addresses a number of methodological 
considerations, most notably the considerable advantages and limitations of an in-depth case 
study. The central part of the chapter presents an empirical assessment structured around three 
consecutive local elections. The final part relates these empirical findings to the overarching 
research question and the expected benefits from decentralisation reforms according to the 
prevailing literature. 
 




Decentralisation is any act whereby a central government formally cedes powers to actors and 
institutions at lower levels in a political-administrative and territorial hierarchy.378 Efforts to 
redistribute state authority, responsibilities and resources to subnational units of the state can 
serve a wide variety of purposes. Previous experiences with decentralisation across the African 
continent reflected a desire to: better control the rural areas from the centre (in colonial times 
and during one-party rule); reduce national governments’ expenditure (during the years of 
Structural Adjustment Programmes in the 1980s); or to improve political participation and the 
accountability of local governments (in the era of democratisation).379 Indeed, this latter 
objective took centre stage in Mali during the 1990s. The chapter builds on the definition of 
democratic decentralisation as highlighted by Ribot (2002), which “occurs when powers and 
resources are transferred to authorities representative of and downwardly accountable to local 
populations.”380 Malian authorities were not short of ambition in this regard and designed a far-
reaching reform programme, at least on paper.  
First, the reforms envisaged a profound change in the relationship and power balance between 
central and decentral state institutions. The authorities did not opt for a process of 
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resources are transferred to authorities representative of and downwardly accountable to local 
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reaching reform programme, at least on paper.  
First, the reforms envisaged a profound change in the relationship and power balance between 
central and decentral state institutions. The authorities did not opt for a process of 
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By around 2003, ATT abandoned genuine efforts at decentralization. He abolished centres 
created to provide training to local officials and kept power and money in central government 
institutions. This meant that decentralized institutions were deprived of the tools necessary 
to function autonomously from the central government, or even to function at all.394 
  
Likewise, Baudais (2016) stipulated that the limited transfer of resources did not enable 
municipal governments to deliver services.395 Wing and Kassibo (2014) also concluded that 
decentralisation in Mali merely reproduced a weak national government at the local level.396 
Chapter 6 of this thesis addresses these challenges related to the power balance between central 
state authorities and decentralised institutions in more detail.  
 This chapter focuses on the assertion of the decentralisation reforms to democratise the ties 
between municipal authorities and citizens at the local level. More precisely, to answer the 
question whether the reforms engendered new political representatives (“actors”), with a 
considerable influence (“power”) over central policy areas (“domain”) for which they were 
being held accountable by ordinary citizens (“downwards/upwards”).  
  
5.1.2. Accountability  
 
Accountability emerged as a prominent concept in both academic literature and donor policies 
in the decade that followed the many democratic transitions during the so-called third wave of 
democratisation. Together with political participation and representation, it constituted a key 
pillar under democracy’s main proposition to underpin these states with renewed popular 
legitimacy after decades of authoritarian rule. Various authors warned against what Lindberg 
(2009) referred to as the “inherent dangers of a Byzantine conceptual nightmare leading to […] 
severe confusion about what the core meaning of accountability is.”397 Accountability is, by 
definition, relational. An agent, for example a political representative, performs a number of 
tasks in response to expectations held by, say, another party or a group of citizens. The political 
representative is first required to inform, explain and justify his actions to these citizens. In 
other words, the first component of an accountable representative is answerability to citizens. 
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of Karan, the focus of this in-depth case study, the village constituted the new municipality by 
itself for reasons presented below.  
 Secondly, the decentralisation reforms envisioned far-reaching changes in the relationship 
between state authorities and Malian citizens. Political decentralisation and local multi-party 
elections accompanied the above institutional reforms. Following Ribot (2002), Hyden (2008) 
and Olowu (2001), three specific elements of democratic decentralisation are particularly 
important: These concern the actors that take control of decentralisation; the power they obtain; 
and the domain over which they acquire authority. When it comes to the actors, Olowu (2001) 
argued, “many traditional rulers in different parts of Africa have used decentralised power to 
obstruct development of their people by diverting decentralised resources to personal uses […] 
because of their fear that these may break their hold on local power.”388 Hyden (2008) 
underlined the importance of addressing power relations when studying the performance of 
institutions in Africa. Policy outcomes were not only the result of institutional changes, but also 
determined by informal power relations.389  
 Based on these three dimensions, Ribot (2002) noted that representatives of decentralised 
democratic institutions “must have a domain of discretionary decision-making powers, that is, 
one of local autonomy. It is with respect to this domain of powers that decentralised actors 
represent, are accountable to, and serve the local population.”390 Reviewing much of the 
decentralisation literature, he concluded, “[d]ecentralisation is not taking the forms necessary 
to realise the benefits that theory predicts, because it fails to entrust downwardly accountable 
representative actors with significant domains of autonomous discretionary power.”391 
 Research conducted in subsequent years confirmed this finding and revealed the lack of a 
real transfer of authority, responsibilities, human and financial resources from the central level 
to the newly established municipal institutions.392 Sears (2017) noted that agents of the central 
authority obstructed decentralisation as it entailed a “reduction of their powers and privileges 
to which they had become accustomed and felt entitled.”393 It was under President Touré (2002-
2012) that decentralisation de facto came to a standstill:  
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inspiration in this respect. He considered the mere presence of democratic institutions – most 
notably elections – to be the primary indicator of democracy. Many policy papers also focused 
on various institutional aspects of democratic consolidation and broader governance reforms in 
Africa.402 A firm belief that development and democracy could be spearheaded through formal 
institutional change underpinned these approaches. Institutional thinking also inspired the roll-
out of ambitious decentralisation programmes across the African continent. The basic idea was 
that new governance institutions could generate accountable political behaviour. Formal 
institutions, as defined in the introductory chapter, referred to the rules and procedures created, 
communicated and enforced through channels widely accepted as official and often codified in 
constitutions and legislation. The term official implies that the rules and procedures emanate 
from an authority, in this case the state. However, politicians are not solely embedded in a 
formal institutional setting. Their behaviour is equally shaped by a wide range of informal 
institutions, defined as socially shared values, usually unwritten, which are created and enforces 
outside officially sanctioned channels.403 
Neo-patrimonialism emerged as a particularly influential paradigm in academic research 
dealing with the interplay between formal and informal institutions, certainly but not solely 
across the African continent. The neo-patrimonial paradigm, which has its roots in the 1970s 
and 1980s, guided many studies on the African state, politics and governance practices.404 It 
demonstrated the prevalence of informal patrimonial forms of domination in the institutional 
setting of the state. In practice, state officials actually operated as so-called patrons and 
exchanged public resources in their particularistic networks of individual people (clientelism) 
or groups of dependents (patronage) in return for their loyalty and support. African state 
institutions were therefore re-conceptualised as hybrid institutions in which both impersonal 
rational-legal bureaucratic and personalised patrimonial forms of domination co-existed.405 
Scholars took different positions about the balance between these two forms of domination. 
However, the prevailing tendency in this research stream pointed at the overriding influence of 
patrimonial logic to the detriment of formal rational-legal procedures.  
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Secondly, citizens must have the capacity to pass judgement and impose sanctions on the 
representative. Such enforceability constitutes the second major component of 
accountability.398 In this chapter, the impact of the introduction and subsequent functioning of 
the new municipal councils on both answerability and enforceability aspects of the 
accountability relationship between local political representatives and citizens will be assessed.  
 The legislative framework that guided Mali’s decentralisation policies offered many 
opportunities for ordinary citizens to be better informed by and seek justifications from local 
state representatives, either directly or indirectly, via the elected councilors (e.g. the 
answerability side of accountability). The legislative framework, for example, obliged the 
municipal authorities to draft the annual budget in a participatory manner and to present 
financial reports to citizens.399 A majority of councilors could equally force the mayor to take 
specific actions or impose sanctions on the municipal authority (“enforceability”).  
Based on a substantive review of literature dealing with the concept of accountability, 
Lindberg (2009) identified three key dimensions: the source of accountability (are 
representatives being held accountable internally, within an institution, or externally, by 
citizens); the degree of control that people have over representatives (although difficult to 
quantify); and the direction of accountability (vertical upwards, vertical downwards or 
horizontal).400 One of the central propositions of Mali’s decentralisation reforms that takes 
centre stage in this chapter was the ambition to institute a strong degree of downward 
accountability of elected municipal representatives towards local citizens.  
 Before introducing the empirical analysis, the following section briefly recaps key notions 
of the theoretical outline provided in the introductory chapter that are relevant to the assessment 
of decentralisation in the wider context of Mali’s heterarchical political order. 
 
5.1.3. Decentralised administration in a heterarchical setting 
 
A substantial group of scholars examined processes of democratisation by focusing on formal 
institutions.401 Political and economic scientist Schumpeter constituted an important source of 
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locally to legitimise authority and shape accountability as well as influential cultural institutions 
at the local level before presenting an empirical assessment of the decentralisation in Karan.   
A final point of critique, or at least nuance, to institutional and neo-patrimonial perspectives 
on decentralisation relates to the central position of the state in these approaches. In the context 
of a heterarchical political order, several power poles, both state and non-state, interact and 
jointly shape decentralised administration. The exercise of public authority in the public service 
involves multiple actors operating beyond or besides the state. In various chapters, this thesis 
revealed the central role of religious and traditional authorities in this regard, specifically in 
rural localities. Local communities, as underlined in the introductory chapter, should not be 
seen as a one-dimensional socio-political arena, but rather as an emerging public space in which 
different actors and modes of domination and legitimation confront one another.  
This chapter therefore extends the patronage concept and uses “Patronage Plus” as an 
analytical lens to account for this multitude of actors and the multidimensional relationships 
between material and non-material resources at play. It empirically examines how interactions 
between formal and informal institutions, official and unofficial actors, and different 
legitimising repertoires shaped decentralised administration over a longer period. The study 
opted for an in-depth empirical assessment concentrated on a single case study. The next section 
briefly clarifies the advantages and limitations of that methodological choice.   
 
5.2. METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
This chapter presents results based on extensive fieldwork conducted around the first (1999), 
second (2004) and third (2009) local elections in Karan, a village some 90 kilometres south of 
Mali’s capital city Bamako, close to the Guinean border. Karan is located in the second region 
of Mali, Koulikouro, in the district of Kangaba. In cultural terms, it is part of the Mande region, 
which extends over parts of Senegal, Gambia, Guinea and Mali.  
Based on longitudinal empirical research in a single locality, the results are characterised by 
the well-known advantages and limitations of a case study. The method enabled a thorough 
contextualised analysis of the functioning of a democratic institution at the local level. It 
provided the possibility to move beyond formal institutional aspects of decentralisation reforms 
and take the sociocultural context in which political agency was shaped prominently into 
account. Recurrent and lengthy periods in the research area created relations of trust with key 
respondents. In-depth interviews enabled a nuanced understanding of socio-political dynamics 
and accountability mechanisms in practice. Moreover, the longitudinal perspective allowed for 
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Several scholars challenged, or at least nuanced, the neo-patrimonial paradigm. Hagmann 
(2006) argued that neo-patrimonialism emerged into a “catch-all concept” used to explain 
political processes without always presenting the empirical evidence of the actual informal 
practices.406 Others denounced its usage for putting too much emphasis on informal dynamics 
and not enough focus on the formal rules and regulations that did seem influential in practice.407 
Empirical studies also revealed that patronage was only one amongst many aspects 
characterising relations between African politicians or state officials and ordinary citizens.408 
The neo-patrimonial approach tended to overestimate the influence of money or other material 
advantages exchanged between political patrons and their clients.  
 The institutional and neo-patrimonial approaches have both been criticized for lacking a 
cultural-oriented perspective on democratic consolidation in Africa. Hyden (2008) underlined 
that institutions cannot be studied in isolation from the norms and values of the societies within 
which they develop.409 Schaffer (1998) contended that democratic values that underpin specific 
institutions are not necessarily universal.410 Based on extensive fieldwork in Senegal, he 
demonstrated that elections had a different meaning amongst Senegalese people compared to 
citizens in the United States. Reasoning along similar lines, Van Donge (2006) noted: “An 
emphasis on political culture should heighten awareness of the various forms which democratic 
values may take in different societies.”411 Besides the notion that democratic values take 
different forms, political and historical anthropologists emphasised that “multi-party 
democracy [in Africa] has simply been assimilated into a broader range of thought.” 412 This 
thesis follows Chabal and Daloz’s (2006) call for an interpretative approach, focusing on 
popular beliefs that shape political agency, and to examine the meaning people themselves give 
to specific institutions.413 This chapter therefore introduces existing cultural repertoires used 
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decentralisation reforms in many localities. The study thereby contributes to – and can be 
compared with – a wider body of empirical studies examining similar processes with diverse 
outcomes in different geographical settings.415 Moreover, the geographical scope of this 
analysis is broadened in Chapter 6 of this thesis, which assesses the emerging role of non-state 
armed groups in decentralised administration in northern Mali.  
 
5.3. EXISTING LOCAL ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS 
 
The short theoretical recap provided above noted that informal institutions that shape the 
incentive structures faced by political actors involved in decentralised administration are 
broader than resource-driven forms of patronage and are often culturally shaped. This section 
therefore introduces influential local cultural institutions, sources of political legitimacy and 
accountability mechanisms that existed in the research area before the creation of new 
municipal authorities and local elections in the context of the decentralisation reform package.  
The most important political institution at the local level was the council of elderly. This 
village council met on a weekly basis in the vestibule of the village headman and managed all 
local economic, political and social affairs. Political representation and access to representative 
positions was based on a number of criteria: (1) claims of autochthony expressed through stories 
of origin; (2) patronymics (jamuw);416 (3) kabilaw;417 (4) hierarchical status groups; (5) 
seniority; and (6) gender. These criteria should not be interpreted as “predetermined 
cultural/ancestral patterns” that, in an objective and static manner, easily determined who was 
entitled to local political representative functions and who was excluded.418 Rather, different 
(groups of) people used these criteria to present their – often contradictory – authority claims. 
As claims of autochthony were important for gaining access to powerful positions, different 
(interest) groups portrayed themselves as the most autochthonous inhabitants of a particular 
village in order to claim their right to become a political representative.  
	
415 Cf. Fay, C. (2006), for a broader collection of case studies. 
416 “Patronymic” refers to a person’s last name, but also to an historical figure. Patronymics have a strong social 
meaning in Mande and specific relations exist between patronymics. For example, a teasing relationship exists 
between certain patronymics that allows people to neglect certain moral codes and tell each other off.    
417 A kabila is one of the most important socio-political institutions at the local level. Its members work together 
on a communal field, put aside money collectively and meet on a regular basis to discuss internal and village 
affairs. A kabila groups together a number of families (and the migrants these host) that have a shared ancestor. 
418 Olivier de Sardan, J.-P. (2008) ‘Researching the Practical Norms of Real Governance in Africa’, London: ODI 
Africa Power and Politics Programme, (Discussion paper No.5), p. 3.	
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a dynamic assessment of hybrid democratic practices over time. It thereby avoided a recurrent 
criticism of the hybrid political paradigm that it offers a static account that fails to account for 
change.  
The research primarily relied on participant observation, which provided invaluable 
information on often sensitive matters. I attended and observed local campaign events, public 
meetings, informal discussions amongst local grins (groups of friends), the functioning of an 
unofficial local “policing” network and family group meetings. I often witnessed tensions 
between representatives of the newly created democratic institution and existing (informal) 
institutions. I used different research methods (e.g. questionnaires, open interviews, participants 
observation, focus groups) to enhance the validity of the research data.     
Yet, the adopted research method inherently restricts the representativity of the data. This 
holds especially true for the case of Karan in the context of the decentralisation reforms. As a 
municipality comprising just one village, Karan constituted a rather exceptional case. The 
decentralisation reforms generally regrouped several villages into one municipality in order to 
achieve scale advantages and administrative efficiency. Nevertheless, Karan, for reasons 
clarified below, constituted an atypical case and did not merge with other villages into one 
municipality. The lack of representativity of the present case study also risks contributing to the 
prevailing “Mande-centric” appreciation of Malian politics that was highlighted in the 
introductory chapter of this thesis. The context in which the decentralised reforms were 
implemented in Karan greatly differed from that in many other parts of the country in terms of 
security, the role of religion, geographical distances vis-à-vis municipal and central state 
representatives, the financial means involved in decentralised administration and many more 
disparities. Notwithstanding these considerable limitations in terms of representativity, the 
conclusions derived from the in-depth case study do have relevance beyond the mere physical 
boundaries of the small municipality of Karan. This benefit lies, as highlighted in the 
introductory chapter and in line with Lijphart (1971), in the process of theory building.414 This 
case study particularly contributes to a better understanding of the interplay between existing 
“traditional” political institutions, democratic institutions and different sources of legitimacy at 
the local level. It assesses how political agency is shaped by incentives generated through newly 
established formal institutions and socially accepted norms enforced outside official channels 
in the context of decentralised administration. While the outcome of this interplay varies from 
place to place, it constituted a central dynamic characterising the implementation of the 
	
414 Lijphart, A. (1971) ‘Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method’, American Political Science Review, 
65(3): 682-693, p. 691. 
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followed by craftsmen – usually bards and smiths – (nyamakalaw) and former slaves (jonw).423 
Access to the village council was limited to noblemen only. Representatives of the nyamakalaw 
and jonw “caste” could not become village council members. Lastly, all council seats were 
reserved for relatively old men, many of whom had been members since the early 1960s.424 
Seniority was an important factor determining political authority. The village headman was the 
oldest Keïta amongst the oldest living generation. In daily life, norms prohibited people from 
publicly contradicting older brothers or fathers. The official political role of women was rather 
limited at the village level, although a number of women were very active in other domains of 
public life (such as in NGOs and women associations).  
The kare, a generational group, constituted a last important and noteworthy local institution. 
A kare was formed by a generation of young boys collectively circumcised. They remained 
members of the same kare throughout their entire lives and donated funds to each other’s 
marriages, supported members if they fell ill and met on a regular basis to discuss local events. 
Whereas a kabila provided vertical lines of solidarity (family ties crossing generations), a kare 
constituted a horizontal solidarity group (generational ties crossing family lines). Although 
Karan’s village councillors did inform, consult with and justify their actions towards members 
of their kabilaw (and were thus answerable), the opportunity to hold village councillors 
accountable was restricted. It seemed almost impossible to pass judgement against or sanction 
village councillors who had been in office for 40 years. Hence, the enforceability side of 
accountability was limited and vertical downward accountability between village councillors, 
who obtained a wide sphere of influence, and local citizens was relatively weak.  
The next section of this chapter examines the extent to which the introduction of Mali’s 
decentralisation programme adapted and strengthened local mechanisms of accountability over 
time as predicted by theory. 
5.4. DECENTRALISATION REFORMS IMPLEMENTED: THE CASE OF KARAN 
 
5.4.1. The first local elections: Consensus-building instead of electoral competition 
 
Existing notions of political representation and participation greatly influenced the 
establishment and subsequent functioning of the first municipal council in Karan.  
	
423 The social organisation is more flexible than in India as the social status of particular groups might change over 
time, as clarified in the introductory chapter.  
424 In 2009, an agreement was reached to renew the village council members. 
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The origin of a Mande village tended to be presented (and, as such, still referred to by citizens 
today) as a pact between its first inhabitants and groups that arrived at a later stage. In Karan, 
the Keïta’s were considered the most autochthonous inhabitants. According to their version of 
the “myth of origin”, their ancestor founded Karan and met two other families, the Traore and 
Dumbia, with whom he established a pact.419 Consistent with this pact, the function of village 
headman (dugutigi) was to be taken up by the Keïta, whereas the Traore and Dumbia would 
become mediators in the village (locally referred to as the furugnoko). Citizens frequently 
referred to this pact and the furugnoko indeed played a mediatory role. Although many other 
families arrived in the centuries following the establishment of Karan, these three most-
autochthonous families with the patronymics (jamuw) Keïta, Traore and Dumbia monopolised 
the 11 village council seats. Claims of autochthony thus highly influenced one’s access to 
representative functions. As Jansen (1995, 1996) underlined, oral traditions in Mande were 
much more than storytelling about some ancient past.420 The stories were references shaping 
social life and justifying power relations.          
Another criterion that influenced one’s chances of becoming a member of the village council 
is the kabila to which one belongs.421 In Karan, the sons and grandsons of the founder of the 
village established five different kabilaw. The selection of village council members was based 
on the different kabilaw in the village. In other words, the village council members represented 
their kabila. However, the number of representatives differed for the various kabilaw. The two 
kabilaw that were established by the sons of the village founder obtained three seats in the 
village council; those established by his grandsons obtained only two positions and the kabila 
founded by his great-grandson just one seat. Yet again, claims of autochthony expressed 
through genealogies appeared to be an important factor determining one’s access to 
representative positions. The earlier a kabila was founded, the more autochthonous it was and 
the more representatives it received in the village council.422  
The hierarchical set-up of Mande society, which echoed India’s caste system, also influenced 
the access to representative functions. Society was divided into noble people (hooronw), 
	
419 Many different versions of the origin story exist. The Traore and Dumbia, for example, claim that they had 
arrived in Karan before the Keïta but that the latter were more powerful, hence the Traore and Dumbia could not 
maintain the position of village headman themselves. These origin stories must not, therefore, be analysed as true 
accounts of some ancient past, but more as a reflection of actual power relations in local society. By presenting 
themselves as autochthonous inhabitants, different groups make status claims in local society.   
420 Jansen, J. (1995) De Draaiende Put. Een Studie naar de Relatie tussen het Sunjata-epos en de Samenleving in 
de Haut-Niger (Mali), Leiden: CNWS; idem. (1996) ‘The Younger Brother and the Stranger in Search of Status 
Discourse for Mande’, Cahiers d’Études Africaines, 144 (46-4): 659-684.	
421 Kabilaw is plural and kabila singular. 
422 In 2009, the number of seats was augmented from 11 to 15 and equal representation amongst the five kabilaw 
was being considered. 
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Tensions between the village council of elderly and the newly created municipal council arose 
in the years after the local elections. The first elected mayor previously worked in the state 
bureaucracy and became frustrated with the gap between his official mandate and the limited 
authority he had in daily practice. The mayor was cut off from the two main local sources of 
finance: annual funds provided by the national cotton company and local tax collection. The 
village council continued to manage these funds. Yet, the village council had not kept up-to-
date financial records and was unable to account for the manner in which it spent these funds 
in recent years. More than 3,000 euros were missing. The village councillors indicated that 
citizens had not yet paid their taxes, whereas many people indicated they had indeed paid the 
village council. No records were available for verification. The mayor continuously tried to 
persuade the village councillors and citizens to allow the municipal council to manage these 
funds, without which he could not execute most of his official responsibilities. He also 
frequently pointed to the existing lack of financial transparency, which greatly frustrated some 
of the village councillors. This issue would play an important role in the run-up to the second 
local elections in 2004.  
Clearly, neither the 1999 elections, nor the new municipal council were able to shape local 
political behaviour according to their official mandate. Instead, the new formal structures were 
based on existing, informal power relations shaped around cultural notions of political 
representation, hierarchy and loyalty. The immediate impact of Mali’s decentralisation 
programme on local accountability was therefore minimal. The new political actors did not 
obtain sufficient power to act according to their official mandate, obtained an external sphere 
of influence and were primarily held accountable by the village council, based on family ties 
and local norms of seniority, rather than ordinary citizens.  
 
5.4.2. Second elections in Karan: Informal power basis further reduces formal impact 
 
In the run-up to the second local elections in 2004, a furugnoko proposal to allow for another 
consensus list and a second mandate for the incumbent mayor was rejected. The mayor’s 
ambition to control local financial resources irritated the head of the village council. He saw 
the elections as an opportunity to consolidate the supremacy of the village council over the 
municipal council. The head of the village council was also the leader of the largest kabila in 
Karan, called Dubala. Notably, young members of Dubala also dominated the local branch of 
134	
	
This became apparent during the selection process of candidates in the run-up to the 1999 
elections. Representatives of the furugnoko, the families that played a mediatory role according 
to the “pact of origin,” met with the village council, the principal unofficial political institution 
in Karan. They proposed to develop a consensus list comprising representatives from the 
various kabilaw instead of organising competitive elections based on party lists that could 
possibly generate conflict in the village.425 The proposal was accepted and each kabila leader 
called for a meeting to identify representatives who would sit on the new official institution (the 
municipal council) on behalf of the kabila. The leadership of the five kabilaw put together a 
consensus list in accordance with the power-sharing arrangement between the different kabilaw 
in the village council. The list included only noble people and descendants from the three 
families that claimed to be the autochthonous inhabitants of Karan (Keïtas and furugnoko). 
Candidates were either Keïta, Traore or Dumbia. No other jamuw was represented on the list. 
On election day, Karanese citizens voted for the consensus list.  
The newly elected (official) municipal council differed from the (unofficial) village council 
in two respects: seniority and gender. Karan’s municipal councillors were much younger than 
Karan’s village council members were and included a female representative. The age difference 
enabled the village council to secure control over their “younger brothers” in the municipal 
council, based on local seniority norms. In daily life, younger brothers were expected to conduct 
tasks away from home, whereas older brothers were responsible for internal (family) affairs.426 
This division of labour now applied as reference to guide the relationship and division of 
responsibilities between the two institutions. According to the law, the municipal council 
constituted the main institution governing local affairs. In practice, however, the municipal 
council only maintained contact with the state bureaucracy, produced official state documents 
(birth and marriage certificates) and tried to attract foreign NGOs to invest in Karan. The 
municipal council was, in other words, used as a gateway to the world outside the village. The 
(unofficial) village council continued to dominate all internal affairs, notably tax collection, 
conflict management and decision-making over a wide variety of internal matters. All major 
decisions were taken in the vestibule of the village headman, i.e. not in the municipal town 
hall.427  
	
425 The 1997 national elections had generated considerable tensions in Karan between supporters of two rival 
candidates. Some people would no longer speak to each other, marriage proposals were refused on the basis of 
political affiliations and, for some time, the losing side refused to contribute to the development efforts of the 
village.  
426 Jansen, J. (1995); Vliet, van M. (2004). 
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This became apparent during the selection process of candidates in the run-up to the 1999 
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decisions were taken in the vestibule of the village headman, i.e. not in the municipal town 
hall.427  
	
425 The 1997 national elections had generated considerable tensions in Karan between supporters of two rival 
candidates. Some people would no longer speak to each other, marriage proposals were refused on the basis of 
political affiliations and, for some time, the losing side refused to contribute to the development efforts of the 
village.  
426 Jansen, J. (1995); Vliet, van M. (2004). 




the leader of his own kabila, and he did not criticise the village council for its failure to account 
for part of the tax money it had received from Karanese citizens. Under the new mayor, 
transparency of local affairs actually deteriorated. The mayor appointed young friends – mostly 
from ADEMA and Dubala – to head various local management boards. Although these boards 
were all officially required to report to the municipal council on a regular basis, they only 
reported informally to the mayor in person. Municipal councillors of rival parties were left in 
the dark. The mayor himself refused to report to ordinary citizens. During his mandate, tax 
collection reduced from 3.9 million Fcfa to 2.3 million Fcfa, leaving the municipality unable to 
pay the salaries of municipal staff. The vast majority of local people suspected a rise in corrupt 
practices but their biggest frustration was the lack of information provided by the mayor and 
his allies.429 Public frustration with the performance of the mayor, certainly within the four 
other kabilaw, continued to mount. Interestingly, when asked why the police or regional 
authorities were not informed of the suspected corruption, almost all interviewees indicated that 
“relations between our families never end; they are more important than money. This is between 
us here in Karan.”430 A local cultural institution (kare) then started to lead a call for improved 
local governance, albeit outside the official local governance legislative framework. In Karan, 
the Sobessi kare were considered the local police but they decided to use their mandate in a 
wider sense.431 One of them expressed a commonly held feeling as follows: 
 
Karan has fallen into a well. We, as Sobessi, need to get Karan back out of there. The elderly 
people in the village council and the current mayor have not managed the village well. Many 
projects that arrived in Karan already failed upon entry. They are responsible for Karan’s 
decay. We have to change.  
 
The Sobessi managed to build popular support for the removal of the corrupt management board 
of the local infirmary. They then initiated an ultimately overambitious action to replace the 
members of the village council. The head of the village council started to put pressure on a 
	
429 There were serious indications of corruption in the local health board, the management of the local granary and 
other institutions. The mayor also claimed to have lost more than 2 million Fcfa of public funds while driving with 
his motorcycle to a neighbouring village.  
430 The former mayor had informed the authorities over alleged corruption by the current mayor with respect to his 
management of the local granary, but this was condemned by almost everyone, even those who believed the current 
mayor to be highly corrupt. Only 90 kilometres from the capital city, formal state institutions such as the police 
seemed to have little impact in this situation. 
431 Members of the kare primarily mediate in conflicts between families, e.g. if crops are being eaten by someone 
else’s cattle.  
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one of the main political parties, the Alliance for Democracy in Mali (ADEMA).428 A pact was 
rapidly agreed upon: the head of the village council would mobilise the people of “his” kabila 
behind ADEMA while the party, once elected, would safeguard the interests of the village 
council. The incumbent mayor, in turn, tried to mobilise his own kabila, called Kurula, behind 
the Party for Democracy and Renewal (PDR) in his ambition to become re-elected.  
The election results led to a stalemate in the municipal council with regard to the election of 
the mayor. Both PDR (with strong support from Kurula) and ADEMA (with a firm support 
basis in Dubala) obtained five seats. Adama Keïta secured the eleventh and last seat on behalf 
of the Union for the Republic and Democracy (URD). He had been able to secure support from 
his direct family and sections of the youth association in Karan. His vote for either ADEMA or 
PDR would determine which party secured the position of mayor.  
Adama Keïta had been an active member and representative of the local branch of ADEMA 
in Karan. He had, however, left the party with two other rank-and-file members following a 
conflict with the local Secretary-General, Treasurer and Chairman of the party. Nevertheless, 
he supported ADEMA in the vote for the election of the second mayor of Karan:  
 
I wanted to vote for PDR. Prior to the elections, I had even reached an agreement with their 
leader. I did not like the candidate from ADEMA nor the party. I had just broken away from 
it! After the elections, the leader of PDR offered me 250.000 Fcfa and a motorcycle in order 
to secure my support. As I come from the kabila Dubala, the leader of Dubala informed me 
that I would be suspended from the kabila if I did not vote in favour of ADEMA. What could 
I do? It would complicate the rest of my life if I lost support from my kabila. It is my family. 
My life. I wasn’t awarded a cent by ADEMA or Dubala, but I voted in favour of ADEMA.  
 
Contrary to his own political preferences and despite the financial offers made to him, Adama 
Keïta voted in favour of ADEMA. This is just one example (of many) of the way in which 
informal ties and family (kabila) pressure continue to strongly influence the selection of 
political actors at the local level. Such culturally shaped power relations can thus be much more 
influential than pure patronage and money politics. As it turned out, the leader of the kabila 
Dubala played a determining role in Adama Keïta’s choice for an ADEMA mayor. 
Once elected, the new ADEMA mayor indeed stopped the municipal council’s quest to gain 
control over local funds. He also avoided any competition with the village council, headed by 
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one of the main political parties, the Alliance for Democracy in Mali (ADEMA).428 A pact was 
rapidly agreed upon: the head of the village council would mobilise the people of “his” kabila 
behind ADEMA while the party, once elected, would safeguard the interests of the village 
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in 2009 provided an opportunity to ensure an alternation of power. However, this required a 
campaign strategy based on culturally shaped tactics and informal patronage in order to 
succeed.  In the run-up to the elections, two main competing blocks were formed. On the one 
hand, PDR representatives, who narrowly lost the 2004 elections, and other (smaller) local 
parties established the ben kan list.432 The kabila Kurula, the kare Sobessi, the Karanese people 
residing in Bamako and the village mediators (furugnoko) constituted their primary support 
base. On the other hand, the ADEMA and URD parties, the head of the village council, the 
kabila Dubala and the younger kare Sankassi all supported the incumbent mayor. The ben kan 
list aimed to maintain the support from its own electoral bases, while mobilising support 
amongst the Sankassi kare and Dubala kabila during the campaign. They therefore put together 
their list of candidates in a strategic manner. The kabila Kurula, its main support base, obtained 
the two top positions on the electoral list, which also included representatives of the four other 
kabilaw.433 The same applied to the different generational groups (karew). The list only 
included people considered to be “true autochthones.”434 One’s personal financial means 
constituted another important criterion for being placed on the list. Two men residing in 
Bamako headed the ben kan list. The number one, Djibril Naman, worked as a director for the 
National Railway Company, often travelled to Europe and had sound political contacts. The 
campaign repeatedly underlined his personal wealth, as illustrated below. Djibril Naman was a 
member of the Sankassi kare and obtaining wide support within “his” kare as well as the other 
younger generations constituted a key priority during this campaign. According to one of the 
main campaign strategists: 
 
We knew URD and ADEMA had strong support in the Sankassi kare. The second mayor 
had awarded numerous local management positions to its members. We therefore decided 
that the head of our list should be someone from the Sankassi kare. We organised various 
informal meetings with all Sankassi in order to secure their support for Djibril because he 
was one of them.  
 
	
432 Because their list was supported by the village mediators (who had tried to mobilise everyone behind the list), 
they referred to their alliance as the ben kan list, meaning the list of consensus. 
433 As various group representatives explained: “If you propose a list with people from just one, two or three 
kabilaw, the people will not accept it. You need to keep every kabila on board.” 
434 A comment by one of the non-autochthones who presented himself as a candidate in 2004 and invested a lot of 
money during his campaigns is illustrative in this respect: “During the electoral campaigns in 2004, I offered local 
citizens a cow, 50 kilos of rice and spent 20.000 Fcfa for preparing the sauce. Some 150 people showed up and ate 
with me. Nevertheless, I only obtained 63 votes. My competitors had gone around the various hamlets saying that 
if I would be elected, I would take Karan’s money to my own native town. People here prefer local candidates.” 
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number of Sobessi to stop their campaign for renewal. The case of Noumouri Keïta is 
illustrative:  
 
Our quest for renewal of the village council as Sobessi was not easy. When we started our 
opposition against the current members of the village council, my wife was taken away from 
me. She had to return to her hamlet where she was born. The leader of my kabila was behind 
all this. That is how he put pressure on me and tried to stop me from supporting the quest for 
renewal of the village council.  
 
The mayor indicated that the Sobessi had no formal mandate to remove the village councillors. 
He continued to support the head of the village council and the Sobessi finally dropped their 
case. Shortly after, the Malian Parliament passed a law that called for the renewal of village 
councils nationwide. This provided the formal grounds for renewal in Karan. Finally, in 2009, 
the village council was renewed. The mayor, however, refused to obtain the formal approval of 
the regional state authorities based on which the new village council could start operating and 
the elderly continued to influence local affairs.  
Ten years after its introduction, the impact of Mali’s decentralisation programme on local 
accountability continued to be limited. Although formal electoral competition had now taken 
place, the informal (kabila-based) power basis of the new mayor limited his influence sphere 
once elected. Family ties proved more influential than patronage politics in shaping political 
behaviour during the second electoral mandate. The municipal council’s sphere of influence 
remained limited to external affairs and accountability relations were primarily oriented 
towards the village council to the detriment of ordinary citizens. An informal power 
arrangement between the mayor and the head of the village council also blocked the officially 
required renewal of the village council. The Sobessi kare held the village and municipal 
councils answerable for a lack of transparency and even enforced a renewal of the local 
infirmary board. Hence, a local cultural institution managed to realise some degree of 
downward accountability at the local level. 
 
5.4.3. Third local elections in Karan: Alternation of power  
 
Because of the informal deal between the head of the largest kabila Dubala and the mayor, 
opportunities for ordinary citizens to hold the poor-performing mayor accountable were limited 
during the second electoral mandate. The official requirement to organise another local election 
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illustrative:  
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He continued to support the head of the village council and the Sobessi finally dropped their 
case. Shortly after, the Malian Parliament passed a law that called for the renewal of village 
councils nationwide. This provided the formal grounds for renewal in Karan. Finally, in 2009, 
the village council was renewed. The mayor, however, refused to obtain the formal approval of 
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place, the informal (kabila-based) power basis of the new mayor limited his influence sphere 
once elected. Family ties proved more influential than patronage politics in shaping political 
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towards the village council to the detriment of ordinary citizens. An informal power 
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Because of the informal deal between the head of the largest kabila Dubala and the mayor, 
opportunities for ordinary citizens to hold the poor-performing mayor accountable were limited 
during the second electoral mandate. The official requirement to organise another local election 
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irregularities. The former mayor, together with one of his allies, was obliged to pay back a 
percentage of the funds that had disappeared. The new mayor paid the rest from his own pocket 
and refused to inform state authorities of the matter in order to “maintain social stability and 
avoid further tensions between families.” The mayor replaced management bodies of local 
institutions, who started to report on a regular basis to the municipal and village councils. The 
new municipal council also organised various public consultative meetings. Transparency 
thereby improved. The new municipal council agreed upon a division of labour with the village 
council. It would continue to focus on external matters and accepted the mandate of the village 
council to manage internal affairs “because they would otherwise feel marginalised which 
would create problems for us,” according to one of the municipal councillors. The municipal 
staff increased its influence sphere in the area of tax collection. However, it worked closely 
together with the kare Sobessi (regarded as the local police). The funds and network of the new 
mayor already proved valuable for Karan during the first six months of his mandate. He 
travelled to Spain to motivate the Karanese migrants living there to sponsor a Karanese 
development project. He also paid a large share of the repair costs of a dirt road connecting 
Karan to the main road and he took a friend working for the National Media Institute to Karan 
in order to secure state assistance for a local radio station.  
Overall, the formal requirement to organise local elections in 2009 opened up the possibility 
for people to sanction the second mayor of Karan. His political adversaries were well aware 
that they had to come up with a culturally sensitive campaign strategy and present their 
candidate as a good patron for Karan. The patron had to obtain local cultural capital in order to 
win the elections. After the elections, the third mayor of Karan secured more power than his 
predecessors, primarily due to his own capital and network. In contrast to the competition 
between the municipal and village councils during the first mandate and the informal deal 
between the village headmen and the mayor, which negatively affected the provision of public 
goods during the second mandate, a constructive agreement was now reached between the new 
mayor and the new village council. The sphere of direct influence of the municipal council 
remained directed at Karan’s external relations. The new municipal council greatly improved 
information provision and public consultation, thereby allowing ordinary citizens to hold them 
answerable. However, the dependence on the funds and network of the mayor and the top-down 
nature of these patron-client relations did not leave much room for strong enforceability 
mechanisms. Thus, accountability only partially and gradually improved following the third 
elections and remained largely upwards rather than truly downwards. The provision of public 
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Continued references to important cultural values constituted an important ingredient of the ben 
kan’s campaign strategy. They stressed that the furugnoko supported their list and that, 
according to Karan’s pact of origin, people needed to respect the wish of their mediators.435 In 
addition, the large network and wealth of leader of their list, Djibril Naman, was emphasised. 
During a rally, the campaign team stated:  
 
If everyone votes for Djibril Naman, we will mobilise the rich Karanese people residing in 
Bamako to come and invest in Karan. You have to vote for someone who has the capacity 
to build something for the entire community. You have to vote for us. We will build a 
community radio station here in Karan. We will also build a house within which the youth 
can gather.  
 
Djibril Naman generated huge cheers from the crowd when he promised that the local mosque, 
which the community had started to build, would be finished in no time if he was elected. The 
message was clear. You either vote for the incompetent incumbent mayor or for someone who 
has the capacity to act as a patron for Karan and can provide tangible support to the 
municipality. Members of the ben kan list also increased pressure on URD and ADEMA 
candidates not to campaign actively, by making use of informal (and powerful) family ties. A 
striking example, amongst many, concerned the ambition of Naman Sidibé to become the leader 
of the ADEMA list:  
 
I wanted to become head of the list, but family pressure stopped me from doing so. The 
leader of my kabila, who supported the ben kan list, told me that I had to withdraw. My 
father told me the same. He said that if I did not, the family would not support me if I ever 
got in trouble. That I would learn what life is like if you are not supported by your family. 
My room for manoeuvring was therefore rather limited. I could maintain a lower position on 
the list, but could not openly campaign or head the list.  
 
On election day, the results were clear. Out of the eleven seats available, the ben kan list secured 
eight seats, ADEMA just two and URD one. The leader of URD responded: “I invested so much 
money and received only one seat in return. If it were not in politics, people would be jailed for 
such an offence.” When the new mayor took office, the financial records indeed showed many 
	
435 Campaigning slogans used during their visits to the hamlets were: “I fa boh ye” (you respect the words of your 
father) and we are the group of ben kan or ben makan (consensus).  
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Continued references to important cultural values constituted an important ingredient of the ben 
kan’s campaign strategy. They stressed that the furugnoko supported their list and that, 
according to Karan’s pact of origin, people needed to respect the wish of their mediators.435 In 
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I wanted to become head of the list, but family pressure stopped me from doing so. The 
leader of my kabila, who supported the ben kan list, told me that I had to withdraw. My 
father told me the same. He said that if I did not, the family would not support me if I ever 
got in trouble. That I would learn what life is like if you are not supported by your family. 
My room for manoeuvring was therefore rather limited. I could maintain a lower position on 
the list, but could not openly campaign or head the list.  
 
On election day, the results were clear. Out of the eleven seats available, the ben kan list secured 
eight seats, ADEMA just two and URD one. The leader of URD responded: “I invested so much 
money and received only one seat in return. If it were not in politics, people would be jailed for 
such an offence.” When the new mayor took office, the financial records indeed showed many 
	
435 Campaigning slogans used during their visits to the hamlets were: “I fa boh ye” (you respect the words of your 
father) and we are the group of ben kan or ben makan (consensus).  
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were primarily built in cultural institutions, notably the kabilaw and karew. Even the “patron of 
Karan” had to run a culturally sophisticated campaign to secure victory during the third 
municipal elections.  
In sum, the creation of a municipal council and introduction of local elections did not 
enhance state legitimacy in ways expected from and predicted by institutional theory in the 
context of Mali’s heterarchical political order. In practice, much more heterogeneous patterns 
of decentralised administration prevailed, which were best captured through the analytical lens 
of “patronage plus.” These involved multiple patrons – both state and non-state actors – who 
legitimised their authority in a multi-dimensional way. Political legitimacy was established 
through the interplay between both material and immaterial resources.  
Thus far, the thesis has focused entirely on the gradual emergence of a heterarchical political 
order in Mali in the period that preceded the 2012 crisis. The next and final chapter examines 






goods eventually saw a rapid and dramatic improvement but primarily thanks to the informal 
role of Karan’s patron rather than the formal role of the municipality.  
5.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The case material presented here compels scholars and international development agents to be 
modest when it comes to promoting democratic accountability and thereby state legitimacy 
through institutional change. The new municipal institutions introduced by Mali’s 
decentralisation policies encountered various existing power poles and were incorporated in 
informal ties that restricted their functioning at the local level. In practice, the powers, spheres 
of influence and degree of downward accountability of Karan’s new municipal council 
considerably lagged behind its official mandate. This study thereby confirms Ribot’s (2002) 
conclusion and that of subsequent research: 
 
Decentralisation is not taking the form necessary to realise the benefits that theory 
predicts, because it fails to entrust downwardly accountable representative actors with 
significant domains of autonomous discretionary power.436  
 
In other words, Mali’s decentralisation programme did not affect the degree, source and 
direction of accountability in Karan in the ways its legal foundations stipulated.  
Mali’s decentralisation programme did contribute to improvements in the provision of public 
goods in Karan. Not because of the official powers assigned to the municipal council, but 
because of informal patron–client relations that penetrated the new institution. Local elections 
offered successful people in Bamako an opportunity to invest in their villages of origin and to 
start building a political support base. Based on these informal (family) ties, a wealthy Karanese 
entrepreneur living in Bamako decided to invest his private funds, time and network to improve 
the quality of life for the people in Karan. Yet, the empirical data presented above also 
underlined the need to further refine the neo-patrimonial paradigm that dominates academic 
literature on African political developments. Local political relationships appeared to be much 
more complex than an exchange of goods, money and other favours between so-called patrons 
and clients. Powerful positions at the local level were based on cultural values such as 
autochthony, seniority and family solidarity. Informal hierarchical family ties strongly 
influenced an individual’s “political room for manoeuvre.” Moreover, political support bases 
	
436 Ribot, J.C. (2002), p.3.	
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The first part adopts an analytical perspective “from below.” It illustrates the deteriorating 
security trends and considerable contribution made by non-state armed actors to providing some 
basic form of protection amidst state absence. Consistent with the approach adopted in Chapter 
2, this analysis is restricted to the “supply side” of security. Additional empirically grounded 
research is certainly required to take popular perceptions of the different security actors and 
their efforts more prominently into account. The section ends with a reflection inspired by the 
notion that “protection from violence” constituted an increasingly important source of 
legitimacy in a context of widespread insecurity. The literature suggests that, “[t]hose who are 
able to offer protection from violence are at the same time those with the best chances to 
accumulate power and position.”438 Accordingly, this section explores the extent to which the 
prominent role of non-state armed actors in the security realm evolved into a broader role in the 
area of decentralised administration. 
The second part of the chapter adds a perspective “from above.” It first analyses Mali’s 
protracted peace process and its subsequent implementation phase. State authorities and leaders 
of the northern armed groups largely dominated both processes. This part first demonstrates 
that the persistent efforts aimed at re-integrating the northern armed groups into reconstituted 
and unified state security and governance structures yielded few results. It subsequently 
illustrates how patterns of hybrid security provision by the Malian state as well as international 
actors prevailed in that context.    
The third and final part of the chapter briefly assesses prevailing challenges to Malian 
democracy in the post-crisis years. More specifically, it examines prevailing patterns of popular 
participation, representation and accountability in order to assess democracy’s contribution to 
enhancing state legitimacy in the aftermath of the 2012 crisis.  
 
6.1.  SEEN FROM BELOW: DISPERSED DISPUTES AND A FRAGMENTED SECURITY LANDSCAPE 
 
 
6.1.1. Rise and geographical spread of the terrorist threat 
 
In 2012, a loose alliance of terrorist organisations still occupied northern Mali while severe 
power struggles between military and civil factions paralysed the state at the centre. 
Unsurprisingly, most Malian citizens believed their country was moving in the wrong 
direction.439 Just 12 per cent of all Malians and three per cent of citizens living in the occupied 
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Multiparty democracy turned into a militiacracy? 






When things fell apart in Mali, a French-led military intervention dislodged an opaque alliance 
of jihadists from the main urban centres across the north of the country. Shortly thereafter, 
elections marked the return of a democratic regime. The UN Security Council deployed a 
stabilisation mission (MINUSMA) to assist Malian authorities, amongst others, to extend and 
re-establish the state administration throughout the country. By mid-2015, the Malian 
government signed an internationally brokered Peace and Reconciliation Agreement with the 
main northern armed groups. That same year, representatives of more than 60 countries, 
multilateral institutions and the private sector pledged $3.25 billion in support of Mali.  
Nevertheless, a heterarchial political order only anchored during the five years that followed 
the 2012 crisis, despite considerable international efforts and the restoration of a democratic 
regime. The Malian state did not substantially expand its position in or influence over other 
power poles in society. In 2018, public expenditure by the Malian state covered a mere 20 per 
cent of the national territory, as noted in the introductory chapter. More than two thirds of 
Malian state representatives were not present at their duty stations in the northern and central 
regions. The state remained largely confined to isolated urban pockets. Its role in the realm of 
security provision remained particularly restricted. Craven-Matthews and Englebert (2018) 
contended that, “[t]he Malian military may have barracks and people wearing uniforms, but it 
still appears to have none of the basic operational dimensions of an actual military.”437 A wide 
variety of non-state armed groups and international military forces played a leading role in 
performing this core statehood function in practice.  
This final chapter examines, in an explorative manner, why Malian state authority remained 
so restricted and non-state armed groups endured as influential power poles across the northern 
and central regions in the period between 2013 and 2018. This chapter mainly focuses on the 
security realm and decentralised administration. 
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Figure 5: Rising levels of insecurity in Mopti, central Mali (® ACLED) 
 
These terrorist organisations targeted civilians as well as Malian, non-state and international 
armed forces. After several terrorist assaults on restaurants and hotels in Mali’s capital, a 
complex suicide attack on a military camp in Gao killed more than 70 people.  
 During 2018, the number of violent incidents increased by another 40 per cent compared to 
the year before.445 In the third quarter of 2018 alone, 287 Malian civilians were killed, 38 injured 
and 67 were abducted.446 The national army also faced heavy losses. The UN recorded over 300 
fatalities and many more serious injuries amongst the rank-and-file of the Malian army between 
mid-2016 and late 2018.447 The UN mission MINUSMA itself faced 177 fatalities between 
early 2013 and late 2018.  
 This significant rise in terrorist attacks successfully compounded the return of the Malian 
state administration across the northern regions. It also incited the departure of state 
representatives from the central region. In 2018, as noted above, a mere 30 per cent of state 
officials occupied their duty station in the northern regions and central Mopti region.448 Defence 
and Security forces operated in urban areas and near isolated military camps but lacked presence 
across the rural areas where terrorist organisations expanded their influence.  
	
445 ACLED (2018) ‘The Year in Overview’, 11 January 2019.  
446 UNSG report on the situation in Mali, 25 September 2018, available at: 
https://minusma.unmissions.org/en/reports. 
447 UNSG reports on the situation in Mali.  
448 UNSG report of on the situation in Mali, 6 June 2018. 
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northern regions felt secure. After the French-led international military intervention in 2013, 
two thirds of the Malian population now believed the country was moving in the right direction. 
More than six out of ten citizens felt secure and 76 per cent of (urban) citizens in northern Mali 
indicated that a basic level of security had been restored. Based on an assessment of 
Afrobarometer survey data, Penar and Bratton (2014) concluded that these positive perceptions 
about the security situation in the country significantly contributed to the overall optimistic 
mood in the country.440  
However, already from 2015 onwards, Malian citizens faced a sharp increase in the number 
of violent incidents of a different nature than they were used to. Armed confrontations involving 
non-terrorist armed groups and Malian Defence and Security forces decreased. In contrast, 
extremist violence became ever more prominent. Moreover, the geographical pattern of violent 
incidents changed. Whereas violent incidents used to be concentrated in Mali’s northern 
regions, they now moved southwards to the central Mopti region and spread across borders.441  
The year 2017 marked a real turnaround in terms of intensity of violence and the geographical 
locus of incidents. It recorded more violent incidents than witnessed in the previous 20 years.442 
The formation of the jihadist coalition Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) 
constituted a major driving force behind these rising patterns of insecurity. Various jihadist 
organisations that controlled different parts of northern Mali established JNIM together with 
the Maacina Liberation Front, a network of jihadist groups that gained ground across central 
Mali. The leader of the alliance, Iyad Ag Ghali, pleaded allegiance to Al-Qaeda. This merger 
enabled the organisation to improve coordination between the individual branches and to 
intensify recruitment efforts. Between October 2017 and February 2018, JNIM conducted an 
average of 12 terrorist attacks per month. Most attacks took place in central Mali.443  
Another major development constituted the formation of the Islamic State in the Greater 
Sahara (ISGS) by a former spokesperson of MUJAO, which concentrated its efforts around 
Mali’s border area with Niger.444 From early 2018 onwards, the group managed to establish a 
considerable local support base and expanded its activities. 
 
	
440 Bratton, M. and Penar, P. (2014) ‘Mali’s Public Mood Reflects New Found Hope’, Afrobarometer Policy Paper, 
No.9, p. 5. 
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443 ACLED (2018) ‘Mali: The Regionalization of Armed Rebellion’, 16 February 2018. 
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Figure 6: Trends in militant Islamist group activity in the Sahel (®Africacenter.org). 
 
6.1.2. Dispersed disputes: Exploiting local fault lines and exacerbating violent conflict 
 
Previous parts of this thesis (cf. Chapters 4 and 5) revealed that youth constituencies, (semi-) 
nomadic herders and the wider rural population increasingly resisted the Malian state, which 
instituted its authority based on exclusive clientelistic ties with regional powerbrokers. Jihadist 
organisations strategically allied with marginalised sections of the population across both 
northern and central Mali. They exploited grievances towards the central state and local elites. 
These factions considered the state as either absent, predatory, corrupt or obstructive to their 
basic livelihoods.454 In response, terrorist organisations adopted an anti-elitist and pro-
pastoralist agenda vis-à-vis marginalised constituencies while offering avenues for economic, 
financial and social status mobilisation and emancipation.455  
The Maacina katiba active in central Mali constituted a noteworthy example in this regard. 
After an initial attempt to establish a broad inter-ethnic support base, it eventually aligned with 
marginalised Fulani constituencies.456 The leader of the Maacina katiba linked his calls for 
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148	
	
In this context, as shown below, non-state actors increasingly filled that void and constituted 
pivotal security providers – at a very basic level – across the rural areas.    
 By 2018, the popular mood in the country had radically altered compared to the widespread 
optimism noted in 2013. Two thirds of Malian citizens now indicated that the country was again 
moving in the wrong direction. Up until 2017, national priorities, in the eyes of Malian citizens, 
continued to be dominated by socio-economic matters, most notably food security, youth 
employment as well as access to health services and water. In 2018, security constituted the 
primary concern of citizens in northern and central Mali. One year later, it had become the 
overarching national priority.449 By this time, around 90 per cent of people in Timbuktu, Segou 
and Mopti noted a deteriorating security situation during the course of the previous year.450  
 Between 2015 and 2018, jihadist organisations present in Mali also expanded their activities 
into neigbouring countries guided by a Salafist-jihadist policy of “Sahelisation.”451 From 2016 
onwards, the number of attacks beyond Mali’s border significantly increased (see Figure 6). 
Terrorists conducted deadly attacks on hotels and restaurants in Burkina Faso, quite similar to 
those in Mali. In Burkina Faso, a locally anchored group, Ansarul Islam, which maintained ties 
to Malian jihadist groups, had conducted dozens of attacks since December 2016.452 Niger 
witnessed a similar rise in assaults throughout this period. In 2016, Boko Haram was still 
responsible for the vast majority of attacks conducted on Nigerien soil. However, 2017 marked 
a considerable shift, as attacks conducted in Niger by Al-Qaeda and IS-related groups based in 
Mali grew in importance.453  
 In sum, security threats involving northern armed groups and the Malian state gradually 
faded into the background between 2013-2018. Yet, the terrorist threat significantly intensified 
and gradually shifted to central Mali and towards neighbouring countries. The following section 
illustrates how Jihadist organisations anchored into the socio-cultural fabric by exploiting local 
grievances vis-à-vis the state and existing tensions within and between communities in both 
northern and central Mali.   
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In this context, as shown below, non-state actors increasingly filled that void and constituted 
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MUJAO to fight jihad but to protect themselves against the Tuaregs with whom they are in 
conflict over resources.”461 MUJAO indeed sided with Fulani factions in this area and defended 
their interests in cases of intercommunal land disputes. This stance greatly contrasted with the 
Malian state, which had frequently frustrated or simply ignored their needs.462 MUJAO also 
cancelled state taxes and abolished the fees that herders were charged by landowners to obtain 
access to grazing lands. While MUJAO established its authority by coercion, it also offered 
education, military training and salaries to numerous Fulani youngsters who thereby enhanced 
their social status, future prospects and religious identity. Yet, the divergent trajectories of 
Fulani youngsters should also be emphasised as some joined other militias and many did not 
take part in any of the armed groups at all.463  
 In sum, the local anchoring of jihadist groups clearly perpetuated and exacerbated violent 
conflict within and amongst communities in northern and central Mali. It is in this context that 
a myriad of local militias, self-defence and vigilant youth groups were created to defend local 
territorial or wider factional interests and to fill the security vacuum across northern and central 
Mali, as the next section illustrates.  
 
6.1.3. An archipelago of “micro-zones of influence” in the sand 464  
 
As state presence remained largely confined to the main urban pockets across northern and 
central Mali, an archipelago of local armed groups and militias controlled bits and pieces of the 
vast rural territory in ever shifting alliances. The rise of factional and geographically 
concentrated armed groups – increasingly organised along narrow community, clan or cast lines 
– served a combination of interests. This included the protection of constituents, personal 
ambitions of its leadership, defending lucrative interests in the smuggling economy or 
expanding influence in the political realm over other local factions.  
 Surveys conducted by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 
revealed that local communities across northern and central Mali predominantly relied on local 
non-state security initiatives in the absence of state security.465 Citizens, for example, indicated 
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Jihad to the Fulani identity.457 He recurrently referred to the ancient Maacina Empire, an 
historical period of Fulani hegemony that sharply contrasted with their present-day 
marginalisation in central Mali. Although unable to cater for public services on a large scale, 
the organisation instituted new forms of governance that regulated and improved access to 
critical natural resources for its supporters. Moreover, they exploited frustrations amongst 
Fulani youth vis-à-vis traditional authorities who maintained preferential ties with the central 
state administration but had failed to cater for the wider needs of the community. These ties 
between individual Fulani and terrorist groups tended to be conflated in popular perceptions as 
a relationship between terrorism and the entire Fulani community, which obviously seriously 
undermined the level of inter-communal distrust in the central region.  
Jihadist groups indeed strategically exploited – and thereby aggravated – intercommunal 
rivalries. Conflicting interests over the use of scarce natural resources – especially land and 
water – or competition over economic opportunities, including high-value smuggling networks, 
all contributed to these rising tensions. The central regions Mopti and Segou witnessed a 
particularly dramatic surge in inter-communal violence. The overall number of conflict-related 
fatalities in Mopti alone grew more than tenfold between 2015 and 2018.458 A 2018 report by 
Human Rights Watch identified over 200 civilians died in inter-communal violence in the 
Mopti region.459 Moreover, traditionally subordinate factions challenged stringent social 
stratification and local hierarchies. While these tensions regularly erupted into violent clashes 
in the past, the scale of such conflicts amplified in recent years. 
The anchoring of MUJAO in the area around Menaka and the Malian border with Niger 
revealed how terrorist groups exploited existing intercommunal tensions. This area has long 
been prone to (violent) confrontations opposing Doussak Tuareg and Tolebe Fulani herders. 
Conflicts mostly centred on access to natural resources or banditry (e.g. cattle theft). The Tuareg 
faction first joined the ranks of the MNLA, the armed group that led the secessionist struggle 
against the Malian Defence and Security forces in 2012. Later, they created their own armed 
group, the Movement for the Salvation of Azawad (MSA). Their increased armed capabilities 
encouraged, amongst others, Fulani youngsters in the area to align with and seek protection 
through MUJAO.460 A Nigerien state official reiterated, “Young Peuls [Fulani] don’t join 
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Across northern Mali, (coalitions of) armed groups dispersed along faction lines and localised 
territorial interests in the five-year period that followed the 2012 crisis. The trajectory of the 
MNLA illustrated this prevailing pattern of fragmentation. Initially, the group obtained a broad 
support base amongst multiple Tuareg clans with strongholds in both Kidal and Menaka as 
clarified in Chapter 2.471 In March 2014, the MNLA faced a first breakaway due to mounting 
tensions between influential Idnane and Ifoghas Tuareg leaders. The MNLA leadership 
expelled Ibrahim Ag Assaleh, whom it considered to be too closely aligned to the government. 
This former Member of Parliament for Bourem in the Gao region subsequently created his own 
movement, the Coalition of the People for Azawad (CPA). The CPA had a modest military 
presence on the ground, so the breakaway was not that big a blow for the MNLA. The creation 
of the Movement for the Salvation of Azawad (MSA) led to a more significant weakening of 
the MNLA. It constituted a breakaway of the Menaka wing and the departure of most of its 
militants from the Doussak and Chamanamas Tuareg factions.472 They complained that the 
MNLA was far too focused on Kidal and invested little in protecting (the interests of) the 
Menaka area. Yet, clan-based tensions subsequently also weakened the MSA. The group 
eventually split into a separate Doussak and Chamanamas Tuareg armed faction.473 In October 
2016, another substantial breakaway occurred when Tuareg clans from the Timbuktu region, 
mainly linked to the Kel Antessar Tuareg faction, left the MNLA. Together with clan members 
in civil society, they formed the Congress for Justice in Azawad.474  
 Unity in the Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA), founded in 2012, also proved short-lived 
as the group had already split into two factions by 2013.475 One united Gao-based Arab factions 
aligned to the Malian government, while the other drew much of its support from both 
	
471 By the time the MNLA was ousted from Kidal by Ansar Al-Din, led by former seasoned Tuareg-rebel-turned-
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that Malian Defence and Security Forces were much less present than non-state security actors 
were in the administrative cercles in central Mali (Mopti and Segou). They also considered the 
latter more effective. Over 60 per cent of citizens relied on local militias for their protection 
against banditry, other militias or jihadist groups.466  
 Across central Mali, local militias and self-defence groups emerged to protect local 
constituencies from attacks by jihadists or other communal groups in the absence of the state. 
They often originated as loose alliances of small village-based groups. Some evolved into 
broader and more structured organisations with an increasingly prominent communal and ethnic 
profile. Beyond self-defence, local militias played a role in securing improved access to land 
and water by (the threat of) force or by ensuring financial opportunities for disenchanted youth. 
The selling of stolen cattle, for example, evolved into a lucrative industry and incited the 
creation or expansion of local militias.467 The Dozo (or Donsos) constituted a militia with a 
particularly strong communal profile. It regrouped traditional Bambara hunters from many 
village-based self-defence groups across central Mali that aimed to protect villagers against the 
rising terrorist threat and other communal militias. These highly localised groups evolved into 
a wider regional self-defence operational structure, amidst continued state absence. The Dan na 
Ambassagou group also expanded its organisational capacity by uniting multiple Dogon self-
defence groups from different villages across the border area between Mali and Burkina Faso. 
Yet, Dogon citizens in the Douentza area established their own loose alliance of village-based 
armed groups. Several Fulani, in turn, created the Alliance for the Salvation of the Sahel to 
protect themselves, notably against other militias.468 During 2018, the level of intercommunal 
violence in central Mali amplified in a context already clarified above. The increased numbers 
of deadly clashes involved numerous armed self-defence groups. Many horrifying retaliatory 
killings of ordinary citizens of different communities took place. The UN, amongst others, 
expressed particular concerns about the “indiscriminate targeting of members of the Fulani […] 
community.”469 Ursu (2018) noted that divisive issues at the origin of group tensions, such as 
competing access to natural resources, translated into more intense ethnic divisions as these 
conflicts escalated and intercommunal ties militarised.470  
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Since the ousting of the Malian state in 2012 and its modest return subsequently, armed 
governance gained further prominence and the role of armed groups in the local decentralised 
administration increased in northern Mali. It became crucial for the leadership of local clans or 
castes to obtain strong representation in the realm of armed governance in order to defend and 
promote their interests vis-à-vis other factions. The (historic) rivalry between Ifoghas and 
Imghad Tuareg factions clearly illustrates this point. The traditional leadership of the Ifoghas 
Tuareg (see Chapter 2), long dominated other Tuareg factions. Its representatives emerged as 
the principle regional powerbroker of the central state in the Kidal region. Yet, both Idnane and 
Imghad factions, amongst others, increasingly contested Ifoghas supremacy. Imghad Tuareg, 
for example, successfully secured key local representative positions and the parliamentary seat 
for Kidal in 2013, at the expense of Ifoghas candidates. The Ifoghas chieftaincy was equally 
concerned about its limited influence over the main Tuareg armed groups in the area. The 
Idnane and many young Tuareg dominated the MNLA while the forceful Groupe Autodéfense 
Touareg Imghad et Alliés (GATIA) promoted the interests of Imghad Tuareg and its allies. The 
traditional Ifoghas leadership obtained scant control over both movements and worked through 
the armed group Haut Conseil pour l’Unité de l’Azawad (HCUA) to defend its interests.479 
Together with the MNLA and an Arab armed group, the HCUA established a coalition called 
the Coordination of Azawad Movements (“the Coordination”). In the words of Thurston (2018), 
this primarily constituted “something of an Ifoghas-Arab front that could face down challenges 
from […] the Imghad.”480 As noted above, over time, the MNLA’s influence reduced because 
of the many splits it faced. Consequently, the HCUA gradually became the leading force in this 
armed coalition.  
  Clearly, decentralised administration, armed governance and factional politics along local 
clan and caste lines became increasingly intertwined. In the end, all politics is indeed local. 
Traditional authorities and the leadership of armed groups maintained close ties, as illustrated 
above. On the ground, representatives of the armed groups increasingly sidelined and overtook 
functions and responsibilities of both traditional leaders and the – very distant – state. Empirical 
research across northern Mali by Molenaar et al. (2019) revealed that:  
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Berabiche Arabs in the Timbuktu region and some Tilemsi Arabs, and joined an anti-
government coalition of armed groups.  
The smuggling economy remained a key arena in which armed groups competed for 
influence and profit. Armed groups in northern Mali supported traffickers by securing the 
transport of high-value illicit goods. In return, they received the financial means to fund the 
salaries of their recruits, vehicles and weapons. Obtaining control or considerable influence 
over specific strategic hubs along the main smuggling routes therefore constituted an important 
source of revenue. These nodes were situated along the road that enters western Mali from 
Mauritania with hubs around Lere, Ber and Lerneb as well as a second route that heads to Gao 
and Algeria via Tarkint, Tabankort, the Tilemsi Valley, Kidal and In-Khalil. For example, 
competing trafficking networks of Berabiche and Lamhar Arabs, linked to the Arab-dominated 
armed group MAA, on the one hand, and Tuareg Idnanes, a core constituency in the MNLA on 
the other, regularly clashed in their attempt to control Il-Khalil and Ber.  
 This kind of rivalry between local factions, shaped along clan and cast lines, characterised 
wider patterns of armed governance in the realm of the decentralised administration. The next 
section illustrates that armed groups expanded their role vis-à-vis other power poles in a context 
of state absence and widespread insecurity. 
 
6.1.4. Armed governance and decentralised administration 
 
Several authors demonstrated that decentralisation across northern and central Mali intensified 
power struggles between different factions struggling to control the local administration and its 
related advantages.476 Fierce competition between local clans or casts sometimes erupted into 
violent confrontations. Lecocq and Klute (2013) contended that old and new conflicts about 
tribal hierarchies and other disputes, most notably access to natural resources, “were fought 
both within the new game of decentralised […] administration and local democracy.”477  
Exactly how these patterns of competition between local factions played out and whether they 
turned violent or not, obviously differed from one place to the other. However, people referred 
to the fusion of violence and democracy as “demokalashi” for a reason.478  
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role of local militias or terrorist groups in the realm of decentralised governance was linked to 
issues of law and order, as well as some social service provision to the most marginalised 
constituencies.486   
 Hence, the armed groups derived a form of “basic legitimacy of protection from violence.” 
This source of legitimacy suggests that, “[t]hose who are able to offer protection from violence 
are at the same time those with the best chances to accumulate power and position.”487 Previous 
chapters have already revealed the importance of indigenous, religious and liberal democratic 
sources of legitimacy in Mali’s heterarchical order. This chapter thus highlights the rise of 
another key source of legitimacy that is particularly relevant in an insecure environment. Again, 
much more empirically grounded research is needed to examine the ability of armed groups to 
provide services in daily practice and the ways in which citizens perceive the increased role of 
different armed groups. The above sections merely assessed the supply side of security and 
power balance between different actors involved in armed governance.  
 In sum, five years after the French-led military intervention, the role of the state remained 
very limited and often confined to urban pockets across both northern and central Mali. In 
contrast, the role of armed groups in offering basic protection and shaping decentralised 
administration clearly expanded on the ground. Between 2013 and 2018, Mali’s heterarchical 
political order became ever more heterogeneous as a myriad of armed groups, militias and other 
power poles instituted their authority across in many “micro-zones” of influence.  
 The next part assesses the Malian peace process and the subsequent implementation process 
of the peace accord that were both dominated by northern armed groups and Malian state 
authorities. The number of violent incidents between these former adversaries significantly 
dropped. However, the overall objective of the peace process in terms of unifying the northern 
armed groups and state representatives into reformed state structures yielded few results. 
 
6.2. SEEN FROM ABOVE: PREVALENCE OF HYBRID SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE PATTERNS  
 
6.2.1. The peace process: Pacification without unification 
 
During the 2012 crisis, Malian state authority completely vanished across the northern regions. 
A French-led military intervention subsequently dislodged the terrorists from all main urban 
areas and helped the Malian state back on its feet. Building on its strong informal ties with all 
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A logic of armed politics has captured the regions of Kidal and Ménaka, in which non-state 
armed actors of both the pro-autonomy alliance Coordination des movement de 
l’Azawad (CMA) in Kidal and the pro-central state Platform coalition in Ménaka have 
successfully extended their leverage vis-à-vis modern state authorities and traditional 
authorities.481 
  
The growing role of the CMA undermined elected officials, as the Mayor of Kidal noted:  
 
My position and power as Mayor has changed since the arrival of the new masters who drove 
the Malian state out, even though I am the emanation of the people who chose me through 
the ballot.482 
 
Displaying its authority in administrating the region of Kidal, the leadership of the CMA: 
 
published a set of policy measures for the region including regulations for road traffic, 
narcotics, and alcohol trafficking, settling territorial disputes, health issues, and the role of 
religious authorities in dispute settlement. […] To underline the CMA’s ability to enforce 
these regulations, Ag Intallah also announced the launch of Operation Re-education, a two-
week police operation.483  
 
Bøås and Strazzari (2020) noted that this ability to use force indeed constituted one of the key 
resources required to establish and uphold authority across northern Mali.484 The CMA, for 
example, ran a local policing body in Kidal alongside its branch of armed militants. Traditional 
justice actors in the region increasingly relied on armed groups to help enforce their decisions. 
Ordinary citizens also began to address issues of law and order directly with representatives of 
armed groups instead of contacting traditional authorities.485  
 In central Mali, the security landscape, as demonstrated in the previous section, appeared 
even more fractured compared to the northern regions. Initial research suggested that the wider 
	
481 Molenaar, F. et al. (2019), p. 88. The Platform Coalition assembled groups that opposed the secessionist Tuareg 
rebellion and frequently aligned with the Malian authorities. It included the Coordination of Patriotic Movements 
and Forces of the Resistance (CMFPR), a branch of the Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA), an early offshoot of 
a Tuareg armed group, the Coalition of the People for Azawad (CPA) and later also GATIA. 
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communities or Malian society at large. The negotiating parties regularly consulted with their 
own constituencies and handpicked a number of “civil society” representatives to provide input 
during one of the rounds of negotiations. However, the entire process remained a far cry from 
the locally driven, community-based, reconciliatory processes that positively influenced the 
peace process in the 1990s, as highlighted in Chapter 2.  
 The negotiations centred on four thematic areas: (i) the institutional set-up of the Malian 
state; (ii) defence and security aspects; (iii) justice/reconciliation mechanisms; and (iv) socio-
economic and cultural aspects. Consensus building on the institutional set-up and distribution 
of power in the political system proved particularly challenging and remained an important 
point of divergence. While the Coordination pushed for a federal state model that provided 
maximum autonomy to the northern regions within the confines of the national state, both the 
Platform and the government called for enhanced decentralisation (“regionalisation”). The 
peace process proved unable to build genuine consensus on the outcome document. In the end, 
the Algerian-led international mediation team submitted a final peace agreement to all parties 
built around profound institutional regionalisation and quotas for improved political 
representation of northern communities. While state authorities and the Platform initialled the 
agreement, the Coordination refused to accept the final proposal, which they believed failed to 
incorporate their main political aspiration. The Coordination eventually signed the deal in June 
2015 after considerable international pressure and a soft commitment that some of their 
observations could be addressed during the implementation phase. The agreement indeed 
defined a two-year implementation period. However, the deadline was recurrently extended 
amidst a lack of progress. Five years after the signing of the agreement, it was still ongoing. 
In the same vein as the peace process, armed groups and Malian authorities largely 
dominated the actual implementation process. Their representatives met during regular 
meetings of the follow-up committee (the Comité de Suivi de l’Accord). The next section first 
reveals the poor level of implementation of key aspects of the peace accord that aimed to 
establish reconstituted inclusive state institutions. The subsequent section then shows the 
prevalence of particularistic interests of these actors that superseded issues of national interest 
throughout the implementation process, which originally covered a two years period but was 







actors across involved, the Burkinabe government swiftly brokered a preliminary peace 
agreement between the Malian interim government and northern armed groups. The deal 
acknowledged Mali’s territorial integrity, the unitary state and paved the way for a new round 
of elections to restore state legitimacy. In terms of participants, importantly, the preliminary 
deal sought to separate the “good guys” amongst the northern armed groups from the “bad 
guys,” who refused to distance themselves from terrorist activities. However, it took until mid-
2014 before Mali’s newly elected state authorities and the leaders of the “compliant” (e.g. non-
terrorist) northern armed groups engaged in an official peace process. The process was a clear 
attempt to unify compliant northern armed groups and the Malian state into reconstituted, more 
inclusive and effective state structures. This would enable a joint response against the terrorist 
threat caused by “non-compliant” groups. Hence, the stage seemed to be set for the Malian state 
to expand and re-institute its authority in society.  
 
The Algiers peace process: Armed groups in the driving seat  
Between mid-2014 and early 2015, an Algeria-led mediation, with direct and active 
involvement of the wider international community, provided a platform for five rounds of 
negotiations. These negotiations centred on Malian authorities and two grand coalitions of 
northern armed groups already mentioned above, the “Platform” and “Coordination.” However, 
members of the latter coalition refused to negotiate with the armed groups gathered in the 
Platform coalition, as they had not been a direct party to the conflict in 2012. Unable to unite 
the three parties around the same table at the same time, a two-track diplomatic approach 
eventually prevailed. Formal negotiations between the mediators and the two individual 
coalitions took place separately for most of the time.  
The set-up of the Algiers process thus privileged the armed groups and Malian authorities. As 
a result, the armed groups significantly expanded their sphere of influence to the detriment of 
other power poles in society, including civil society organisations, religious and traditional 
leaders and youth networks. Moreover, the structure did not enable local community 
representatives or ordinary citizens to participate or contribute in a meaningful way. Tellingly, 
83 per cent of Malian citizens indicated not having “any” or only “poor” knowledge of the 
Malian peace agreement two years – and again four years – after it had been signed.488  
 The top-down, exclusive negotiations between the parties frequently took place outside Mali 
and were poorly suited to address rising levels of mistrust amongst and within northern 
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implementation period.493 It is noteworthy that groups labelled as terrorist armed groups 
committed only a small minority (39) of these offences, while the armed groups (246) and 
Malian Defence and Security forces (288) were responsible for the majority of cases. The 
authorities launched very few investigations and hardly any legal proceedings took place, 
revealing persistent levels of impunity in recent years.494  
When it came to national reconciliation, the peace accord called for the organisation of a 
National Conference to discuss the root causes of Mali’s recurrent crises. The outcome was 
supposed to emanate in a National Charter for Peace, Unity and Reconciliation that could be 
integrated into the revised constitution. Organised between 27 March and 2 April 2017, the 
National Conference united more than 1000 people and offered representatives from a wide 
variety of organisations, armed groups, regions, professional and ethnic background a (one-off) 
opportunity to engage with one another on fundamental matters of mutual concern.495 The 
initiative was widely appreciated. The status of the conference, however, remained unclear and 
the authorities failed to integrate the outcomes into the constitutional reform process.496 Beyond 
the conference, the Algiers accord did not foresee the set-up of a nationwide and locally driven 
reconciliatory process. 
State authorities and the northern armed groups, as noted above, primarily focused on the 
security and political components in the agreement. Nevertheless, a stalemate between the two 
subjects soon obstructed any substantial progress towards unified state institutions. Malian 
political elites were unwilling to implement key political reforms by transferring substantial 
powers and resources to subnational levels of government if the armed groups did not disarm 
first. The latter, in turn, refused to hand over their (heavy) weaponry in the absence of a viable 
political track. Both parties thus refused to restrain their own power base in the collective 
interest. The impasse persisted throughout the five years covered by this chapter.  
The security aspects of the peace agreement proved particularly illustrative in this regard. The 
objective was to “reconstitute” the Malian Defence and Security forces so that they became 
more inclusive, representative and efficient. However, by the end of 2018, the UN Under-
	
493 Available at: https://minusma.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/executive_summary_english.pdf. 
494 Ibid. 
495 The outcome of the conference is available at: http://www.malinet.net/editorial/rapport-general-de-la-
conference-dentente-nationale-bamako-du-27-mars-au-02-avril-2017/. For a comprehensive analysis of the 
conference, see Sy, O. Dakouo, A. and Traore, K. (2018), La Conférence d’Entente Nationale. Mise en oeuvre et 
leçons apprises pour le dialogue national au Mali. Berlin: Berghoff Foundation. 
496 The authorities did develop legislation on national reconciliation, peace building and amnesty that, somewhat 
ironically, proved more divisive than unifying. The proposed bill was fiercely criticized by Malian human rights 
associations who indicated that it risked instituting a culture of impunity, which had already proven detrimental to 
Mali’s longer-term stabilization efforts. 
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The implementation phase: State building and the national interest into the background 
Of the four main subjects central to the Malian peace agreement, the parties mostly focused on 
the political and security aspects. The Independent Observer noted that justice and 
reconciliation as well as developments aspects of the accord received much less attention.489      
The establishment of a specific Development Fund for the northern regions constituted an 
important element of the peace agreement. It could generate a peace dividend that reinforced 
societal by-in to the peace process. Nonetheless, the fund had not been established by the end 
of the two-year implementation period. The Malian government regularly reiterated its 
reluctance to transfer resources to the northern regions in the absence of state officials. 
Moreover, ministers questioned the geographical focus of the fund. Malians living in the 
southern regions would perceive it as a reward for rebellion.490 By the end of 2018, little 
progress had been achieved across the northern regions in terms of peace dividends as the 
government struggled to develop tangible implementation modalities of the fund during the 
two-years implementation period. The Independent Observer also reported that the signatory 
groups largely neglected justice issues throughout the two-year implementation phase. This 
sharply contrasted with the importance that Malian citizens attached to these matters. A 
majority of people even considered the fight against impunity amongst the top priorities of the 
entire process.491 In 2018, the Independent Expert for Human Rights in Mali reported that: 
 
No significant progress has been observed on a judicial level since the signing of the 
Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, in which the Government had committed 
to ending impunity. Most perpetrators of abuses and violations of human rights and 
international humanitarian law go unpunished.492  
 
The Human Rights division of the UN’s stabilization mission to Mali recorded over 600 cases 
of human rights violations, involving more than 1400 victims during the two-year 
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Demobilisation, Disarmament, and Reinsertion (DDR) programme.501 A few months later, the 
authorities indeed managed to launch the preparatory works for an accelerated DDR programme 
to the benefit of non-state militias present in the Mopti region.502 However, it proved extremely 
difficult to convince or force militias across the region to hand over their arms in a context 
characterised by recurrent terrorist attacks, violent intercommunal conflicts and scant protection 
offered by state institutions outside the urban pockets. When a couple of hundred fighters did 
agree to be cantoned, the state and international partners proved unable to swiftly move forward 
with the DDR process and the fighters eventually took up arms again.   
In sum, by the end of 2018 some incremental steps towards reformed and unified state 
institutions had been taken. Yet, the different power poles in Mali’s heterarchical political order 
safeguarded their own sphere of influence as the next section reveals. In its capacity as 
Independent Observer of the actual implementation of the peace accord, the Carter Center 
reported that Malian armed groups and political elites predominantly focused on short-term 
measures to their own benefit, often without a clear relation to or even at the expense of key 
tenets in the peace agreement and the national interest.503  
 
Particularistic interests dominating the implementation process 
Compared to the minimal efforts and advances in the above areas of national interest, the Malian 
parties devoted much more time and energy to negotiating so-called interim measures of the 
peace agreement. Certainly, they benefitted directly from these measures in the area of security 
and the decentralised administration. They were originally intended to build confidence 
between all parties during a three-month period after the signing of the peace agreement ahead 
of more comprehensive institutional reforms. In practice, these “interim” clauses became the 
main focus of negotiations between the armed groups and Mali’s political leadership for many 
years. The creation of so-called interim authorities proved to be a case in point.  
The peace agreement stipulated that elected members of local and regional councils in 
northern Mali would be replaced by people designated by the armed groups and Malian 
government. These interim authorities thereby (temporarily) institutionalised a hybrid form of 
decentralised administration that officially anchored the position of armed groups in the realm 
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Secretary General for Peacekeeping noted that the foreseen security reforms were 
operationalised.497 The unification of different influential armed power poles under a single 
chain of command and control proved extremely challenging. The security paragraphs of the 
peace agreement foresaw a vast Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) as well 
as Security Sector Reform (SSR) programme. In December 2015, Malian authorities formally 
launched the Commission for Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR). 
Nevertheless, it took another year before the authorities nominated its president. In practice, the 
Ministry of Defence long considered DDR a “lower priority” and mainly an avenue for “rebel 
groups to benefit from more resources.”498 Many officers in the armed forces resisted the 
integration of Tuareg rebels, some of whom had been integrated in the 1990s but had deserted 
again in the run-up to the 2012 rebellion. During an official meeting of the Monitoring 
Committee of the implementation process, the Minister of Defence openly stated that he did 
not feel committed to or restrained by the peace agreement. The armed groups, in turn, long 
refrained from presenting lists of combatants who could go through the motions from 
cantonment to reintegration. The cantonment of their fighters and handover of arms would 
seriously weaken their local power position and leverage vis-à-vis the government and other 
power poles. In September 2018, the parties eventually reached an initial agreement on the 
criteria for reintegration of armed combatants. However, conflicts over rank, the number of 
combatants, their salaries and per diems persisted.499 None of the armed parties showed up to 
the official launch of the reintegration process on 6 November 2018.  
During the implementation period of the Algiers peace agreement, the security situation in 
the central region Mopti dramatically deteriorated, as revealed above. The region was 
effectively sidelined from the entire peace process that centred on the northern armed groups. 
Representatives of several communities in central Mali, particularly Fulani, felt “that history is 
repeating itself: peace is being built without them if not against them.” Many believed that “you 
need to take up arms to be heard.”500 In March 2018, a delegation composed of Malian 
authorities, Members of Parliament, NGOs and local community leaders visited central Mali. 
In October, Prime Minister Maiga promised that local militia members would benefit from a 
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The MOCs regrouped 200 representatives of the Malian army and another 200 representatives 
from each of the two coalitions of armed groups in Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal. All parties were 
expected to handover light and heavy arms to enable the MOCs to function. 
In practice, however, the armed groups refrained from handing over vital equipment and 
sufficient personnel that could make the instrument work in the collective interest but would, 
at the same time, weaken their authority in their own stronghold.  
In May 2018, after almost three years of negotiation – instead of the three months foreseen 
by the peace accord – the parties officially launched the MOCs. Yet, they remained ineffective 
in the case of Gao and largely non-existent in both Timbuktu and Kidal. By October 2018, the 
MOC battalion in Gao consisted of 725 soldiers but obtained only six heavy weapons, all 
provided by the government.505  In Kidal and Timbuktu, the parties managed to fill just one 
third of the MOC positions. In 2017, a complex terrorist attack targeted the MOC in Gao killing 
more than 70 people. The MOC was poorly equipped to protect itself, let alone Malian citizens. 
The mechanism was also unable to effectively contribute to security efforts during the 2018 
presidential elections and conducted few patrols in practice.506 In November 2018, the CMA 
coalition officially reiterated its stance to refrain from transferring its heavy weaponry to the 
MOCs. It limited its contribution to some combatants and light weapons. Clearly, the attempt 
to unify different state and non-state armed forces in order to protect Malian citizens against 
the rising terrorist threat had achieved few results by the end of 2018. 
Armed groups also protected their territorial influence sphere in the context of the MOC. In 
November 2018, the CMA coalition blocked over 170 combatants from four armed groups that 
arrived from Gao and Menaka and intended to participate in Kidal’s MOC. The CMA declared 
that the inclusivity of the MOC needed to reflect “realities on the ground.” As three of the four 
movements had no solid support base in the Kidal region, the CMA blocked them from 
partaking in the MOC and sent them back to Gao and Menaka. It did not want other groups to 
increase their presence in the CMA’s influence sphere. Likewise, CMA representatives from 
Kidal had previously been blocked from participating in Gao’s MOC.  
In light of the limited progress achieved in fostering inclusive national defence and security 
institutions, the next section reveals that hybrid patterns of security provision prevailed in the 
five-year period that followed the 2012 crisis.  
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of local governance. Representation in and control over these institutions enabled the armed 
groups to position themselves in the run-up to future elections and express claims of regional 
authority. Malian opposition parties and local citizens fiercely contested the legitimacy of the 
interim authorities. They questioned the legality of instituting different governance 
arrangements between northern and southern Mali, but the Constitutional Court allowed for it. 
In addition, they criticised the undemocratic character of their composition by people 
representing state officials and non-state armed groups based on an exclusive deal stuck 
between the signatory parties outside the realm of a legislative process. In Gao, youth and civil 
society groups protested against the fact that these interim authorities were imposed in a top-
down manner without their consent. People also contested their legitimacy in other regions.504  
While the interim authorities should have been established three months after the peace 
agreement had been signed, it took a full year before state authorities and representatives of the 
Coordination and Platform reached a power-sharing agreement that underpinned their 
establishment. The Coordination obtained the presidency of the regional authorities in Kidal, 
Timbuktu and Taoudeni while the Platform would lead Gao and Ménaka. The deal also 
provided additional positions to the armed groups, including advisors to regional governors and 
lower-level state officials. However, it took until April 2017, almost two years after the peace 
agreement had been signed, before the regional authorities were officially installed in all five 
regions amidst persistent tensions over proposed candidates and representational challenges. In 
Timbuktu, for example, armed splinter groups pressed for their inclusion into these institutions 
by sieging the regional council building. In the end, they obtained positions as advisors in the 
decentralised administration. Various Arab and Tuareg factions also raised concerns about their 
underrepresentation, which led to additional delays. The operationalisation of the interim 
authorities thus continued to be hampered by controversies about their level of inclusivity. 
These challenges clearly reflected the complexities of Mali’s extremely heterogeneous 
heterarchical order, as illustrated in the first part of this chapter.  
 Similar patterns characterised the implementation of interim measures in the security realm.  
The peace agreement defined an interim period during which representatives of the compliant 
armed groups and state Defence and Security forces would conduct joint military patrols in 
order to restore mutual confidence ahead of more comprehensive security reforms. To this end, 
the agreement envisaged the creation of temporary regional military command structures, so-
called Operational Coordination Mechanisms (“MOCs”), which supervised these joint patrols. 
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chapter referred to the fierce competition between Ifoghas and Imghad Tuareg factions in Kidal. 
After the defeat and retreat of the Malian army from large parts of northeastern Mali, a group 
of 66 Imghad Tuareg, fearing retaliatory attacks, sought refuge at a nearby UN camp.  
From then on, the Malian state relied on more delegatory forms of hybrid security provision.  
Only months after the defeat of the Malian army, the Groupe Autodéfense Touareg Imghad et 
Alliés (GATIA) was established to protect the interests of Imghad Tuareg and its allies. It did 
not take GATIA long to launch a series of attacks against non-state armed groups that had been 
part of the rebellion against the Malian state with the aim of regaining territorial control. The 
group had a strong military posture and indeed managed to dislodge the MNLA in various 
localities across the Gao region.511 GATIA also established checkpoints around the city of Kidal 
in order to gain a form of territorial control along the main transport routes. The advances 
secured by GATIA on the battlefield benefitted the Malian state. The militia transferred the 
control over some of its territories to Malian armed forces.512 International security personnel 
stationed in northern Mali witnessed joint movements and the use of similar (transport) 
equipment by the national army and GATIA. In an official Facebook post by the American 
Embassy in Bamako, the US Ambassador called upon the Malian government to: 
 
  Put a stop to all ties both public and private with GATIA, a group of armed militia that 
is not contributing to peace in the north.513  
 
Similar to the Touré era, Malian authorities allowed loyal factions to profit from illicit 
trafficking, also to prevent non-allied movements from benefitting too much from this lucrative 
trade. A case in point constituted the arrest of alleged trafficker Yoro Ould Daha in early 2014 
by the French military for his activities under the banner of terrorist organisation MUJAO. A 
week later, Malian authorities released him and he then played an important role in support of 
loyalist armed groups that ousted groups opposing the state from Menaka.514 The authorities 
could build on well-established networks with individual powerbrokers across the northern 
regions, thereby exerting influence indirectly. 
This was not the case in central Mali, where loosely organised local militias operated at much 
greater distance from the state. Malian authorities or the Defence and Security forces did not 
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6.2.2. The prevalence of hybrid security provision in the aftermath of the crisis 
 
Fragmentation of hybrid security provision  
Soon after the 2012 crisis, Malian authorities revived hybrid security patterns witnessed during 
the Touré era (2002-2012) and previous regimes, as demonstrated in Chapter 2. In 2014, the 
Malian army attempted to take control of Kidal, the stronghold of the Tuareg rebellion, by force. 
It did so on the basis of a complementary form of hybrid security provision as both official 
army soldiers and representatives of un unofficial Imghad militia took part in the assault. In 
May 2014, Prime Minister Mara was adamant to demonstrate that Kidal was part of Mali’s 
national territory and should be administered by representatives of the state rather than Tuareg 
armed groups.  He insisted on visiting the town on 17 May. This period preceded the Algiers 
peace talks and the non-state armed groups as well as Kidal-based civil society movements 
vociferously protested his visit, in the absence of a functioning peace process. Demonstrators 
successfully blocked the airstrip and prevented an airplane transporting Malian ministers from 
landing in Kidal. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Mara managed to avoid the runway by travelling 
in a UN helicopter. Army General and leading Imghad representative Ag Gamou accompanied 
the prime minister that day. Soon after Mara arrived in Kidal, the Governor’s office was set on 
fire. The prime minister was extracted from the scene and taken to the UN base in Kidal. 
Nevertheless, eight people, including six Malian civil servants, died that day. This provoked 
furious reactions across the country. The government issued a statement describing the events 
in Kidal as a declaration of war and indicated that an appropriate response would follow.507  
In the early morning of 21 May, the Malian army – supported by an Imghad dominated 
militia – attacked Kidal with the objective of regaining control over the city by force.508 
However, it was defeated in five hours. The armed groups subsequently regained control of 
several northern cities, including Aguelhoc, Menaka, Tessalit, Tessit and Anefif, significantly 
altering the power balance between the authorities and armed groups.509 Barely two years after 
the secessionist rebellion had driven out the Malian state of the northern regions, its presence 
was again reduced in several northern localities. The participation of the Imghad Tuareg militia 
infuriated other Tuareg factions in control of Kidal at that point in time.510 The first part of this 
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  Put a stop to all ties both public and private with GATIA, a group of armed militia that 
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and economic opportunities were now being played out in the context of terrorism. State forces 
allied with Tuareg armed groups to counter ISGS and affiliated Fulani militias.  
In sum, hybrid security patterns showed a great deal of continuity despite becoming more 
diffused in the years that followed the 2012 crisis. The security landscape was now composed 
of a myriad of local armed groups and militias. The following section reveals how international 
actors and military interventions were shaped in the context of this heterogeneous context. 
 
Internationalisation of hybrid security provision 
Ever since the French-led military intervention in 2013, international military actors continued 
to play a crucial role in Mali including with respect to the growing terrorist threat in the 
following years. In 2014, the French regional counterterrorist mission Barkhane replaced the 
Mali-based Serval operation. It stationed approximately 1000 of its troops in northern Mali. In 
addition, UN stabilisation mission MINUSMA deployed up to 13,000 military personnel and 
almost 2000 police offers. Around 70 per cent of its staff operated from either northern or 
central Mali. Craven-Matthews and Engelbert (2018) estimated that the budget of these two 
missions corresponded to 75 per cent of the Malian state’s domestic revenues.522 The EU 
deployed over 500 experts for its training missions to build the capacity of Mali’s military 
(EUTM) and police (EUCAP) personnel. The Malian state clearly continued to considerably 
depend upon international actors to provide security across its national territory after the 2012 
crisis.  
 The UN Security Council recurrently emphasised that Malian Security and Defence Forces 
were primarily responsible for providing security across the country. The UN mission 
MINUSMA merely aimed to support and certainly not to replace Malian state institutions. 
However, considering the extremely limited presence of the state in northern and central Mali, 
the UN mission was forced to operate and patrol without the involvement of Malian security 
forces in several localities. In these areas, security provision was de facto delegated to 
international actors such as MINUSMA and to the French force Barkhane.  
Although Malian authorities persistently increased the national Defence and Security budget, 
Craven-Matthews and Engelbert (2018) noted that the Malian economy simply extracted 
insufficient domestic resources to singlehandedly fund the security personnel and material 
currently provided by external actors.   
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officially support specific local militias in terms of training, arms delivery or funding. Yet, 
influential political and military state actors initially tolerated the rise of some militias in the 
region anticipating their contribution to counterterrorism efforts in the rural areas, where the 
state was particularly weak.515 Several militias also received support from individual 
representatives – often fellow community members – in the central state.516 Moreover, 
numerous accounts, including those provided by Malian state officials, referred to joint patrols 
conducted by Dozo or Bambara militias and state security forces. These militias also reportedly 
escorted state representatives across the region.517 In an indirect delegation of security provision 
to Dogon and Bambara militias, a 2018 motorcycle ban along transport routes in Mopti was 
widely perceived to be selectively implemented. Malian state officials enabled these militias to 
roam freely in the region, in large numbers, while restraining other militias, most notably 
Fulani, from doing so.518 Dogon militias continued to man checkpoints and check ID cards of 
passing citizens along different roads. As the level of communal violence rose, the capacity of 
the central state to exert real influence over the militias appeared to be very limited. Those 
militias initially tolerated by the government hardly contributed to counterterrorism objectives 
and prioritised their own localised interests, such as improving access to natural resources 
through violent means against other villages and communities. Moreover, the state failed to 
impose and implement the aforementioned ordonnance, aimed at disarming militias, as well as 
its commitment to investigate flagrant cases of human rights abuses allegedly conducted by 
militias. Quite to the contrary, military operations by the Malian army reportedly resulted in 
serious human rights violations including extrajudicial killings, torture and arbitrary arrests.519  
In the border areas between Mali and Niger, the Malian state aligned itself with specific local 
militias during anti-terrorist operations. In 2015, as noted in the first part of this chapter, the 
Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) settled in the area. Numerous Fulani Tolebe 
youngsters joined or realigned their self-defence militias with this terrorist organisation.520 By 
then, local Doussaks Tuareg youngsters had established an armed group that allied with 
GATIA.521 Historic rivalries between the two communities over access to pasture, land, water 
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“satellite” groups is too strong, these transnational ties certainly influenced security dynamics 
in Mali.  
Even the, at first sight, technocratic support provided by the EU to raise the capacity of the 
Malian Security and Defence forces proved to be sensitive. The International Crisis Group 
(2014) reported that tensions between Tuareg factions influenced the actual (non-) deployment 
of military units trained by the EU.529 The very same held for the selection of a Malian battalion 
for the regional G5-Sahel force. In early 2017, regional authorities from Burkina Faso, Chad, 
Mali, Mauritania and Niger established this joint military force in the wake of the rapidly 
deteriorating security situation in the Liptako-Gourma border area between Burkina Faso, Mali 
and Niger. 530 They mandated the force to tackle, amongst others, cross-border terrorist threats 
and trafficking and to support the restoration of state authority, public services and humanitarian 
support in fragile border areas.531 In Mali, however, the composition and effective 
operationalisation of the Malian battalions under the command of the G5-Sahel was constrained 
by the limited progress in reconstituting an inclusive national army. 
In sum, during the five years that followed the 2012 crisis, both non-state armed groups and 
external partners played a major role in shaping one of the most pivotal tasks of statehood. 
Rather than moving towards a state-centred hierarchical order, a form of transnational security 
provision emerged that cut across global/local and state/non-state boundaries.  
The following and final part of this chapter offers a brief assessment of the functioning of 
Malian democracy during the five-year period that followed the 2012 crisis. It reveals 
remarkable patterns of continuity with pre-crisis period under President Touré and similar 
challenges that restrained democracy’s contribution to state legitimacy. 
	
6.3. STATE LEGITIMACY CHALLENGED DURING THE POST-CRISIS PERIOD 
 
In the years before the 2012 crisis, popular satisfaction with the leadership of President Touré 
and the democratic regime type had dwindled. The previous chapters revealed critical 
challenges related to political participation, representation and accountability that undermined 
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Considering the state’s absence in most rural areas across northern and central Mali, it came as 
no surprise that hybrid forms of cooperation between international forces and local militias also 
emerged. Chapter 2 briefly noted that collaboration between the French mission Serval and the 
MNLA provided valuable intelligence to the French military during the 2013 intervention. In 
subsequent years, the Barkhane operation also cooperated with non-state armed groups, such 
as the MSA and GATIA. These armed groups participated in operations against Islamic State 
in the border area between Mali and Niger.523 Their representatives attended high-level security 
meetings in Paris.524 This clearly showed that international actors became part of Mali’s 
fractured and fragmented security landscape, dominated by non-state actors. While these 
pragmatic forms of cooperation are effective from a military point of view, they undermine 
longer-term state building initiatives. In line with the analysis of the local anchorage of jihadists 
in northern and central Mali provided above, Ibrahim and Zapata (2018) also cautioned that, 
“[a] surge in counterterrorism operations against jihadists in Menaka risks inadvertently 
exacerbating a longstanding intercommunal conflict.”525  
Individual regional powerbrokers equally shaped transnational security practices and 
reinforced the position of armed groups. Pellerin and Guichaoua (2018) noted that countries 
like Mauritania and Morocco provided resources to specific armed groups in an attempt to 
influence the course of events in Mali and to prevent security threats to cross borders.526 The 
very same held for Algeria, long-time mediator in recurrent Malian crises, which used its 
historical ties with key Tuareg leaders in the Kidal region to prevent the quest for independence 
amongst some Malian Tuareg to affect Algerian Tuaregs.527 Moreover, Algeria and Libya long 
competed for influence in northern Mali and established networks of supporters in Kidal in 
particular. This was equally true for the longstanding rivalry between Algeria and Morocco that 
at one point risked spilling over into and affecting the Malian crisis.528 Hence, many of Mali’s 
neighbours provided financial, diplomatic or material support to specific armed groups also 
based on long-standing sociopolitical and cultural ties. Although the terms “proxy” or 
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warrants issued against them. The personal interests of the leadership of these state and non-
state power poles converged in the run-up to the elections.  
The creation of two new northern regions, Taoudeni and Menaka, illustrated how informal 
trade-offs between national elites and regional power poles in society continued to shape 
interest representation through the political system. Former president Touré had taken the 
initiative to create these two regions in December 2011 but never managed to implement this 
decision because of the Tuareg rebellion that broke out and the subsequent coup. Arab leaders 
fiercely lobbied the Bamako-based political elites to provide them with “their” own region and 
“their own parliamentarians” by creating the region of Taoudeni.535 On 28 February 2018, the 
Malian government officially approved the creation of Taoudeni and Menaka. These regions 
were situated above hydrocarbon basins and strategically located alongside trafficking 
networks.536 Their establishment was perceived as: 
 
An attempt to buy off powerful traffickers and businessmen by giving them control over  
resources and the movement of people and goods within their regions.537  
 
The decision also provided President Keita with a firm political support basis for his re-election 
in 2018. A local RPM party official in Taoudeni recalled:  
 
Our faction leaders made a commitment to IBK: to provide him with a gift after having 
granted Taoudeni an official status as region. What gift is better than to thank him during 
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In a similar vein, the creation of the Menaka region enabled Iwellemmdan Tuareg to position 
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and gradually eroded state legitimacy. This section examines, in an explorative way, key trends 
in these three areas in the years that followed the series of dramatic events in 2012.  
The international community had a strong interest in restoring Mali’s constitutional order. 
Following its military intervention, France wanted to avoid a prolonged unconstitutional period 
at all costs, while several donors could only allocate foreign aid to the Malian state once it 
obtained a formal democratic status. Moreover, the operationalisation of MINUSMA’s mandate 
required the re-establishment of constitutional order.532  
 Soon after the French-led military intervention, Mali organised presidential elections in July 
(first round) and August 2013 (second round) in every region across the country, including the 
stronghold of the Tuareg armed groups Kidal. Turnout figures were quite high by Malian 
standards. Moreover, the mere fact that the elections were organised in areas until recently far 
beyond state control marked the initial success of Mali’s return to democratic rule.533 Citizens 
widely perceived these elections as free and fair and overall support for democracy increased 
from 62 per cent in 2012 to 75 per cent in 2013. Malian democracy thus got off to a relatively 
good start. Former Prime Minister and Speaker of Parliament, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita (IBK) 
secured a landslide victory in the 2013 presidential elections. He obtained more than 77 per 
cent of the votes during the second round of these elections. Openly supported by influential 
religious leaders, he capitalised on his reputation as a sturdy politician who had restored civil 
oversight over the army and effectively tackled social unrest during the 1990s. He campaigned 
with a pledge to “put Mali first” and restore the country’s honour.   
The legislative elections took place on 25 November (first round) and 15 December (second 
round) 2013. The separate organisation of the presidential and legislative elections significantly 
favoured the president elect. Now that Keita had secured the presidency, influential local 
powerbrokers strategically shifted allegiance in support of his party – the Rassemblement Pour 
le Mali (RPM) – in the run-up to these legislative elections. By doing so, they maintained their 
individual networks with the executive intact, which were critical for nourishing their support 
base. Several regional powerbrokers in the former ruling party ADEMA also defected to RPM 
in the run-up to the legislative elections.534 Most noteworthy and controversial was the move 
by two leading representatives of the Tuareg armed rebellion, Hamada Ag Bibi (MNLA) and 
Mohamed Ag Intallah (HCUA) and the subsequent decision by the IBK regime to lift the arrest 
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as an arena to carefully manage a delicate support base amongst Mali’s political class rather 
than to promote policies in a consistent and durable manner. The president’s son became chair 
of the prestigious parliamentary Commission of National Defence, Internal Security and Civil 
Protection; his father-in-law the Speaker of the National Assembly; and one of his nephews 
was appointed Secretary-General of the Presidency. Malian citizens indicated that IBK was 
putting his “family first” rather than “Mali first.”546 
The rallying of most political actors and influential power brokers around the new president 
weakened the political basis for democratic accountability. Keita also tried to further increase 
the – already considerable – institutional power base vested in his office. He did so by 
influencing a constitutional reform process that intended to legally anchor the outcome or the 
Algiers peace agreement. In 2016, Malian authorities tasked a Constitutional Reform 
Commission to develop proposals that reflected the Algiers accord and “other shortcomings” 
in the constitution, without further specifying the latter.547 The prime minister initially 
established the commission but President Keita reversed this decision and took the process 
firmly into his own hands.548 In March 2017, the Malian government presented a constitutional 
reform bill to parliament introducing several changes to the original proposal drafted by the 
Commission. Importantly, they further enhanced the powers of the president by allowing him 
to remove the Prime Minister, to appoint one third of the newly created Senate as well as the 
head of the Constitutional Court.549 The authorities clearly used the reform process to further 
enhance the already omnipotent presidency instead of reshaping the distribution of powers in 
Mali’s democratic regime. Parliament initially rubberstamped the bill. Again, executive 
oversight had to come from outside the democratic channels. Keita’s move provoked mass 
protests in Bamako and other urban areas. Popular demonstrations continued to swell and the 
government eventually felt compelled to postpone the referendum on the constitution. An 
opinion poll indicated that 35 per cent of citizens opposed the reform, 11 per cent supported it 
while a majority stated not to be informed or to have an opinion.550  
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Perpetuated the perception that electoral politics do not necessarily function to place 
popularly legitimate actors in office, but rather reinforce behind-the-scenes negotiations 
for positions and influence amongst national and regional elites.539  
 
Many regional powerbrokers predominantly used their privileged access to government 
networks and resources to their own advantage.540 This revival of informal networks between 
the state and regional powerbrokers resembled the dynamics witnessed during the Touré era.  
This also held for the centripetal forces of parliamentary coalition building characterised by 
the rallying of most political forces around the Executive (cf. Chapters 3 and 4). The 
Rassemblement pour le Mali (RPM) secured 66 seats in parliament during the 2013 elections, 
a notable increase from the 11 seats it secured during the second mandate of President Touré. 
However, the party subsequently managed to establish a dominant parliamentary coalition in 
support of the president of as much as 115 seats.541 This comfortable two-thirds majority 
constituted a “light version” of president Touré’s one-coalition dominance (cf. Chapter 3). 
During parliamentary debates, members of the presidential majority coalition vigorously 
defended rather than scrutinised the executive.542 Locally, a similar pattern of realignment with 
the presidential party was witnessed as numerous powerbrokers rallied behind the RPM in the 
run-up to the municipal elections of 20 November 2016.543 RPM increased its local council 
seats from a mere 300 in 2009 to more than 2500 in 2016.  
 President Keita (IBK) maintained a firm grip over the government by frequently changing 
Prime Ministers. He appointed no less than five different Prime Ministers in the period after 
2013, each serving, on average, only a year.544 Although not formally mandated to dismiss the 
prime minister, “the frequency with which IBK has changed Prime-Ministers during his first 
term in office is strong evidence of the president’s informal powers.”545 He used the government 
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Although sketched in an exploratory manner, prevailing patterns of political participation, 
representation and accountability shaped through the democratic channels certainly did not 
enhance the position of the state vis-à-vis other power poles in the context of Mali’s 
heterarchical order. In fact, the functioning of Malian democracy in the years after the 2012 
crisis made people turn away from the state towards alternative power poles. As Mali’s 
exclusive and inaccessible democratic institutions persistently failed to channel citizens’ 
mobilisation, interest representation or popular frustrations with the state, non-state institutions 
are likely to gain ever more ground in society.    
 
6.4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In the context of a rapidly deteriorating security situation, state presence beyond urban pockets 
in northern and central Mali remained extremely limited. As the exercise of public authority 
became increasingly tied to the ability to use force, armed groups extended their influence over 
other power poles in the realm of decentralised administration in Mali’s heterarchical political 
context. A wide variety of armed groups, communal militias, loosely organised and highly 
localised security initiatives emerged and anchored across specific territorial strongholds. 
Amidst this highly diffused security landscape, leaders of non-state armed groups operated at 
the intersection of multiple networks from which they drew material and immaterial resources. 
They maintained ties across the formal/informal and local/national/global divide with 
traditional authorities, central state representatives, political leaders, other armed groups, 
transnational networks, international military actors and many others.  
Initiatives that aimed to strengthen and boost the inclusivity of state institutions yielded very 
few results in the aftermath of the 2012 crisis. Instead, informal ties between national elites and 
regional powerbrokers continued to bridge the wide divide between the political urban centre 
and periphery. Again, the leadership of armed groups played a prominent role in this regard. 
Not least because of their privileged position in the peace process and the prevalence of hybrid 
forms of security cooperation with the central state and international military missions.  
Hence, far from moving in the direction of a hierarchical and state-centred political order, 
Mali’s heterarchical order has become increasingly diversified in recent years with a more 
prominent role for armed groups amidst other power poles in both northern and central Mali. 
None of the state or non-state actors emerged as a dominant hegemonic force in the five years 
that followed the 2012 crisis. On the contrary, high levels of volatility and fluidity prevailed as 
armed groups fragmented, reconfigured and alliances recurrently shifted. 
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Hence, patterns of democratic accountability remained extremely weak and contributed to the 
gradual erosion of state legitimacy during Keita’s first term in office. Corruption and 
deteriorating governance flourished easily in this context. Although the president declared the 
year 2014 as “the year to fight corruption,” high-level scandals surfaced that allegedly involved 
people close to the president’s inner circle. This included the purchase of an expensive 
presidential plane, kept outside the regular state budget, and new equipment for the army at 
artificially inflated prices as well as the unlawful usage of no-bid clauses.551 The International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) subsequently suspended its support programmes to Mali. The overall 
quality of governance deteriorated considerably during IBK’s term in office. Between 2014 and 
2018, Mali’s score in the Mo Ibrahim corruption index decreased by 20 points (on a 0–100 
scale).552 In the Afrobarometer survey for 2014/2015, Malian citizens displayed their 
dissatisfaction with government efforts to tackle corruption.553 In the 2016/2018 round, 44.2 
per cent of 1,200 informants believed corruption had increased a lot and a further 27.2 per cent 
said that corruption had increased somewhat or stayed the same.554 
After a hopeful start in 2013, popular satisfaction with the way democracy functioned dropped 
again, close to the (low) pre-coup levels, during the course of IBK’s term in office.  
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This Malian case study joins an expanding body of literature in the academic fields of political 
science, sociology, history, regional studies and anthropology that challenges prevailing state-
centred and institutional approaches to both political authority and legitimacy.  
The first part of the thesis deconstructed Malian state authority. Classical views in the 
literature portrayed the state as the supreme institutional locus of political power and authority 
in society. The state was on top of society and so it should be. Such a hierarchical order was 
required to prevent anarchy. In Mali, however, a heterarchical political order gradually emerged 
in which the state was but one of the institutions amongst many non-state equals involved in 
the exercise of public authority. This heterogeneous order became further anchored in the period 
that followed the profound 2012 crisis, despite considerable international support geared 
towards rebuilding the Malian state and the restoration of a democratic regime. 
The core part of the thesis deconstructed Malian state legitimacy in two different ways. First, 
in responding to the overarching research question, this thesis revealed the limited contribution 
of key democratic institutions in underpinning state legitimacy. In fact, their performance seems 
to have weakened the position of the state vis-à-vis non-state power poles in Mali’s 
heterarchical context. Secondly, the thesis showed that non-actors mobilised alternative sources 
of legitimacy beyond democracy that remained highly influential in society. 
This chapter briefly summarises the main conclusions of the individual chapters in these two 
core areas of the thesis. On that basis, it ends with a short reflection on the need to move beyond 
state-centred institutional blueprints when analysing processes of public authority and public 












Finally, one of the most striking features of the post-crisis period constituted the limited 
influence that Malian citizens could exert over the way out. They were marginalised in the 
peace process, could make little contribution to national reconciliation and increasingly relied 
on armed actors, who they had not chosen but who offered some form of protection. By 2018, 
the country formerly known as a flagship of democracy seemingly moved towards a 
militiacracy. More in-depth empirical research is definitely required to assess popular 
perceptions about the different actors instituting their authority, in particular the armed groups, 
and their (in)ability to contribute to public service provision in the context of Mali’s 
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literature portrayed the state as the supreme institutional locus of political power and authority 
in society. The state was on top of society and so it should be. Such a hierarchical order was 
required to prevent anarchy. In Mali, however, a heterarchical political order gradually emerged 
in which the state was but one of the institutions amongst many non-state equals involved in 
the exercise of public authority. This heterogeneous order became further anchored in the period 
that followed the profound 2012 crisis, despite considerable international support geared 
towards rebuilding the Malian state and the restoration of a democratic regime. 
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in responding to the overarching research question, this thesis revealed the limited contribution 
of key democratic institutions in underpinning state legitimacy. In fact, their performance seems 
to have weakened the position of the state vis-à-vis non-state power poles in Mali’s 
heterarchical context. Secondly, the thesis showed that non-actors mobilised alternative sources 
of legitimacy beyond democracy that remained highly influential in society. 
This chapter briefly summarises the main conclusions of the individual chapters in these two 
core areas of the thesis. On that basis, it ends with a short reflection on the need to move beyond 
state-centred institutional blueprints when analysing processes of public authority and public 












Finally, one of the most striking features of the post-crisis period constituted the limited 
influence that Malian citizens could exert over the way out. They were marginalised in the 
peace process, could make little contribution to national reconciliation and increasingly relied 
on armed actors, who they had not chosen but who offered some form of protection. By 2018, 
the country formerly known as a flagship of democracy seemingly moved towards a 
militiacracy. More in-depth empirical research is definitely required to assess popular 
perceptions about the different actors instituting their authority, in particular the armed groups, 
and their (in)ability to contribute to public service provision in the context of Mali’s 




state and non-state actors persisted over time, evolved into a de facto institutionalised practice 
and was guided by a longer-term strategic objective to counter recurrent security threats.  
To a certain extent, such an analysis holds true for explaining patterns of interaction between 
the central state and loyal non-state groups in northern Mali. Yet, there was little evidence of 
the systematic and large-scale cooperation encountered in several other countries in terms of 
training and the provision of logistical and material support. Furthermore, this way of 
conceptualising hybrid security provision was unsuitable for depicting the situation in central 
Mali where the state had even less influence over the myriad of local militias and self-defence 
groups active on the ground.  
 More fundamentally, the notion of a “militia-tary strategy” placed too strong an emphasis 
on the role and influence of the state. It still presented the state as a central, overarching and 
hierarchically superior institution that deliberately shaped and largely determined its 
relationship and partnership with non-state groups. Such a conceptualisation failed to grasp and 
adequately represent the power balance between state and non-state actors involved in public 
security provision in a heterarchical context. First, the material resource basis of centralised 
statehood in a place like Mali remained extremely restricted. It proved inherently challenging 
for any central institution to singlehandedly exercise its authority, let alone provide protection 
across all corners of such vast geographical area characterised by such profound security 
challenges. Secondly, influential factors beyond the state clearly shaped hybrid security patterns 
and how these evolved over time. Multiple networks became available that enabled non-state 
armed groups to increase their authority, as already noted in the above. International military 
actors equally strongly influenced the power balance in Mali’s heterarchical setting. Hence, the 
exercise of public authority in general and security provision in particular could not be reduced 
or understood in terms of a strategy by the state alone in the context of a heterarchial political 
setting. In such a setting, a single actor did not exclusively shape hybrid patterns of security 
provision. These patterns relied on the motives and capabilities of multiple actors and proved 
much more diffuse than the concept of a strategy suggests.  
The second part of this thesis then examined the expected contribution by a number of key 








FROM STATE AUTHORITY TO PUBLIC AUTHORITY  
 
The first part of the thesis examined the gradual emergence of a heterarchical political order in 
Mali. This historical assessment warned against the static approach of “hybrid” political orders 
and revealed substantial patterns of change over time. The series of dramatic events in 2012 
marked a change in the power balance between state and non-state actors involved in public 
authority rather than a sudden collapse of robust Malian state authority.  
At independence, the state still constituted the hierarchically supreme institution that 
dominated all other power poles in society. Although lacking much capacity itself, the socialist 
regime left very little room for non-state actors in the socio-economic, political or religious 
realm and curtailed the position of the chieftaincy at the local level. Yet, after its demise in 
1968, hybrid forms of authority soon emerged and anchored in society. The state first shared 
the exercise of public authority with non-state actors in the area of social service delivery and 
eventually relied on non-state power poles to assist in countering security threats. After the turn 
of the century, the power balance in this hybrid set-up progressively shifted in favour of non-
state actors. The state was completely ousted from northern Mali in 2012 and has struggled to 
regain a foothold ever since. In fact, a heterarchical order in which the state was but one 
institution amongst many non-state equals had firmly anchored across both northern and central 
Mali by 2018.  
This part of the thesis focused, in particular, on historical patterns of public service delivery 
in the security realm. The monopoly of the legitimate use of violence constituted a critical 
cornerstone of classical Westphalian notions of state authority. Up until the early 1990s, Malian 
Defence and Security forces indeed performed a leading role in this area. However, the state 
increasingly relied on informal channels of cooperation with loyal non-state armed groups to 
counter security threats in northern Mali ever since. While the material basis and physical 
presence of the state remained limited, armed groups expanded their authority based on the 
resources that became available through transnational networks. Armed groups significantly 
boosted their income and armoury through channels other than those provided by the state. 
They enlarged their sphere of influence and filled the void of the state, particularly across the 
rural areas. The Malian case study thereby illustrated the substantial impact of transnational 
networks in shaping the exercising of public authority in the public service.    
I initially referred to the patterns of hybrid security provision in terms of a “militia-tary” 
strategy deployed by the Malian state. I considered the label justified as the interaction between 
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In practice, political mobilisation and representation centred on exclusive networks between 
national political elites, local power brokers and a small minority of citizens. Patrimonial 
sources of legitimacy and a logic of personal proximity guided these ties. People supported 
political actors from their own vicinity and expected a redistribution of national resources to 
their home area. Patrons prevailed over policies and personal ties trumped institutionalised 
partisan politics. These exclusive patterns of representation connected a few privileged to the 
state but alienated most citizens from the political centre. Popular dissatisfaction with the 
functioning of democracy increased together with widespread frustration with the country’s 
political elites and the expanding levels of corruption.  
 However, the official democratic channels did not offer many opportunities to hold an 
increasingly discredited executive branch of government accountable. The thesis illustrated the 
continued concentration of power in the Malian presidency and considerable institutional 
imbalance between the different branches of government in the decades that followed the 
democratic transition. The prevalence of a single party or coalition dominating the political 
system and capturing state structures in the absence of a viable political opposition equally 
constituted a clear political pattern of continuity over time.          
 In practice, one of the most pivotal institutions in terms of shaping accountability, the Malian 
legislature, functioned more as an extension of the executive branch of government geared 
towards the redistribution of national resources to the geographically centred support base of 
its members. The national interest and the delivery of public goods played a marginal role as a 
by-product of prevailing personal or particularistic interests.  
 In the absence of accessible democratic channels, citizens relied on non-state actors beyond 
– and often in opposition to – the state. Therefore, while intended to enhance state legitimacy, 
the performance of the democratic institutions assessed in this thesis actually weakened the 
state and boosted non-state power poles in that way. Although not assessed in detail, the thesis 
showed that other sources than democratic legitimacy remained influential or gained more 
prominence in recent decades. Democracy certainly did not emerge as the only game in Mali’s 
heterarchical town. Most citizens, certainly across rural areas, continued to rely on non-state 
power poles who legitimised their authority in reference to religious or indigenous sources of 
legitimacy. The ability to protect people became another critical basis of legitimacy as the 





FROM STATE LEGITIMACY TO PUBLIC LEGITIMACY 
 
Since the early 1990s, Mali has constituted a leading example of democracy on the African 
continent. Successive leaders respected political and civic rights, the level of press freedom was 
substantial and associational life truly blossomed. The country embarked on one of the most 
ambitious decentralisation reforms across the African continent. Power was handed over 
peacefully from one president to another in the 2002 polls. Mali was even on the verge of 
becoming a fully consolidated democracy according to Huntington’s (1991) “two-turn over 
test” in the 2012 elections when a military coup abruptly ended President Touré’s term in 
office.555  
 In this context, democratisation was expected to boost the popular legitimacy of the Malian 
state and to help it expand its position in society over other power poles. The core part of this 
thesis examined the performance of a selected number of democratic institutions in 
underpinning this so-called input side of state legitimacy. It assessed the contribution of: (1) 
Malian political parties and the party system; (2) the legislature; and (3) municipal democratic 
institutions in shaping political participation, representation and accountability. Each individual 
chapter combined a political-institutional approach with a wider socio-cultural analytical 
perspective. The analysis reveals that the democratic institutions examined in this thesis have 
not enhanced state legitimacy in line with their official mandate and as expected from theory. 
Quite to the contrary, the democratic structure seems to have weakened the position of the state 
vis-à-vis other power poles in Mali’s heterarchical context.  
 Malian democratic institutions remained poorly rooted into Malian society. The institutions 
did not succeed in performing one the most fundamental functions of a democratic regime, that 
of ensuring popular participation into the political process and connecting people to the choices 
made by state representatives. Only a small minority of citizens participated in successive 
elections or maintained contact with (elected) political representatives. Very basic but 
influential factors such as language, education and religion consolidated the wide divide 
between the democratic system and the Malian demos. The vast majority of citizens did not 
speak or write the official language of government. Religion played a central role in people’s 
private life and the public sphere but was formally kept outside the political system in 
accordance with the French notion of laicité. Initially, influential traditional institutions were 
largely ignored in the decentralisation reforms.  
	
555 Huntington took a minimalist and procedural take on democratic consolidation, which he considered to be 
achived if two peaceful transfers of power in successive elections occurred. CF. Huntington, S. P. (1992). 
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555 Huntington took a minimalist and procedural take on democratic consolidation, which he considered to be 
achived if two peaceful transfers of power in successive elections occurred. CF. Huntington, S. P. (1992). 
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It offers a useful framework for studying diffused patterns of state formation and legitimisation. 
The model also enables researchers to better understand how local, national and transnational 
actors forge and remake the state through a process of negotiation and contestation.  
 Their framework is based on a heterogeneous group of actors that mobilise different sets of 
resources and repertoires to institute their authority. Resources thereby refer to the material 
basis that actors mobilise to institute their authority, while repertoires constitute the (symbolic) 
sources that they refer to in order to express and legitimise their authority. This provides a 
useful analytical perspective for continued research of multi-dimensional practices of public 
authority and legitimacy in Mali’s heterarchical context.  
 Certainly, in light of the deteriorating situation in the country and wider region, such 





The Malian case study thereby revealed the limitations of an institutional and state-centred 
perspective on legitimacy. Instead, an analytical approach that moves away from state 
legitimacy and focuses on public legitimacy captures the complex interplay between different 
actors and sources of legitimacy in the context of a heterarchical political order. 
 
BEYOND STATE-CENTRED INSTITUTIONAL BLUEPRINTS 
 
This thesis contributed to a wider body of literature that underlined the need to change the 
analytical perspective on processes of statehood and democratisation in Africa. Prevailing state-
centred institutional approaches first portrayed Mali as a showcase of democracy as it ticked 
most of the institutional democratic boxes. After the 2012 crisis, Mali’s status on the 
international scene changed as a “fragile” or “weak” state in comparison to the ideal type of a 
Westphalian state. The country was now assumed to be “in transition” towards becoming a 
modern state and democracy. Such normative perspective echoed historically contested 
modernisation theories, which assumed that countries and polities progressed along a single 
magic road towards modernity.  
However, this thesis underlined the diversity of statehood trajectories and showed that the 
functioning of democratic institutions significantly differed from place to place and time to 
time. State formation (and deformation) as well as democratisation are clearly open-ended 
processes. In Mali, the exercise of public authority in the public service (decentralised 
administration, security provision, and legislation) was certainly not confined to state 
institutions. Instead, it involved both state and non-state actors in complex and multi-
dimensional interrelationships. In Mali’s heterarchical context, political authority and 
legitimacy was captured through the analytical lens of “Patronage Plus.” Citizens relied on 
multiple patrons – both state and non-state actors – who legitimised their authority in a 
multidimensional way. Political legitimacy was established through the interplay between both 
material and immaterial resources.  
 This thesis thus revealed that understanding these dynamics requires an approach that centres 
on the interaction between state and non-state actors as well as the interplay between multiple 
sources of legitimacy. Hagmann and Péclard (2010) developed a heuristic framework that 
enables such an analytical perspective beyond institutional blueprints.556  
	
556 Hagmann, T. and Péclard, D. (2010), pp. 539-562. 
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Table 2: Parliamentary party representativeness 
 
Party Name National Assembly (2007) Sample 
Adema-P.A.S.J. 51 3 
URD 34 3 
RPM 11 1 
MPR 8 1 
CNID 7 2 
SADI  4 1 
PARENA  4 1 
UDD  3 1 
US-RDA 1 1 
Independents 15 1 
PSP 1 0 
PCR 1 0 
BARICA 1 0 
MIRIA 1 0 
 
While the level of representation does not neatly reflect the number of MPs allocated to 
each region or the parliamentary strength of each party, all regions and principal parties are 
included. Various opposition parties were well-represented in the survey in order to 
examine potential differences with MPs from the ruling majority. Much effort was 
undertaken to have representatives of the most Northern regions included.  
 
 
Chapter 4 – Questionnaire (based on ODI original)558 
 
A. Contexte politique  
 




















558 Les questions avec * soit ne font pas partie du questionnaire ODI d’origine, soit elles ont été modifiées pour 





Chapter 4 - Methodological clarifications  
The principal data used for Chapter 4 were gathered through semi-structured and in-depth 
interviews with 15 Malian parliamentarians. Such an “actor-oriented” approach was chosen to 
complement prevailing institutional and political analyses of African legislatures.557 In 
recognition of the limited size of the sample, representing 10 per cent of all MPs, a selection of 
parliamentarians was made that ensured maximum regional representation and included all 
main parliamentary parties. The semi-structured interviews were largely based on a 
questionnaire, included below, developed by the African Power and Politics research 
programme of the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) to increase the comparative value of 
the case study. I added a number of research topics, notably the section addressing the adoption 
and electoral process in the run-up to the 2007 elections. Most interviews lasted approximately 
two hours and follow-up interviews were conducted with almost half of all parliamentarians to 
further discuss some of their initial responses. The tables below provide an overview of the 
level of representation of the sample. While these interviews provided an important source of 
information, additional research methods focused more on actual parliamentary behaviour and 
complemented these data. The legislative and oversight performance of current MPs was 
compared with that of their predecessors on the basis of archival research. Observation of 
parliamentary debates and constituency visits further contributed to understanding the actual 
responses provided by parliamentarians to the incentives they faced. 
 
Table 1: Regional representativeness sample 
Region National Assembly (2007) Sample 
Segou 25 1 
Sikasso 25 4 
Koulikouro 23 1 
Kayes 21 2 
Mopti 20 2 
Bamako  14 2 
Gao 8 1 
Timbuktu 7 1 





557 Norman Long (2001), Development Sociology: Actor Perspectives . New York: Routlegde. 
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11. Quelles sont, selon vous, les trois plus importantes raisons pour lesquelles votre parti vous a retenu comme 
candidat?  
o J'ai été, pendant longtemps, un membre actif du parti au niveau local / régional  
o J'ai été, pendant longtemps, un membre actif du parti au niveau national  
o J’ai un bon caractère  
o J'ai aidé de nombreuses personnes et familles dans la circonscription  
o Je viens d’une des familles les plus autochtones et nobles de la zone  
o J'ai amélioré / je vais améliorer la circonscription  
o J’ai bien travaillé / je vais bien travailler dans l'élaboration des lois et pour faire des déclarations au 
Parlement  
o Je suis / serai vigilant dans le contrôle des actions du gouvernement par rapport aux abus de pouvoir  
o Je suis riche 
o J’ai de bonnes relations avec d’autres partis au niveau local  
  
12. Si vous avez été élus sur la base d'une liste de coalition avec d'autres partis, qui a conduit le processus de 
négociation avec ces autres partis? 
o moi-même en tant que candidat  
o Notre branche exécutive locale  
o Un représentant du Comité exécutif national  
o Un ministre originaire de la région  




13. Si vous avez été élu sur la base d'une coalition, en quoi est-il important pour vous d'entretenir de bonnes 
relations avec les autres partis au niveau local, après votre élection? 
o Très important  
o Assez important  
o Pas important 
  
14. Si vous avez été élu sur la base d'une coalition, êtes-vous tombés d'accord sur une répartition des tâches avec 
les autres députés élus de votre circonscription quand il s'agit de maintenir les relations avec la circonscription?  
 
o Non, nous n'avons discuté d’aucune forme de répartition des tâches  










4*. Quelle était la principale raison pour laquelle vous avez rejoint le parti dont vous avez été le candidat lors des 






5. En plus de mon salaire de député, j'ai une autre source de revenu substantiel : 
o Oui  
o Non 
 
6. En tant que député, je suis membre du conseil d’administration d'une entreprise d'Etat / département / agence 
o Oui  
o Non 
 
Sélection des candidats 559* 
 
7. Lorsque que vous avez décidé de devenir candidat de votre parti aux élections législatives de 2007, quels ont 
été les deux principaux groupes cibles dans lesquels vous avez investi en vue d'influencer positivement votre 
sélection en tant que candidat? 
o La section locale de mon parti  
o Les branches locales d’autres partis  
o Le Comité exécutif national  
o Les citoyens locaux  
o Les leaders locaux traditionnels / religieux  





8. Beaucoup de partis au Mali demandent souvent aux candidats de payer une redevance au parti pour pouvoir 
être inscrit sur la liste des candidats. Laquelle des affirmations suivantes est correcte dans votre cas : 
o On m’a demandé une contribution, et je l’ai payée (la somme de ... ... ... ....... .... ... .. FCFA) 
o On m’a demandé une contribution, mais j’ai refusé de payer quoi que ce soit (la somme de ... ... ... ... .... .... 
... .. FCFA) 
o On m’a demandé une contribution, mais j'ai juste payé une quote-part (j’ai payé .... ... FCFA des ... ... .. 
FCFA demandés)  
o On ne m’a pas demandé de payer une contribution 
 
9. Si vous avez payé une contribution au parti, à qui avez-vous versé cette somme? 
 
o au Parti national  
o à la branche locale du parti  
o En partie au parti national, en partie à la branche locale  









559 Cette partie a été ajoutée au questionnaire ODI d’origine. Non seulement elle donnera des informations 
supplémentaires sur les relations entre un député et son parti en ce qui concerne l’obligation de rendre compte, 
mais aussi elle contribuera à une étude plus élaborée sur la démocratie interne du parti.  
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20. En 2007, mon fonds de campagne provenait de (plusieurs options possibles) 
o Mon salaire de député  
o Autres traitements 
o Des dons de la famille élargie  
o Autres dons individuels  
o Des Maliens vivant à l'étranger  
o Du sponsoring du parti national  
o Du sponsoring du parti local  




En 2002, mon fonds de campagne provenait de (plusieurs options possibles) 
o Mon salaire de député  
o Autres traitements  
o Des dons de la famille élargie  
o Autres dons individuels  
o Des Maliens vivant à l'étranger  
o Du sponsoring du parti national  
o Du sponsoring du parti local  
o Des entreprises 
o Autres,….. …………………………………………………………………………………. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
21. Ma source de financement la plus importante, la plus grande, a été en : 
2007: source:………………………………. montant de ………………………………………..  
2002: source………………………………... montant de ………………………………………. 
  
22. La catégorie de dépenses la plus coûteuse pour ma campagne électorale de 2007 a été : 
o les meetings  
o les affiches, tee-shirts, et autres matériels  
o le transport pour la campagne  
o les aides et cadeaux aux personnes  
o les payements aux militants locaux du parti  
o Autre, à savoir ……………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………... 
  
23. La catégorie de dépenses la plus coûteuse pour ma campagne électorale de 2007 a été : 
o les meetings  
o les affiches, tee-shirts, et autres matériels  
o le transport pour la campagne  
o les aides et cadeaux aux personnes  
o les payements aux militants locaux du parti  
o Autre, à savoir……………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
o Je n’étais pas candidat en 2002 
 
24. Sur quels sujets portait votre campagne à l'élection de 2007? Prière indiquer les trois sujets les plus 
importants. 
o Soutenir les citoyens ordinaires par exemple avec des dons, des prêts, le payement des frais de scolarité  
o Être fidèle aux personnes qui ont soutenu ma campagne pour me faire élire  
o Faire des dons à des groupes vulnérables dans la circonscription, des orphelins, des personnes âgées, 
handicapées  
o Réaliser des projets de développement dans la circonscription  
o Être fidèle aux positions de la direction de mon parti politique  
o Représenter la circonscription au parlement, faire des déclarations et être vu dans les médias  
o Contribuer à l’adoption de bonnes lois pour le pays  




La campagne électorale et les élections 
 
15.* Laquelle des déclarations suivantes correspond à votre situation au cours des élections de 2007 : 
o Je me suis porté candidat pour la première fois lors des élections législatives de 2007 
o J'avais été candidat avant, mais n'avais jamais gagné  
o J’avais été auparavant député de ma circonscription 
  
16. Quelles sont, selon vous, les trois principales raisons pour lesquelles les électeurs ont voté pour vous? 
o Je suis un bon candidat  
o Je suis candidat du parti pour lequel ils votent habituellement  
o J'ai aidé beaucoup de personnes et de familles dans la circonscription  
o Ils appartiennent à ma tribu ou à mon groupe ethnique  
o Ils écoutent les familles ou amis qui votent pour moi  
o J'ai amélioré / je vais améliorer la circonscription 
o Je suis / serai vigilant dans le contrôle des actions du gouvernement par rapport aux abus de pouvoir 
o J’ai bien travaillé / je vais bien travailler dans l'élaboration des lois et pour faire des déclarations au 
Parlement 
o Je suis du même parti que le candidat présidentiel qu’ils soutiennent 
  
17. Envisagez 20 électeurs indécis typiques de votre circonscription qui pourraient être persuadés de changer 
leur vote avant une élection. Combien d’entre eux, selon vous, seraient enclins à changer leur vote : 
 
 
si on leur donne  «une petite somme d’argent", 
disons 1000 F CFA, ou un petit cadeau  
 
Personne 1-2 5  10  15 Toutes 
si un membre de la famille se voit attribuer un 
emploi 
      
si le candidat est originaire de la tribu       
si le candidat fait venir un projet de développement 
dans la circonscription 
      
si le candidat fait parvenir les besoins de la 
circonscription à l’attention des médias et du 
parlement 
      
si le candidat fait preuve de vigilance dans le 
contrôle du gouvernement par rapport au budget 
national et aux abus de pouvoir 
      
si le candidat appartient au mouvement du candidat 
présidentiel qu'ils aiment le mieux 
      
 
18. Pour les campagnes électorales auxquelles j'ai participé, j'ai dépensé, pour ma campagne, y compris le 
matériel électoral, les meetings, le transport, le personnel et les cadeaux aux circonscriptions etc., environ la 






19. Au cours des campagnes électorales auxquelles vous avez participé, combien de votre fonds de campagne 
avez-vous dépensé pour les cadeaux personnels, les factures, les funérailles ou autres biens personnels pour 
les circonscriptions? Faites S.V.P une estimation : 
 
2002: ……………………….FCFA 
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avez-vous dépensé pour les cadeaux personnels, les factures, les funérailles ou autres biens personnels pour 
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31. Quelles sont selon vous les trois choses les plus importantes que les citoyens de votre circonscription 
aimeraient que vous fassiez en tant que député?  
o Soutenir les citoyens ordinaires par exemple avec des dons, des prêts, le payement des frais de scolarité  
o Être fidèle aux personnes qui ont soutenu ma campagne  
o Faire des dons à des groupes vulnérables dans la circonscription, des orphelins, des personnes âgées, 
handicapées  
o Réaliser des projets de développement dans la circonscription  
o Être fidèle aux positions de la direction de mon parti politique  
o Représenter la circonscription au parlement, faire des déclarations et être vu dans les médias  
o Contribuer à l’adoption de bonnes lois pour le pays  
o Contrôler le gouvernement pour éviter des abus de pouvoirs 
  
32. La plupart des députés reçoivent en général des visites de personnes venant les voir à la maison / au bureau, 
dans la circonscription quand ils y sont. En moyenne, combien de personnes viennent vous voir par jour pour 
demander de l’assistance? Ou, quand vous faites le tour de vos circonscriptions, combien de personnes vous 
approchent-elles pour les mêmes raisons? 
 
Moyenne journalière: ……………………. personnes 
 
33. Si 20 personnes parmi les cadres / militants du parti local de votre circonscription venaient vous demander 
un service quelconque : combien de personnes sur 20 vous demanderaient de faire quelque chose à propos de : 
[Cochez la réponse dans chaque ligne] 
 
Une aide financière personnelle, payement de frais, 
de factures, un prêt ou un emploi 
Aucun 1-2 5  10  15 Tous 
Des préoccupations de la communauté/ du groupe 
ethnique, ou des questions avec les autorités locales 
      
Des événements concernant la communauté, les 
funérailles, les mariages ou d’autres choses du même 
genre 
      
Aider les groupes vulnérables (orphelins, personnes 
âgées, handicapés) 
      
Des projets de développement communautaire       
Parler des besoins de la circonscription dans les 
médias ou au parlement 
      
Points de vue, politiques et leadership de votre parti 
 
      
Pour couvrir les frais liés au fonctionnement du parti 
local 
 
      
une loi ou politique particulière au parlement 
 
      










25. Certaines personnes disent qu’au cours de la campagne électorale, les députés aident beaucoup les citoyens et 
leur donnent beaucoup de choses - de petits cadeaux, des payements de factures, des bines personnels. Pensez-
vous que des citoyens ont reçu les “choses” ci-dessus des députés lors de la campagne électorale de 2007? 
o Oui, beaucoup 
o Oui, un peu 
o Oui, quelque peu 
o Non, très rarement 
o Non, pas du tout 
 
26. Si vous comparez la campagne électorale de 2007 à celle de 2002, pensez-vous que la campagne de 2007 a 
enregistré plus de ces petits cadeaux et assistance que celle de 2002? 
o Oui, beaucoup 
o Oui, quelque peu 
o Presque la même  
o Non, moins  
o Non, beaucoup moins 
 
27. Si vous avez participé aux campagnes électorales de 2007 et de 2002, pensez-vous que vous ou votre équipe 
de campagne a distribué plus de ces petits cadeaux et assistance en 2007 qu'en 2002? 
o Je n'ai pas participé à la campagne de 2002  
o Oui, beaucoup 
o Oui, un peu  
o Presque la même  
o Non, moins 
o Non, beaucoup moins 
28. Au cours de votre campagne de 2007, lequel des groupes suivants avez-vous essayé de cibler avec vos 
cadeaux et assistance? Prière classer les trois plus importants pour vous. 
o Les personnes susceptibles de voter pour un autre candidat (électeurs indécis) 
o Les cadres et militants locaux du parti  
o Les leaders communautaires (chefs, imams, …) 
o Certains groupes ethniques  
o Des groupes islamiques particuliers  
o Les femmes et les jeunes  
o Les pauvres et analphabètes  
o Les groupes professionnels (agriculteurs, femmes du marché, enseignants,..) 
o Aucun groupe particulier, mais seulement ceux qui réclamaient  
o Autre, à savoir ….. 
 
29. Que pensez-vous des candidats qui donnent des cadeaux, de l'argent, paient des frais, obtiennent des emplois 
et participent à d'autres besoins personnels de leurs électeurs? 
o Bien (le devoir de chef de prendre soin des gens, aider les autres, montrer qu’on est une bonne personne) 
o Assez bien (à bien des égards, c’est bien, mais cela comporte de mauvais aspects) 
o Rien (c’est normal pendant les élections) 
o Assez mal (à bien des égards, c’est mauvais mais il y a quelques aspects positifs) 
o Assez mal (c’est un achat de votes / de la corruption, c'est mauvais pour le développement) 
  
 
Obligation de rendre compte 
 
30. À votre avis, quel est le principal moyen, s’il en existe, par lequel vos circonscriptions vous obligent à rendre 
compte entre les élections?  
o Pas vraiment, les élections sont la meilleure façon 
o A travers les leaders traditionnels / chefs religieux  
o A travers les conseillers municipaux  
o Lors des réunions / forums publiques  
o En me parlant personnellement  
o A travers les cadres locaux du parti  
o A travers les lettres / les pétitions  




31. Quelles sont selon vous les trois choses les plus importantes que les citoyens de votre circonscription 
aimeraient que vous fassiez en tant que député?  
o Soutenir les citoyens ordinaires par exemple avec des dons, des prêts, le payement des frais de scolarité  
o Être fidèle aux personnes qui ont soutenu ma campagne  
o Faire des dons à des groupes vulnérables dans la circonscription, des orphelins, des personnes âgées, 
handicapées  
o Réaliser des projets de développement dans la circonscription  
o Être fidèle aux positions de la direction de mon parti politique  
o Représenter la circonscription au parlement, faire des déclarations et être vu dans les médias  
o Contribuer à l’adoption de bonnes lois pour le pays  
o Contrôler le gouvernement pour éviter des abus de pouvoirs 
  
32. La plupart des députés reçoivent en général des visites de personnes venant les voir à la maison / au bureau, 
dans la circonscription quand ils y sont. En moyenne, combien de personnes viennent vous voir par jour pour 
demander de l’assistance? Ou, quand vous faites le tour de vos circonscriptions, combien de personnes vous 
approchent-elles pour les mêmes raisons? 
 
Moyenne journalière: ……………………. personnes 
 
33. Si 20 personnes parmi les cadres / militants du parti local de votre circonscription venaient vous demander 
un service quelconque : combien de personnes sur 20 vous demanderaient de faire quelque chose à propos de : 
[Cochez la réponse dans chaque ligne] 
 
Une aide financière personnelle, payement de frais, 
de factures, un prêt ou un emploi 
Aucun 1-2 5  10  15 Tous 
Des préoccupations de la communauté/ du groupe 
ethnique, ou des questions avec les autorités locales 
      
Des événements concernant la communauté, les 
funérailles, les mariages ou d’autres choses du même 
genre 
      
Aider les groupes vulnérables (orphelins, personnes 
âgées, handicapés) 
      
Des projets de développement communautaire       
Parler des besoins de la circonscription dans les 
médias ou au parlement 
      
Points de vue, politiques et leadership de votre parti 
 
      
Pour couvrir les frais liés au fonctionnement du parti 
local 
 
      
une loi ou politique particulière au parlement 
 
      










25. Certaines personnes disent qu’au cours de la campagne électorale, les députés aident beaucoup les citoyens et 
leur donnent beaucoup de choses - de petits cadeaux, des payements de factures, des bines personnels. Pensez-
vous que des citoyens ont reçu les “choses” ci-dessus des députés lors de la campagne électorale de 2007? 
o Oui, beaucoup 
o Oui, un peu 
o Oui, quelque peu 
o Non, très rarement 
o Non, pas du tout 
 
26. Si vous comparez la campagne électorale de 2007 à celle de 2002, pensez-vous que la campagne de 2007 a 
enregistré plus de ces petits cadeaux et assistance que celle de 2002? 
o Oui, beaucoup 
o Oui, quelque peu 
o Presque la même  
o Non, moins  
o Non, beaucoup moins 
 
27. Si vous avez participé aux campagnes électorales de 2007 et de 2002, pensez-vous que vous ou votre équipe 
de campagne a distribué plus de ces petits cadeaux et assistance en 2007 qu'en 2002? 
o Je n'ai pas participé à la campagne de 2002  
o Oui, beaucoup 
o Oui, un peu  
o Presque la même  
o Non, moins 
o Non, beaucoup moins 
28. Au cours de votre campagne de 2007, lequel des groupes suivants avez-vous essayé de cibler avec vos 
cadeaux et assistance? Prière classer les trois plus importants pour vous. 
o Les personnes susceptibles de voter pour un autre candidat (électeurs indécis) 
o Les cadres et militants locaux du parti  
o Les leaders communautaires (chefs, imams, …) 
o Certains groupes ethniques  
o Des groupes islamiques particuliers  
o Les femmes et les jeunes  
o Les pauvres et analphabètes  
o Les groupes professionnels (agriculteurs, femmes du marché, enseignants,..) 
o Aucun groupe particulier, mais seulement ceux qui réclamaient  
o Autre, à savoir ….. 
 
29. Que pensez-vous des candidats qui donnent des cadeaux, de l'argent, paient des frais, obtiennent des emplois 
et participent à d'autres besoins personnels de leurs électeurs? 
o Bien (le devoir de chef de prendre soin des gens, aider les autres, montrer qu’on est une bonne personne) 
o Assez bien (à bien des égards, c’est bien, mais cela comporte de mauvais aspects) 
o Rien (c’est normal pendant les élections) 
o Assez mal (à bien des égards, c’est mauvais mais il y a quelques aspects positifs) 
o Assez mal (c’est un achat de votes / de la corruption, c'est mauvais pour le développement) 
  
 
Obligation de rendre compte 
 
30. À votre avis, quel est le principal moyen, s’il en existe, par lequel vos circonscriptions vous obligent à rendre 
compte entre les élections?  
o Pas vraiment, les élections sont la meilleure façon 
o A travers les leaders traditionnels / chefs religieux  
o A travers les conseillers municipaux  
o Lors des réunions / forums publiques  
o En me parlant personnellement  
o A travers les cadres locaux du parti  
o A travers les lettres / les pétitions  
o A travers la radio / autres médias 
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36. Les députés reçoivent souvent des visites de beaucoup de personnes venant solliciter une assistance 
personnelle. Regardez les groupes énumérés ci-dessous. Si 20 personnes de (chaque groupe) viennent vous voir, 
combien d'entre elles pourriez-vous aider?  
 
Les cadres / militants du parti local 
 
Personne 1-2 5  10  15 Toutes 
Les leaders / chefs communautaires locaux 
 
      
Personnes appartenant à votre propre groupe 
ethnique 
 
      
Votre famille élargie et amis proches 
 
      
Des citoyens ordinaires 
 
      
Les élus locaux 
 
      
 
37.* Depuis que vous avez été élu député, avez-vous été approché par un groupe spécifique de lobbying?  
 
o Non, je n'ai jamais été approché par un tel groupe de pression 
 
o Oui, par des personnes faisant du lobbying pour le compte de 
- Une entreprise 
- Un syndicat 
- Une ONG 




38.* Si vous avez reçu des groupes de pression, dans quelle mesure avez-vous pris en compte les questions pour 
lesquelles ils vous ont contacté en tant que député? 
 
o La plupart du temps, j'ai défendu les intérêts pour lesquels ils se battent  
o Parfois, j'ai défendu les intérêts pour lesquels ils se battent  




34. Si 20 chefs / leaders traditionnels de votre circonscription venaient vous demander un service quelconque : 
combien de personnes sur 20 vous demanderaient de faire quelque chose sur : 
 
 
Un peu d’aide financière personnelle, payement de 
frais, de factures, un prêt ou un emploi  
Aucun 1-2 5  10  15 Tous 
Des préoccupations de la communauté/ du groupe 
ethnique, ou des questions avec les autorités locales 
      
Des événements concernant la communauté, les 
funérailles, les mariages ou d’autres choses du même 
genre 
      
Aider les groupes vulnérables (orphelins, personnes 
âgées, handicapés) 
      
Des projets de développement communautaire       
Parler des besoins de la circonscription dans les 
médias ou au parlement 
      
Points de vue, politiques et leadership de votre parti 
 
      
une loi ou politique particulière au parlement 
 
      
Le contrôle du gouvernement / abus de pouvoir       
 
35. Si 20 chefs / leaders traditionnels de votre circonscription venaient vous demander un service quelconque : 
combien de personnes sur 20 vous demanderaient de faire quelque chose sur : 
 
 
Un peu d’aide financière personnelle, payement de frais, de 
factures, un prêt ou un emploi  
Aucun 1-2 5  10  15 Tous 
Des préoccupations de la communauté/ du groupe ethnique, 
ou des questions avec les autorités locales 
      
Des événements concernant la communauté, les funérailles, 
les mariages ou d’autres choses du même genre 
      
Aider les groupes vulnérables (orphelins, personnes âgées, 
handicapés) 
      
Des projets de développement communautaire       
Parler des besoins de la circonscription dans les médias ou 
au parlement 
      
Points de vue, politiques et leadership de votre parti 
 
      
Le contrôle du gouvernement / abus de pouvoir       




36. Les députés reçoivent souvent des visites de beaucoup de personnes venant solliciter une assistance 
personnelle. Regardez les groupes énumérés ci-dessous. Si 20 personnes de (chaque groupe) viennent vous voir, 
combien d'entre elles pourriez-vous aider?  
 
Les cadres / militants du parti local 
 
Personne 1-2 5  10  15 Toutes 
Les leaders / chefs communautaires locaux 
 
      
Personnes appartenant à votre propre groupe 
ethnique 
 
      
Votre famille élargie et amis proches 
 
      
Des citoyens ordinaires 
 
      
Les élus locaux 
 
      
 
37.* Depuis que vous avez été élu député, avez-vous été approché par un groupe spécifique de lobbying?  
 
o Non, je n'ai jamais été approché par un tel groupe de pression 
 
o Oui, par des personnes faisant du lobbying pour le compte de 
- Une entreprise 
- Un syndicat 
- Une ONG 




38.* Si vous avez reçu des groupes de pression, dans quelle mesure avez-vous pris en compte les questions pour 
lesquelles ils vous ont contacté en tant que député? 
 
o La plupart du temps, j'ai défendu les intérêts pour lesquels ils se battent  
o Parfois, j'ai défendu les intérêts pour lesquels ils se battent  




34. Si 20 chefs / leaders traditionnels de votre circonscription venaient vous demander un service quelconque : 
combien de personnes sur 20 vous demanderaient de faire quelque chose sur : 
 
 
Un peu d’aide financière personnelle, payement de 
frais, de factures, un prêt ou un emploi  
Aucun 1-2 5  10  15 Tous 
Des préoccupations de la communauté/ du groupe 
ethnique, ou des questions avec les autorités locales 
      
Des événements concernant la communauté, les 
funérailles, les mariages ou d’autres choses du même 
genre 
      
Aider les groupes vulnérables (orphelins, personnes 
âgées, handicapés) 
      
Des projets de développement communautaire       
Parler des besoins de la circonscription dans les 
médias ou au parlement 
      
Points de vue, politiques et leadership de votre parti 
 
      
une loi ou politique particulière au parlement 
 
      
Le contrôle du gouvernement / abus de pouvoir       
 
35. Si 20 chefs / leaders traditionnels de votre circonscription venaient vous demander un service quelconque : 
combien de personnes sur 20 vous demanderaient de faire quelque chose sur : 
 
 
Un peu d’aide financière personnelle, payement de frais, de 
factures, un prêt ou un emploi  
Aucun 1-2 5  10  15 Tous 
Des préoccupations de la communauté/ du groupe ethnique, 
ou des questions avec les autorités locales 
      
Des événements concernant la communauté, les funérailles, 
les mariages ou d’autres choses du même genre 
      
Aider les groupes vulnérables (orphelins, personnes âgées, 
handicapés) 
      
Des projets de développement communautaire       
Parler des besoins de la circonscription dans les médias ou 
au parlement 
      
Points de vue, politiques et leadership de votre parti 
 
      
Le contrôle du gouvernement / abus de pouvoir       




42. Depuis le début de ce mandat législatif en 2007, environ combien : 
 
De déclarations avez-vous faites au parlement 
 
Aucun 1-2 3-5  6-10  10+ 
De fois avez-vous fait des activités de contrôle de 
l’action de l'exécutif 
 
     
De fois êtes-vous retourné à votre circonscription      
D’amendements législatifs dans lesquels vous avez 
été impliqués 
 
     
Réunions de comités dans lesquels vous avez pris 
part au parlement 
     
Dans combien de réunions avec les ONG avez-vous 
été pour discuter de politiques? 
 
     
De fois avez-vous été dans les médias 
 
     
De funérailles, de mariages, de célébrations avez-
vous suivi dans votre circonscription 
     
De personnes de votre circonscription avez-vous 
essayé de rendre service, ou aider à trouver un emploi 




43. Je suis : 
o un homme  
o une femme 
  
44. J’ai........ Ans 
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La perception du rôle de député 
 
39. Dites-moi si vous êtes d'accord ou pas avec les déclarations suivantes sur le rôle d'un député.  
[A noter que l'on ne peut pas consacrer la plupart de son temps sur les trois choses] 
 
Un député est comme la mère ou le père de la circonscription et doit utiliser la plupart de son temps et de son 
énergie pour les besoins de sa circonscription 
o Je suis tout à fait d’accord 
o Je suis d’accord  
o Ni l’un ni l’autre  
o Je ne suis pas d’accord 
o Je ne suis pas du tout d’accord  
 
Un député est un législateur et devrait utiliser la plupart de son temps et de son énergie à voter des lois pour le 
pays  
o Je suis tout à fait d’accord  
o Je suis d’accord  
o Ni l’un ni l’autre  
o Je ne suis pas d’accord  
o Je désapprouve fermement 
 
Un député doit utiliser la plupart de son temps et de son énergie à contrôler les actions du président et du 
gouvernement et chercher à savoir comment ils dépensent les fonds 
o Je suis tout à fait d’accord  
o Je suis d’accord  
o Ni l’un ni l’autre  
o Je ne suis pas d’accord  
o Je ne suis pas du tout d’accord 
  
 
40. Dans un Mali idéal, qu’est-ce qui, selon vous, doivent être les trois plus importantes responsabilités des 
députés? 
o Soutenir les citoyens ordinaires par exemple avec des dons, des prêts, le payement des frais de scolarité  
o Être fidèle aux personnes qui ont soutenu sa campagne  
o Faire des dons à des groupes vulnérables dans la circonscription, des orphelins, des personnes âgées, 
handicapées  
o Réaliser des projets de développement dans la circonscription  
o Être fidèle aux positions de la direction du parti politique  
o Représenter la circonscription au parlement, faire des déclarations et être vu dans les médias  
o Contribuer à l’adoption de bonnes lois pour le pays  
o Contrôler le gouvernement pour éviter des abus de pouvoir   
 
41. Au Mali actuel, quelles sont selon vous les trois choses que les députés font réellement? 
o Soutenir les citoyens ordinaires par exemple avec des dons, des prêts, le payement des frais de scolarité  
o Être fidèle aux personnes qui ont soutenu leur campagne  
o Faire des dons à des groupes vulnérables dans la circonscription, des orphelins, des personnes âgées, 
handicapées  
o Réaliser des projets de développement dans la circonscription  
o Être fidèle aux positions de la direction du parti politique  
o Représenter la circonscription au parlement, faire des déclarations et être vu dans les médias  
o Contribuer à l’adoption de bonnes lois pour le pays  










42. Depuis le début de ce mandat législatif en 2007, environ combien : 
 
De déclarations avez-vous faites au parlement 
 
Aucun 1-2 3-5  6-10  10+ 
De fois avez-vous fait des activités de contrôle de 
l’action de l'exécutif 
 
     
De fois êtes-vous retourné à votre circonscription      
D’amendements législatifs dans lesquels vous avez 
été impliqués 
 
     
Réunions de comités dans lesquels vous avez pris 
part au parlement 
     
Dans combien de réunions avec les ONG avez-vous 
été pour discuter de politiques? 
 
     
De fois avez-vous été dans les médias 
 
     
De funérailles, de mariages, de célébrations avez-
vous suivi dans votre circonscription 
     
De personnes de votre circonscription avez-vous 
essayé de rendre service, ou aider à trouver un emploi 




43. Je suis : 
o un homme  
o une femme 
  
44. J’ai........ Ans 
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La perception du rôle de député 
 
39. Dites-moi si vous êtes d'accord ou pas avec les déclarations suivantes sur le rôle d'un député.  
[A noter que l'on ne peut pas consacrer la plupart de son temps sur les trois choses] 
 
Un député est comme la mère ou le père de la circonscription et doit utiliser la plupart de son temps et de son 
énergie pour les besoins de sa circonscription 
o Je suis tout à fait d’accord 
o Je suis d’accord  
o Ni l’un ni l’autre  
o Je ne suis pas d’accord 
o Je ne suis pas du tout d’accord  
 
Un député est un législateur et devrait utiliser la plupart de son temps et de son énergie à voter des lois pour le 
pays  
o Je suis tout à fait d’accord  
o Je suis d’accord  
o Ni l’un ni l’autre  
o Je ne suis pas d’accord  
o Je désapprouve fermement 
 
Un député doit utiliser la plupart de son temps et de son énergie à contrôler les actions du président et du 
gouvernement et chercher à savoir comment ils dépensent les fonds 
o Je suis tout à fait d’accord  
o Je suis d’accord  
o Ni l’un ni l’autre  
o Je ne suis pas d’accord  
o Je ne suis pas du tout d’accord 
  
 
40. Dans un Mali idéal, qu’est-ce qui, selon vous, doivent être les trois plus importantes responsabilités des 
députés? 
o Soutenir les citoyens ordinaires par exemple avec des dons, des prêts, le payement des frais de scolarité  
o Être fidèle aux personnes qui ont soutenu sa campagne  
o Faire des dons à des groupes vulnérables dans la circonscription, des orphelins, des personnes âgées, 
handicapées  
o Réaliser des projets de développement dans la circonscription  
o Être fidèle aux positions de la direction du parti politique  
o Représenter la circonscription au parlement, faire des déclarations et être vu dans les médias  
o Contribuer à l’adoption de bonnes lois pour le pays  
o Contrôler le gouvernement pour éviter des abus de pouvoir   
 
41. Au Mali actuel, quelles sont selon vous les trois choses que les députés font réellement? 
o Soutenir les citoyens ordinaires par exemple avec des dons, des prêts, le payement des frais de scolarité  
o Être fidèle aux personnes qui ont soutenu leur campagne  
o Faire des dons à des groupes vulnérables dans la circonscription, des orphelins, des personnes âgées, 
handicapées  
o Réaliser des projets de développement dans la circonscription  
o Être fidèle aux positions de la direction du parti politique  
o Représenter la circonscription au parlement, faire des déclarations et être vu dans les médias  
o Contribuer à l’adoption de bonnes lois pour le pays  














53. À votre avis, le mandat global accordé au parlement par la constitution malienne pour que vous puissiez 
effectuer vos tâches :  
o Est suffisant  
o devrait être augmenté  
o devrait être diminué 
 
54. À votre avis, en jetant un regard le processus budgétaire, les députés : 
o ont une influence suffisante pour modifier le budget national  
o n’ont pas d’influence suffisante pour modifier le budget national 
  
55. Est-ce que le gouvernement dépense l'argent pour des fins non autorisées par le Parlement?  
o Oui, cela est courant  
o Cela se produit, mais pas de façon régulière  
o Non, cela ne se produit pas 
  
56. À votre avis, les possibilités juridiques pour vous d'élaborer une proposition de loi sont : 
o suffisantes 
o devraient être augmentées  
o devraient être diminuées 
  
57. Si une majorité de députés au Parlement propose des amendements à un Projet de Lois spécifique, y a-t-il 
suffisamment d'instruments juridiques pour contraindre le gouvernement à prendre ces amendements en 
compte? 
o Oui, ils sont disponibles  
o Non, ces instruments doivent être augmentés 
o Non, mais cela ne me dérange pas 
 
58. Quand il s'agit du contrôle du gouvernement par le Parlement : 
o Les lois actuelles prévoient des possibilités suffisantes  






59. Quand il s'agit de questions orales et écrites posées par les députés à certains ministres, avec laquelle des 
affirmations suivantes êtes-vous d'accord?  
o Les ministres ne prennent pas la réponse à ces questions très au sérieux  
o Les ministres répondent aux questions posées, mais ne modifient presque jamais réellement leurs politiques 
en conséquence 
o Les ministres répondent aux questions et modifient également leurs politiques en conséquence 
  
 
60. Quand il s'agit de la mise en place de commissions parlementaires d'enquête, 
o Il est relativement facile de les mettre en place et le parlement l'a fait au cours des cinq dernières années  
o Il est relativement facile de les mettre en place mais le parlement ne l'a pas fait au cours des cinq dernières 
années  









45.* Je représente : 
o Une circonscription à prédominance urbaine  
o Une circonscription à prédominance rurale 
  

















48. Mon plus haut niveau de qualification scolaire est : 
o l’école primaire  
o l'école secondaire  
o l’école coranique / medersa  
o l’université  
o le troisième cycle 
  
49*. Quelle est votre religion ? 
o l’islam 




50. Combien de fois vous rendez- vous à l’église/la mosquée/autre sanctuaire ? 
o 1-2 fois/mois  
o Une fois par semaine  
o Un certain nombre de fois chaque semaine  
o Tous les jours 
  
 





52. À votre avis, quel genre de démocratie est le Mali aujourd'hui 
o Une démocratie totale  
o Une démocratie, avec des problèmes mineurs  
o Une démocratie avec des problèmes majeurs  














53. À votre avis, le mandat global accordé au parlement par la constitution malienne pour que vous puissiez 
effectuer vos tâches :  
o Est suffisant  
o devrait être augmenté  
o devrait être diminué 
 
54. À votre avis, en jetant un regard le processus budgétaire, les députés : 
o ont une influence suffisante pour modifier le budget national  
o n’ont pas d’influence suffisante pour modifier le budget national 
  
55. Est-ce que le gouvernement dépense l'argent pour des fins non autorisées par le Parlement?  
o Oui, cela est courant  
o Cela se produit, mais pas de façon régulière  
o Non, cela ne se produit pas 
  
56. À votre avis, les possibilités juridiques pour vous d'élaborer une proposition de loi sont : 
o suffisantes 
o devraient être augmentées  
o devraient être diminuées 
  
57. Si une majorité de députés au Parlement propose des amendements à un Projet de Lois spécifique, y a-t-il 
suffisamment d'instruments juridiques pour contraindre le gouvernement à prendre ces amendements en 
compte? 
o Oui, ils sont disponibles  
o Non, ces instruments doivent être augmentés 
o Non, mais cela ne me dérange pas 
 
58. Quand il s'agit du contrôle du gouvernement par le Parlement : 
o Les lois actuelles prévoient des possibilités suffisantes  






59. Quand il s'agit de questions orales et écrites posées par les députés à certains ministres, avec laquelle des 
affirmations suivantes êtes-vous d'accord?  
o Les ministres ne prennent pas la réponse à ces questions très au sérieux  
o Les ministres répondent aux questions posées, mais ne modifient presque jamais réellement leurs politiques 
en conséquence 
o Les ministres répondent aux questions et modifient également leurs politiques en conséquence 
  
 
60. Quand il s'agit de la mise en place de commissions parlementaires d'enquête, 
o Il est relativement facile de les mettre en place et le parlement l'a fait au cours des cinq dernières années  
o Il est relativement facile de les mettre en place mais le parlement ne l'a pas fait au cours des cinq dernières 
années  









45.* Je représente : 
o Une circonscription à prédominance urbaine  
o Une circonscription à prédominance rurale 
  

















48. Mon plus haut niveau de qualification scolaire est : 
o l’école primaire  
o l'école secondaire  
o l’école coranique / medersa  
o l’université  
o le troisième cycle 
  
49*. Quelle est votre religion ? 
o l’islam 




50. Combien de fois vous rendez- vous à l’église/la mosquée/autre sanctuaire ? 
o 1-2 fois/mois  
o Une fois par semaine  
o Un certain nombre de fois chaque semaine  
o Tous les jours 
  
 





52. À votre avis, quel genre de démocratie est le Mali aujourd'hui 
o Une démocratie totale  
o Une démocratie, avec des problèmes mineurs  
o Une démocratie avec des problèmes majeurs  










Le fonctionnement interne du Parlement malien 
 
61. À votre avis, les ressources financières qui sont à la disposition du Parlement sont : 
o suffisantes pour couvrir la plupart de mes responsabilités en tant que député  





62. À votre avis, le salaire et les indemnités versés aux membres du Parlement sont :  
o suffisants pour qu’ils s'acquittent de leurs devoirs  











64. Quand il s'agit de personnel de soutien, à votre avis, les députés :  
o ont assez de personnel de soutien, y compris le soutien administratif, juridique, de politiques  













66. Jusqu’où est-il important d’avoir la présidence d'une des commissions et pourquoi? 























61. Quand il s'agit de représenter les intérêts de votre circonscription au parlement et dans les médias : 
o Les lois actuelles prévoient des possibilités suffisantes 





61. Quand il s'agit d'aider votre circonscription grâce à des projets de développement communautaire : 
 











62. Le Mali passera en revue de nombreuses lois dans les années à venir, veuillez indiquer les trois réformes qui 
selon vous méritent une grande priorité 
 
o Améliorer les conditions légales pour permettre aux députés d'influencer la législation  
o Améliorer les conditions légales pour permettre aux députés de contrôler le gouvernement  
o Améliorer les conditions légales pour permettre aux députés de contribuer au développement de leur 
circonscription  
o Améliorer les conditions légales pour permettre aux députés de présenter les intérêts de leur circonscription 
au Parlement  
o Améliorer le traitement des membres du Parlement  
o Réduire les pouvoirs du président  
o Empêcher la législation qui interdit l’adoption de la transhumance  
o Modifier le système électoral 
o Adopter un système parlementaire au lieu d'un système semi-présidentiel 
o Adopter un régime présidentiel au lieu d'un système semi-présidentiel 
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70. Quand il s'agit de représenter les besoins de votre circonscription au parlement, c’est : 
o un avantage d'être député du mouvement majoritaire  
o un avantage d’être dans l'opposition  
o cela n'a pas vraiment d’importance que l’on soit de l'opposition ou de la majorité 
  





71. Quand il s'agit de voter ou d’amender des lois pour le pays c’est : 
 
o un avantage d'être député du mouvement majoritaire  
o un avantage d'être député du mouvement majoritaire  
o cela n'a pas vraiment d’importance que l’on soit de l'opposition ou de la majorité 
  
 





72. Quand il s'agit de contrôler l’action du gouvernement, c'est : 
 
o un avantage d'être député du mouvement majoritaire  
o un avantage d'être député du mouvement majoritaire  
o cela n'a pas vraiment d’importance que l’on soit de l'opposition ou de la majorité 
  






Consensus de ralliement 
 
67. Dans la période précédant les élections de 2007, il y avait un grand débat au sein de la plupart des partis soit 
pour présenter un candidat présidentiel ou pour soutenir le président sortant Touré. Votre parti a-t-il présenté son 
propre candidat à la présidentielle? 
 
o Oui  
o Non 
 
Quel a été selon vous l’impact de ce choix sur vos chances d'être élu comme député? 
o Mes chances ont augmenté  
o Pas d'impact significatif  











68. Si vous êtes dans l'opposition : Qu'est-ce que vous considérez être le plus important désavantage de votre 









Si vous êtes du «mouvement majoritaire »: Qu'est-ce que vous considérez comme l'avantage le plus important 








69. Quand il s'agit de créer des emplois et de développer votre circonscription, c'est : 
o un avantage d'être député du mouvement majoritaire  
o un avantage d’être dans l'opposition  
o cela n'a pas vraiment d’importance que l’on soit de l'opposition ou de la majorité 
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79. Qu'est-ce que vous considérez comme votre plus grande réalisation depuis que vous avez été (ré) élu en 
2007? 





80. Quel député, selon vous, a été capable de faire beaucoup pour tous les Maliens ou pour sa circonscription 
depuis 2002? 








73. Si vous voulez être efficace en tant que député au Mali, vous devez vous aligner sur la position du président 
républicain 
o Tout à fait d'accord  
o D'accord  
o Neutre  
o Pas d'accord  
o Pas du tout d’accord 
  
La discipline de parti 
 
74. S’agissant de votre groupe parlementaire, comment décririez-vous le niveau de la discipline de parti : 
o très élevé, nous devons garder la ligne du parti sur presque toutes les lois qui sont votées  
o c’est seulement sur un nombre limité de lois qu’on nous demande de rejoindre la ligne du parti  
o Nous sommes tout à fait libres de voter comme nous le souhaitons en tant que députés individuels 
  
75. Dans votre groupe parlementaire, qui a le plus d'influence sur la détermination de la ligne de parti? 
o Un débat ouvert entre les députés nous permet de nous prononcer sur la façon dont nous allons voter  
o Le chef du groupe parlementaire a une voix décisive  
o Le Comité exécutif national et chef du parti a une voix décisive  




76. Pour laquelle des tâches suivantes est-il important d'avoir une bonne relation avec le chef de votre groupe 
parlementaire? 
o Pour exercer mes fonctions législatives en tant que député  
o Pour représenter les intérêts de ma circonscription au niveau national  
o Pour le contrôle de l’action du gouvernement  
o Pour contribuer au développement de ma circonscription  
o Aucune 
  
77. En jetant un regard en arrière sur les deux dernières années de mandat, veuillez indiquer si le niveau de la 
discipline de parti a créé des obstacles pour vous :  
 
o Pour exercer mes fonctions législatives en tant que député  
o Pour représenter les intérêts de ma circonscription au niveau national 
o Pour le contrôle de l’action du gouvernement  
o Pour contribuer au développement de ma circonscription 
o Aucun 
 





78. Serait-il favorable pour vos chances d'être réélu en 2011 si vous êtes candidat du parti que vous représentez 
actuellement?  
 
o Oui, cela contribuerait à améliorer mes chances 
o Non, je ne pense pas que cela aurait une incidence sur mes chances 
o Non, cela pourrait même affecter négativement mes chances 
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The core part of the thesis deconstructs democracy’s contribution to Malian state legitimacy. 
After an exemplary transition in the early 1990s, Mali emerged as a poster child for democracy 
on the African continent.  
 In 2012, the country came within a hair’s breadth of reaching the status of a fully 
consolidated democracy according to Samuel Huntington’s institutional definition of two 
peaceful transfers of power through elections. In practice, disgruntled soldiers staged a chaotic 
military coup just before the elections that very same year. Democracy collapsed and Malian 
citizens actually welcomed the ousting of a highly discredited regime. In contrast with the 
country’s international reputation, popular satisfaction with the way democracy worked and 
how the political elites performed had both dwindled.  
 The assessment provided in this thesis is centred on three conceptual pillars upon which 
democracy’s contribution to state legitimacy (so-called input democracy) stands according to 
the literature: (1) political participation; (2) representation; and (3) accountability. In theory, 
democracy provides the institutions that connect people and their interests to the decision 
making process as well as the mechanism that ensure effective checks and balances. The 
analysis is limited to the functioning of Malian political parties and the party system (Chapter 
3); the legislature (Chapter 4); and local democratic institutions established following the 
ambitious decentralisation reforms in the 1990s (Chapter 5).  
 The thesis reveals that these prominent democratic institutions have not enhanced Malian 
state legitimacy as expected from their official mandates and in ways predicted by theory. Quite 
to the contrary, the democratic structure seems to have actually weakened the position of the 
state vis-à-vis other power poles in Mali’s heterarchical context.  
 Successive elections mobilised only small parts of the population and popular contact with 
elected officials remained highly restricted. Very basic but influential factors as language, 
education and religion consolidated the wide divide between the democratic system and the 
Malian demos. Political participation and representation centred on exclusive networks between 
national political elites, local power brokers and a small minority of citizens. These exclusive 
patterns of representation connected a few privileged to the state but alienated most citizens 
from the political centre. Popular frustration with the country’s political elites gradually 
increased. Yet, Malian democratic institutions largely failed to hold an increasingly discredited 
executive accountable and to channel rising levels of popular discontent. Scratching below the 
surface of Mali’s exemplary transition, the thesis illustrates remarkable institutional and 
political characteristics of the previous authoritarian era that prevailed under the democratic 
regime. Power continued to be concentrated in the Malian presidency and a considerable 
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Beyond Institutional Blueprints 
Hybrid security provision and democratic practice in Mali  
 
SUMMARY 
This Malian case study joins an expanding body of literature in the academic fields of political 
science, sociology, history, regional studies and anthropology that challenges prevailing state-
centred and institutional approaches to both political authority and legitimacy.  
 The first part of this thesis deconstructs Malian state authority. Classical views in the 
literature portray the state as the hierarchically supreme institutional locus of political authority 
in society. The state is on top of society and so it should be. The state monopoly on the 
legitimate use of violence constitutes a critical cornerstone of this classical definition. This 
thesis, however, illustrates the gradual emergence of a “heterarchical political order” in Mali. 
Instead of a hierarchically superior institution, the state increasingly operated as a “horizontal 
contemporary” of non-state actors in society. In this context, the state was but one of the 
institutions amongst many non-state equals involved in the exercise of public authority. The 
state shared key statehood functions with non-state actors. Hence, the analytical perspective 
shifts from state authority towards more hybrid forms of public authority.  
The thesis offers an historical assessment of hybrid security provision since Malian 
independence up until 2018. The analysis reveals that the Malian state increasingly relied on 
non-state armed groups to counter recurrent security threats in the northern regions. 
Transnational smuggling, kidnapping and terror networks played a prominent role in reshaping 
the power balance to the benefit of non-state actors. Based on these shaky foundations, state 
authority withered in the blink of an eye when a Tuareg rebellion revived and an opaque alliance 
of drug smugglers, radical Islamists and armed groups took control of almost two thirds of the 
national territory in Mali’s annus horribilis 2012 (Chapter 2). In the five-year period that 
followed the crisis, the heterarchical order only further anchored despite considerable 
international support geared towards rebuilding the Malian state. By 2018, Malian state 
authority was largely confined to the main urban centres and state expenditure reached a mere 
20 per cent of the national territory. A myriad of non-state actors, including traditional and 
religious leaders, armed groups, militias and self-defence groups instituted their authority 
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Voorbij Institutionele Blauwdrukken  




Dit proefschrift over Mali past binnen een bredere opkomende academische stroming in de 
politieke wetenschap, geschiedenis, sociologie, antropologie en regiostudies die een 
institutionele benadering van politieke autoriteit en legitimiteit in Afrika, en vooral de centrale 
rol die de staat hierbij wordt toegedicht, betwist en nuanceert.  
 Het eerste deel van de thesis gaat in op de autoriteit van de Malinese staat. De klassieke 
benadering van politieke autoriteit gaat uit van een hiërarchisch staatsmodel. De staat vormt de 
ultieme politieke autoriteit en staat als het ware boven andere instituties in de samenleving. Alle 
burgers binnen een nationaal grondgebied zijn gebonden en gehouden aan de autoriteit van de 
staat. Het geweldsmonopolie vormt één van de belangrijkste pijlers onder deze klassieke op de 
staat gerichte benadering. Dit onderzoek laat echter zien dat in Mali eerder een ‘heterarchisch’ 
staatsmodel tot stand is gekomen. Hierin neemt de staat geen hiërarchisch superieure positie in 
maar functioneert eerder als een horizontale gelijke van niet-statelijke instituties in de 
samenleving. De staat is sterk afhankelijk van deze niet-statelijke actoren bij het vervullen van 
haar publieke kerntaken. Het analytisch perspectief verschuift daarmee van staatsautoriteit naar 
publieke autoriteit.   
Het proefschrift illustreert dit aan de hand van een historische analyse van publieke 
dienstverlening op het gebied van veiligheid. Deze studie toont aan dat de Malinese staat steeds 
afhankelijker werd van niet-statelijke gewapende groepen om veiligheidsdreigingen in noord 
Mali het hoofd te bieden. Verschillende transnationale smokkel, kidnapping en 
terreurnetwerken droegen vervolgens bij aan een verschuiving van de machtsbalans in het 
voordeel van niet-statelijke gewapende groepen. Gestut op dit fragiele fundament, stortte de 
staatsautoriteit volledig in toen een hernieuwde Tuareg rebellie in 2012 uitbrak. Een alliantie 
van terreurgroepen, smokkelaars en kleinere gewapende groepen overvleugelde vervolgens 
deze revolte. In zeer korte tijd verloor de staat de controle over meer dan 2/3e van het Malinese 
grondgebied tijdens dit annus horribilis (Cf. Hoofdstuk 2). In de daaropvolgende periode van 
vijf jaar, verankerde de heterarchische orde zich alleen maar steviger in Mali ondanks de 
aanzienlijke internationale steun gericht op het versterken van de Malinese staat. Tegen het 
einde van 2018 was de autoriteit van de staat grotendeels beperkt tot de urbane centra. De 
staatsuitgaven bereikten slechts 20% van het nationale grondgebied. Een verscheidenheid aan 
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institutional imbalance between the different branches of government prevailed. One-party or 
one-coalition dominance in the party system and the near absence of a viable political 
opposition constituted another clear pattern of continuity that further exacerbated executive 
dominance. In a context of inaccessible and ineffective official democratic accountability 
mechanisms, citizens relied on non-state actors beyond – and often in opposition to – the state. 
The functioning of democratic institutions thus weakened the state and boosted non-state actors. 
Clearly, democracy did not emerge as the only game in Mali’s heterarchical town. In practice, 
most citizens continued to rely on non-state power poles who legitimised their authority in 
reference to other sources of legitimacy than the ballot. In addition to influential indigenous, 
patrimonial and religious sources, this thesis reveals that the ability to protect citizens became 
another critical source of legitimacy in the context of a deteriorating security situation. Citizens 
thus rely on multiple actors, both state and non-state, who legitimise their authority in a 
multidimensional way. In Mali’s heterarchical context, political legitimacy is established 
through the interplay between these different sources of legitimacy. Hence, the analytical 
perspective shifts from state legitimacy to public legitimacy. 
 This thesis thereby contributes to a growing body of literature that demonstrates the need to 
move beyond state centred institutional blueprints when analysing processes of public authority 
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politieke wetenschap, geschiedenis, sociologie, antropologie en regiostudies die een 
institutionele benadering van politieke autoriteit en legitimiteit in Afrika, en vooral de centrale 
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samenleving. De staat is sterk afhankelijk van deze niet-statelijke actoren bij het vervullen van 
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grondgebied tijdens dit annus horribilis (Cf. Hoofdstuk 2). In de daaropvolgende periode van 
vijf jaar, verankerde de heterarchische orde zich alleen maar steviger in Mali ondanks de 
aanzienlijke internationale steun gericht op het versterken van de Malinese staat. Tegen het 
einde van 2018 was de autoriteit van de staat grotendeels beperkt tot de urbane centra. De 
staatsuitgaven bereikten slechts 20% van het nationale grondgebied. Een verscheidenheid aan 
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institutional imbalance between the different branches of government prevailed. One-party or 
one-coalition dominance in the party system and the near absence of a viable political 
opposition constituted another clear pattern of continuity that further exacerbated executive 
dominance. In a context of inaccessible and ineffective official democratic accountability 
mechanisms, citizens relied on non-state actors beyond – and often in opposition to – the state. 
The functioning of democratic institutions thus weakened the state and boosted non-state actors. 
Clearly, democracy did not emerge as the only game in Mali’s heterarchical town. In practice, 
most citizens continued to rely on non-state power poles who legitimised their authority in 
reference to other sources of legitimacy than the ballot. In addition to influential indigenous, 
patrimonial and religious sources, this thesis reveals that the ability to protect citizens became 
another critical source of legitimacy in the context of a deteriorating security situation. Citizens 
thus rely on multiple actors, both state and non-state, who legitimise their authority in a 
multidimensional way. In Mali’s heterarchical context, political legitimacy is established 
through the interplay between these different sources of legitimacy. Hence, the analytical 
perspective shifts from state legitimacy to public legitimacy. 
 This thesis thereby contributes to a growing body of literature that demonstrates the need to 
move beyond state centred institutional blueprints when analysing processes of public authority 











belangen van de meerderheid. De toenemende frustraties met de politieke leiders werden echter 
nauwelijks gekanaliseerd door de afstandelijke en ineffectieve democratische kanalen.  
Onder de oppervlakte van de voorbeeldige transitie begin jaren 90 van de vorige eeuw, leefden 
enkele belangrijke institutionele en politieke kenmerken uit het autoritaire verleden voort 
tijdens het democratische tijdperk. Zo bleef de macht sterk geconcentreerd in handen van de 
president en was de machtsverhouding binnen de trias politica sterk in het voordeel van de 
uitvoerende macht. De dominantie van één partij of één coalitie in het partijsysteem en de 
afwezigheid van een noemenswaardige politieke oppositie, hetgeen sterk herinnerde aan de 
voormalige éénpartijstaat, versterkte de positie van de machthebbers nog meer. In een 
dergelijke context leunde de bevolking vooral op allerlei niet-statelijke actoren om de in 
diskrediet geraakte nationale leiders te controleren. Het functioneren van de democratische 
instellingen had daarmee een averechtse invloed. Het versterkte eerder de niet-statelijke actoren 
dan de legitimiteit van de staat in de context van Mali’s heterarchische politieke orde.  
 Derhalve ontwikkelde democratie zich in Mali dus zeker niet tot ‘the only game in town.’ In 
de praktijk bleef de meerderheid van de Malinese bevolking primair verbonden aan niet-
statelijke actoren die hun autoriteit legitimeerden op een hele andere basis dan middels 
verkiezingen. Inheemse, patrimoniale en religieuze bronnen bleven zeer invloedrijk. Meer 
recent kwam de basale capaciteit om bescherming te bieden aan burgers op als belangrijke basis 
van legitimiteit in een steeds onveiliger wordende context. De Malinese bevolking leunt dus op 
een grote verscheidenheid aan machthebbers, zowel statelijke als niet-statelijk, die hun macht 
op basis van sterk verschillende bronnen legitimeren. Het analytisch perspectief verschuift 
daarmee van staatslegitimiteit naar publiekslegitimiteit.     
 Hiermee sluit dit proefschrift aan bij een opkomende stroming in de wetenschappelijke 
literatuur die een brede benadering voorstaat bij het bestuderen van publieke autoriteit en 





non-statelijke actoren, waaronder traditionele en religieuze leiders, milities en 
zelfverdedigingstroepen consolideerden hun autoriteit in de rurale gebieden (Cf. Hoofdstuk 6). 
 Het hoofdonderdeel van dit proefschrift richt zich op het functioneren van enkele prominente 
democratische instituties en hun bijdrage aan het versterken van de legitimiteit van de Malinese 
staat. Na een voorbeeldige transitie in het begin van de jaren ’90 van de vorige eeuw, stond 
Mali lange tijd bekend als een schoolvoorbeeld van democratie op het Afrikaanse continent. In 
2012 kreeg het land zelfs bijna het stempel van een volwaardig geconsolideerde democratie 
volgens de institutionele definitie van Samuel Huntington die is gebaseerd op een tweevoudige 
electorale transitie van de macht. Maar kort voor de verkiezingen die dit zouden bewerkstelligen 
greep een groep ontevreden militairen de macht via een staatgreep. De democratie implodeerde 
in plaats van te consolideren. Malinese burgers verwelkomden de coup en het feit dat de zeer 
onpopulaire machthebbers waren verdreven. In tegenstelling tot Mali’s internationale reputatie, 
daalde de tevredenheid onder de bevolking over het functioneren van de democratie en de eigen 
machthebbers al jaren.   
 Dit onderzoek naar de invloed van de democratie op de legitimiteit van de Malinese staat 
richtte zich op drie hoofdonderdelen die in de literatuur worden onderscheiden: (1) politieke 
participatie; (2) representatie; en (3) verantwoording. In theorie garandeert een democratisch 
systeem de instituties die burgers en hun belangen verbinden aan besluitvormingsprocessen 
alsook de mechanismen voor noodzakelijke ‘checks en balances.’ De analyse in dit proefschrift 
beperkte zich tot de bijdrage van Malinese politieke partijen en het partijsysteem (Hoofdstuk 
3); het parlement (Hoofdstuk 4); en lokale democratische instituties opgericht middels de 
ambitieuze decentralisatie hervormingen (Hoofdstuk 5).  
 De analyse toont aan dat deze prominente democratische instituties de legitimiteit van de 
Malinese staat niet hebben versterkt conform hun officiële mandaat, noch volgens de 
verwachtingen vanuit de theorie. Integendeel, de democratische structuur lijkt eerder de positie 
van de staat te hebben verzwakt ten opzichte van niet-statelijke actoren in de context van Mali’s 
heterarchische politieke orde.  
 Opeenvolgende verkiezingen mobiliseerden slechts een zeer beperkt deel van de bevolking 
en contact tussen burgers en politieke vertegenwoordigers bleef minimaal. Basale maar 
invloedrijke factoren als taal, opleiding en religie droegen bij aan de grote kloof tussen het 
democratische systeem de Malinese demos. Politieke participatie en representatie waren 
gebaseerd op exclusieve elitaire banden tussen nationale elites, regionale invloedrijke leiders 
en een klein aantal burgers. Deze patronen van politieke mobilisatie en vertegenwoordiging 
verbonden een klein bevoorrecht deel van de bevolking aan de staat maar verwaarloosden de 
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